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ABSTRACT 
The dissertation aims to contribute to the body of research on firm strategies in the 
context of network externalities, in order to better understand firm level competitive 
behaviour. The dissertation specifically focuses on the interaction of different types of 
firms when the focal firms are competing for dominance in an evolving networked 
business system. The research question is: What are the drivers affecting competitive 
behaviour in a network externality context, and what are the firm and aggregate level 
consequences of the competitive actions? 
The study uses bibliometric methods to map the scientific discourse about the 
phenomenon. The mapping highlights the relevant theoretical approaches 
investigating the phenomenon, including the evolutionary perspective on economics 
and population ecology. Researchers of these approaches have identified positive and 
negative feedback mechanisms leading to different competitive outcomes. Positive 
feedback is associated with divergence and diversification, while negative feedback is 
associated with congruence, imitation, and competitive effects. The dissertation 
investigates the positive and negative mechanisms in an empirical setting. 
The investigation focuses on one business environment at the time of the commercial 
introduction of a new technology. The investigated period was the launch of digital 
television in the United Kingdom between 1998-2002, the era between the 
commercial launch and an industry shakeout. The study builds on data from 
interviews, press releases, trade journals, internet discussion fora and stock market 
information. With the case approach, the dissertation aims at offering a rich view of 
the field while subjecting it to methodological and data triangulation. The analysis 
proceeds from the case narrative to social network analysis, content analysis, and 
qualitative comparative analysis. 
The case evidence describes how firms engaged in intense, resource-draining 
competition, with an outcome of increased aggregate adoption rates. In contrast to 
earlier work on network externalities, the dissertation emphasises that firms imitate at 
an early stage of market creation. The study shows that all firms - including the 
industry leader - are inclined to follow competitors’ behaviour at a time of intense 
rivalry. Building on previous research and the case examination, a new competitive 
metaphor and an integrated model of network market competition are developed. The 
dissertation contributes to the understanding of firm strategies in the presence of 
significant network externalities and proposes implications for managers and policy 
makers.  
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tutkimus tarkastelee yritysstrategioita ympäristössä, jossa verkoston 
ulkoisvaikutukset ovat merkittäviä. Tavoitteena on paremmin ymmärtää yritysten 
kilpailukäyttäytymistä. Tarkastelussa huomio kohdistetaan yrityksiin, jotka pyrkivät 
johtoasemaan kehittyvässä ja verkottuneessa kilpailutilanteessa. Keskeiset 
tutkimuskysymykset ovat, mitkä tekijät vaikuttavat kilpailukäyttäytymiseen verkoston 
ulkoisvaikutusten muokkaamassa ympäristössä ja mitkä ovat kilpailullisten 
toimenpiteiden seuraukset yrityksen tasolla ja sitä laajemmin.  
Bibliometrisen menetelmän avulla tutkimus kartoittaa ilmiöstä käytyä tieteellistä 
keskustelua. Bibliometrinen kartta osoittaa ilmiöön liittyvät teoreettiset 
lähestymistavat, joihin kuuluvat mm. evolutionaarinen taloustiede ja 
populaatioekologia. Lähestymistapojen tutkijat ovat tunnistaneet positiivisen ja 
negatiivisen vaikutusmekanismin, joiden kilpailulliset tulemat ovat erilaisia. 
Positiivinen dynamiikka liittyy kasvuun ja erilaistumiseen. Kilpailun 
yhdenmukaistavat vaikutukset ja matkiminen liittyvät negatiiviseen dynamiikkaan. 
Tutkimus selvittää empiirisesti positiivisia ja negatiivisia vaikutusmekanismeja.  
Tutkimus tarkastelee liiketoimintaympäristöä tilanteessa, jossa uutta teknologiaa 
tuodaan markkinoille. Tutkimusajankohtana on digitaalisen television alkutaival Iso-
Britanniassa vuosina 1998-2002. Ajanjakso alkaa digitaalisen television kaupallisen 
toiminnan käynnistymisestä ja päättyy alan murrosvaiheeseen. Tutkimus rakentuu 
tiedoille, jotka on kerätty haastatteluista, lehdistötiedotteista, alan lehdistä, internetin 
keskustelusivustoilta ja pörssi-informaatiosta. Tutkimus lähestyy aihetta 
tapaustutkimuksen keinoin pyrkien tarjoamaan vivahteikkaan kuvan kohteesta, mutta 
alistaen sen samalla menetelmien ja tietolähteiden ristituleen. Tapauskertomuksen 
jälkeen analyysi etenee sosiaalisten verkostojen analyysiin, sisällön analyysiin ja 
vertailevaan laadulliseen analyysiin.  
Digitaalitelevisiomarkkinoiden kehitys kuvaa, kuinka yritykset osallistuivat 
intensiiviseen kilpailuun, joka kulutti niiden voimavaroja mutta samalla merkittävästi 
kiihdytti palvelun leviämistä. Poiketen vallitsevasta verkoston ulkoisvaikutusten 
tutkimuksesta tämä tutkimus näyttää kuinka yritykset imitoivat toisiaan markkinoiden 
rakentamisen alkuvaiheessa. Tutkimus osoittaa kuinka yrityksillä, mukaan lukien 
myös alan johtavalla yrityksellä, on taipumus ankarassa kilpailussa seurata toinen 
toisiaan. Työssä kehitetään verkostokilpailun malli, joka perustuu tämän tutkimuksen 
tarkastelukohteen analyysiin ja muuhun aikaisempaan tutkimukseen. Tutkimus auttaa 
parantamaan ymmärrystä yritysten strategioista ympäristössä, jossa verkoston 
ulkoisvaikutukset ovat merkittäviä. Tutkimus päätyy esittämään suosituksia 
yritysjohdolle ja muille päättäjille. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background    
A recent European Union study on the diffusion of digital television reported that the 
spontaneous firm strategies of independent firms may lead to market failures, 
“…these structural factors prevent the market players from acting in accordance with 
the general interest and even with their own long-term interest in some cases” (BIPE, 
2002).  
The observation above is one possible aggregate-level consequence of network 
externalities, or network effects. A service or product creates externalities when the 
benefit to the individual user increases with the total number of network participants 
(Rohlfs, 1974). Network externalities are typical in information technology (Shapiro 
& Varian, 1999b). Direct externality occurs when the number of users directly 
influences a product’s utility as, for example, in telecommunication networks (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985; Economides, 1996). Indirect network externality is present when the 
demand for a product is indirectly affected by the availability of complementary 
products (e.g. Katz & Shapiro, 1985; e.g. Economides, 1996; Gupta et al., 1999).  
It has been shown that network evolution and adoption patterns are different when 
strong network externalities are involved, when compared to individual products or 
traditional markets (e.g. Oren & Smith, 1981; Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 
1986b; Arthur, 1989; Church & Gandal, 1992; Suarez, 2004). Despite strong efforts, 
research on network evolution has not yet been able to bridge some important gaps. 
These gaps include the interactions of multiple, overlapping networks (Powell et al., 
2005); relationships among different types of participants (Gupta et al., 1999; 
Venkatraman & Lee, 2004), and the nature of their performance (Majumdar & 
Venkataraman, 1998; Gallagher & Park, 2002).  Empirical research linking firms’ 
network attributes and their relationship to competitive actions is claimed to be 
practically non-existent (Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1994; Wade, 
1995; Brynjolfsson & Kemerer, 1996; Cottrell & Koput, 1998; Majumdar & 
Venkataraman, 1998; Kauffman et al., 2000; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Kauffman 
& Walden, 2001; Le Nagard-Assayag & Manceau, 2001; Schilling, 2002). 
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The dissertation belongs to the normative tradition of the firm strategic research 
stream. The evolutionary perspective has offered a significant contribution to strategy 
studies and has the potential to synthesise many different theoretical approaches in the 
field of strategy (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996; Nelson & Winter, 2002). The 
evolutionary approaches are at the centre of a major debate concerning the relative 
importance of selection versus adaptation in explaining organisational change and 
survival (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Burgelman, 1991). 
The evolutionary perspective on economics (Nelson & Winter, 1973, 1974; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) and population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984) relate to 
network externalities, as they consider the dynamics in firm, industry and 
technological change and evaluate path-dependent mechanisms. The evolutionary 
perspective on economics has developed ideas about how some patterns of behaviour 
are further strengthened because of a positive feedback mechanism (Nelson & Winter, 
1982), whilst population ecology has given an insight into the growth and survival of 
the firm population (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Carroll, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 
1984).  
The dissertation attempts to contribute to research on competitive behaviour in the 
network externality environment. The results support earlier findings that markets 
tend to act speculatively in a network externalities context (e.g. Besen & Farrell, 
1994), but contrasts with the view of how the expected mechanisms actually work. 
The dissertation suggests that previous network externality modelling attempts have 
not fully captured how competitors’ perceptions determine the ‘rules of the game’ 
(Porac et al., 1995). It has been suggested that network externalities lead to rapid 
market ‘tipping’ in which an early leader firm quickly gains an advantage, i.e. 
adoption rates increase significantly because potential adopters strongly favour a firm 
which is seemingly winning the competition (e.g. Besen & Farrell, 1994). In the 
dissertation I will establish how firms anticipate others’ actions and change their own 
behaviour, with significant implications for the competitive outcomes. During 
competition, all competing firms try to manage the expectations of other network 
participants by giving an impression of their own viability. The case evidence 
describes how firms engage in intense, resource-draining competition, which results 
in increased aggregate adoption rates. Intensive competition amongst the major firms 
poses a dilemma for managers when they value (ex-ante) the negative aspects of 
  3 
competitive pressures and the positive network effects of growth. Reasons for 
selecting (ex-post) inappropriate competitive strategies can be understood in terms of 
the cognitive perception of markets.  
The dissertation illustrates that positive and negative feedback effects can have a 
mutually strengthening role. In the short term, the shared expectations of positive 
feedback intensify competition, causing strong negative feedback. Actions aimed at 
improving one’s own position are systematically pre-empted. However, in the long 
term, as the weakest firms exit, the positive feedback effects are fully unleashed. The 
winning networks seem to enjoy the benefits predicted by network externality 
theorists, just later than expected. The losing networks have their losses magnified, 
because the stakes are higher and the game takes longer. By showing the dynamism 
and interplay of negative and positive feedback mechanisms in the evolution of an 
industry, the dissertation contributes to population ecology as well as to the 
evolutionary perspective on economics. As a theoretical advancement, a new industry 
level metaphor called the ‘positive feedback spring’ is suggested. The spring 
describes how negative feedback seemingly delays or eliminates the positive feedback 
effect. When the competitive period ends, positive feedback finally gains its full 
effect, like a spring relieved from the initial pressure. In competition, the positive 
feedback spring would appear to work to the advantage of the industry leader.  
I examined one business environment at the time of the commercial introduction of a 
new technology. The empirical reference of this dissertation is the arrival of digital 
television. The dissertation also has descriptive value because the researched subject 
is still emerging and not yet well understood. The dissertation elaborates on the 
concept of network externalities and contributes by extending the research on the 
effects of network externalities on firm strategy by empirical investigation. An 
investigation of the diffusion of digital television is of critical importance to the 
broadcasting and television industry in developed market economies. In addition to 
economic issues, the success or failure of the new technology will also have a wide 
impact on culture and society as a whole. A better understanding of different 
rationales and their market consequences will advise the business community and 
policy makers in their decision-making. The data used combined press releases, trade 
journals, internet discussion forums, stock market information, and interviews. 
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1.2 Research problem  
Some of the few contemporary empirical studies investigating firm strategies in the 
network externality context have suggested that the creation of a viable installed base 
of customers and complementary products is crucial for a firm’s success (e.g. 
Schilling, 1999; Gallagher & Park, 2002). Economists have also predicted that a 
market with significant network externalities will often act speculatively, helping the 
first-mover firm but destroying others (Besen & Farrell, 1994). Taking these 
propositions together, a rational challenger would quickly and decisively build its own 
network, while the other firms should response to them rapidly, or even pre-
emptively. This implies a very dynamic, or even chaotic market development, where 
every firm has to outpace others.  
There would be serious consequences if this were to fully be the case. However, there 
are some serious gaps in the network externality work, which call into question the 
validity of the advice. It has been suggested that the previous work has not been able 
to provide an understanding of the relative importance of various factors in 
competition (Suarez, 2004), the relationships among different type of participants 
(Gupta et al., 1999; Venkatraman & Lee, 2004) and the nature of their performance 
(Majumdar & Venkataraman, 1998; Gallagher & Park, 2002). Kauffman and Walden 
(2001) describe that “…there is a need for additional research on where network 
externalities exist and how they affect the actors involved” (Kauffman & Walden, 
2001).  
The criticism above aims to highlight the ambiguity of the factors affecting firms, 
especially when there are many kinds of participants. Relationships between different 
types of firms may add a new dimension to competition. There is no clear 
comprehension of how firms act and react in networked competition. The interaction 
of multiple, overlapping networks is a major but neglected area of study (Powell et 
al., 2005).  
In summary, I suggest that there is not a sufficient understanding of what factors are 
guiding a firm’s competitive behaviour, how firms actually act, and how they react to 
other firms’ actions when there are significant network externalities present. This 
further implies that there is no clarity about the outcomes of the competitive actions 
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and reactions. This dissertation attempts to fill the gap by developing a model and an 
explanation of firm strategies in the network externality setting that utilises previous 
theoretical work and my subsequent case analysis. The research problem can be 
defined as a question:  
What are the drivers affecting a firm’s competitive behaviour in a network 
externality context, and what are the firm and aggregate level consequences of 
these actions? 
1.3 Research objectives 
The research objective is to investigate a firm’s competitive behaviour, a task that is 
approached sequentially. The first objective is to understand the setting in question. 
The point of departure is the concept of network externalities. Network externality is a 
term for a particular phenomenon, as well a stream of research investigating and 
theorising about it. Originally, economists and scientists studying industrial 
organisation observed network externality. The economists’ tradition was focused on 
the macro-level consequences of network externalities, whilst research in the fields of 
industrial organisation and financing focused on the causes of the phenomenon 
(Economides, 1996). Much of the work in a similar context has been theoretically 
approached within the framework of economics, leaving limited attention on 
empirical examination (Schilling, 2002). In order to comprehend the discussion about 
network externality, a literature review is conducted using both bibliometric methods 
and more traditional qualitative literature research. The objective is to describe how 
the field of network externalities is defined in the most central books and articles, to 
understand their core ideas and findings, to find out how the research topic links to 
other relevant scientific discourses, and to review two relevant theoretical research 
approaches; the evolutionary perspective on economics, and population ecology. The 
effort also produces a conceptualisation of different types of actors and their 
relationships. The objective of the nomological map is to crystallise the theoretical 
insights found in the literature review. The nomological map acts as a theoretical case 
(Yin, 2003), providing guidance for additional research review and empirical 
examination. A separate, methodological objective that is approached in the first 
sections of the dissertation is to offer one way to conduct an extensive bibliometric 
study. 
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The second major objective is to review the literature related to the evolutionary 
perspective on economics, and to population ecology. I introduce theory-derived 
mechanisms of positive and negative feedback, with their reasoning and implications. 
This discussion acts to focus the empirical investigation.   
Thirdly, a case study is conducted to empirically investigate real-world firm actors 
and their observable strategies. The case study offers a description of the behaviour of 
different kind of firms and customers, and their interactions. Qualitative and 
quantitative data is used. Different analyses of firms’ actions are used to evaluate their 
behaviour and its drivers, and firm- and aggregate-level consequences. The objective 
is to describe how the competitive events and processes occurred.  
Finally, I evaluate how the findings relate to existing theories. The objective is to link 
the empirical case and the theoretical case, to revise the nomological map, and to 
elaborate upon how the key mechanisms work. The discussion covers the applicability 
of the network externality concepts, and theoretical work on the evolutionary 
perspective in economics and population ecology. The section also covers managerial 
cognitions, a framework emerging from the findings, which is not covered in the 
review section.  
1.4 Research approach and methods 
Network externalities and evolution use concepts that are facets of the same 
phenomenon (Suarez, 2004). Even with this relatedness, there are no clear 
predecessors using evolutionary approaches with the network externality concepts and 
context. Most of the concepts in the dissertation have originally been developed by 
network externality theorists, while empirical attention will be focused on dynamics 
investigated according to the traditions of the evolutionary perspective on economics 
and population ecology.   
One of the objectives of the dissertation is explanation building, for which a single-
case method is usable (Yin, 2003). The object of analysis is firm strategy, which is 
observable to the public as actions and news events (VandeVen, 1992; Das & Van de 
Ven, 2000). Two major concerns have been separating ‘noise’ from the actual 
phenomenon, and finding unbiased and reliable data. To overcome these problems I 
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initially relied on unobtrusive data-gathering methods (Golder & Tellis, 1993; Tellis 
& Golder, 1996; Gallagher & Park, 2002). Interviews were then used for further data 
triangulation in order to check validity (Jick, 1979; Cunningham, 1997; Yin, 2003).  
Both qualitative and quantitative data were used to overcome the small number of 
observations and observed organisations, and as a way to add richness to the analysis 
(Barron, 1998). The investigated data objects are press releases, trade magazines, and 
stock market information (mostly in electronic form), and interviews. The 
nomological map derived from the literature is revised to reflect the findings from the 
case (Yin, 2003).  
The literature section is built on the quantitative bibliometric work, whilst 
acknowledging the limits of this approach. A methodological objective, which can be 
judged to be a by-product of this research process, is to demonstrate a logical process 
for using the bibliometric method in literature survey.    
The investigation is done under the premises of (critical) empiricism, as reviewed by 
Jensen in the work of, e.g. Roy Bhaskar. These premises are, firstly, ontological 
realism, which assumes the existence of reality as limit condition, or regulatory ideal; 
secondly, epistemological relativism, which assumes that knowledge depends on a 
reiterated sequence of perceptions, cognitions, and inferences; and thirdly, the 
exercise of judgmental rationality in science. The last point emphasises that after 
continuous comparisons of alternative accounts of reality, the scientists and scientific 
field ought to end with fallible judgments about what to do next (Jensen, 2002). For a 
realist, causal laws are separated from patterns of empirical events, and regularities 
are insufficient for the identification of a causal law. The role of the social scientist is 
to construct the conditions wherein actual domains can be merged with the real 
domain. Explanatory idiographic studies are “epistemologically valid, because they 
are concerned with the clarification of the structures and their associated generative 
mechanisms, which have been contingently capable of producing the observed 
phenomena” (Tsoukas, 1989).  
The research process has used several modes of inference. Deductionist inference is 
the explicit model of reasoning used in evaluating the nomological maps. My research 
project originated when I was puzzled by these phenomena, having myself worked in 
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the same industry. This suggests that induction contributed to my pre-understanding 
of the problem. Forming maps and modifying explanations are abductions as they 
involve creating new rules, explaining why particular facts have been encountered 
(Jensen, 2002). 
1.5 Terminology 
The terminology in this dissertation consists both of terms widely used in 
management literature, and concepts that are more closely related to economics or 
communication studies. There follows a brief discussion of the basic concepts, while 
those key concepts closely linked to their respective theoretical framework are 
defined and discussed in the literature review.  
1.5.1 Networks 
A network is a composite of actors and a pattern of relationships that tie them together 
(Iacobucci & Hopkins, 1992).  More formally, networks are composed of links that 
connect nodes, which are either one-way or two-way networks. In two-way networks 
the end-nodes (A, B) are allowed to connect (AB and BA). In a one-way network, 
there is only one direction of flow (Economides, 1996).  
Physical networks include communication and transport systems (Katz & Shapiro, 
1985). A ‘virtual’ network (Katz & Shapiro, 1994), or ‘hardware-software’ (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985) describes a system of linked durable goods with interdependent 
demand. ‘Virtual,’ or ‘hardware-software’ networks can illustrate communities of 
consumers (Brynjolfsson & Kemerer, 1996). For example, Gandal (1994; 1995) used 
this paradigm when studying the users of a file compatibility standard. A network 
may include both firms and persons, typically end customers (Arthur, 1996). 
In management literature networks describe several aspects of product-consumer 
relationships, and inter-firm or personal relationships. Since the 1980’s firm networks 
have been widely studied as a tool for managing environmental uncertainty and 
satisfying resource needs (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). In his article on embeddedness 
in social relations, Granovetter (1985) clarified how personal relations and social 
networks create trust and discourage malfeasance. Jarillo (1988) conceptualized 
strategic networks as a mode of organisation. Participation in a strategic network is 
  9 
seen as a managerial action to position a firm competitively in a market. Firms 
involved are seen as distinct, independent, but related, with a central ‘hub’ firm as a 
leader and creator. For Jarillo (1988), establishing a strategic network gives a 
possibility to organise more effectively by lowering transaction costs.  
Podolny and Stuart (1995) and Podolny et al. (1996) use a technological network to 
describe the constraints on a firm, and to conceptualise organisation-specific niches. 
In technological networks the nodes are technological innovations, and the ties 
represent commonalities linking innovations to their antecedents. The network has an 
explicit time dimension. A network as a governance form of organisation is “any 
collection of actors that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one 
another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organisational authority to arbitrate 
and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange…”(Podolny & Page, 1998).  
 In the present study, the term network is used conceptually in accordance with Katz 
and Shapiro (1985; 1994). The term comprises both physical and ‘virtual’ networks.  
The Podolny and Page (1998) definition of network organisation is similar, except for 
the inclusion of customers. In this study, the network consists of firms, their products 
and services, and consumers, in exchange relations. Different suppliers provide a total 
product offering. The offering links suppliers and consumers. A firm, its products, or 
a consumer, can be involved with one or several networks, or be an outsider to the 
network.  
1.5.2 Network externalities, or network effects  
Network externalities, or network effects, model the benefits to a customer of joining 
a wide network. Rohlfs (1974) introduced network externalities in an article on 
interdependent demand for communications services. In this example, the number of 
telephone owners in a telecommunications network directly influences the product’s 
utility. A rising number of customers increased the value of the network for each 
participant (Rohlfs, 1974; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). An indirect network externality 
arises in a situation in which the demand for a focal product is affected by the 
availability of its complementary products (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 
1986a). Liebowitz and Margolis argue that indirect network externalities describe the 
market situation poorly. Often, the reason for network growth is not due to 
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externalities, but to technological progress which is lowering the costs of inputs 
(Liebowitz & Margolis, 1994, 1995). They also discuss the different implications of 
terms ‘network externalities’ and ‘network effects’, which are both used. Due to its 
popularity, the term network externality/externalities is primarily used here. There is a 
wider discussion of network externalities in the literature review.   
1.5.3 Market 
Market boundaries have been widely investigated using several frameworks. 
According to Geroski (2001), economists consider products that have a high cross-
elasticity of demand as belonging to same markets; a quite narrow definition 
(Geroski, 2001). Carroll and Hannan (1995) state that organisational ecologists view 
the market as a socially constructed phenomenon, and that all of the potential 
competitors are included in the population (Carroll & Hannan, 1995). The populations 
can be defined in the context of the particular research interest (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977). The socially constructed boundaries are result of firms observing each other’s 
actions and defining their positions in relation to each other (Porac et al., 1989; Porac 
et al., 1995). Researchers in management literature tend to describe the market of a 
particular firm, which is consistent with population ecology (Geroski, 2001). In this 
study, I follow the management and firm strategy literature tradition that has is 
especially concerned with firms and their relationships. Baum and Korn (1996) 
described their approach as being one in which “every firm in an industry is 
conceived to occupy a potentially unique market domain – defined by activity in 
various product-client markets – that delineates its locations in a multi-market 
resource base” (Baum & Korn, 1996). In the case study of this work, United Kingdom 
viewers demand different products and services from the television industry. The 
demand of final products and derived demand is affected by the different participants, 
and the markets are not independent from the firms operating there. Some participants 
are producers as well as traders and consumers in the market (Geroski, 2001).  
1.5.4 Technology 
Technology is understood as artefacts and knowledge that together serve a functional 
need (Das & Van de Ven, 2000). The evaluation criteria for a particular technology 
have traditionally been seen as being independent from the actions of the firm (Das & 
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Van de Ven, 2000; Dickson et al., 2001; Lee & O'Connor, 2003). This view stresses 
the product related aspects (Lee & O'Connor, 2003) or technical features (Das & Van 
de Ven, 2000). On the other hand, technology as a social construct is evaluated 
through the interactions of the firm and other participants (Das & Van de Ven, 2000). 
The latter perspective, emphasising the institutional, or extrinsic aspects (Das & Van 
de Ven, 2000; Lee & O'Connor, 2003), is also followed in this study.  
1.6 Limitations of scope and key assumptions 
This dissertation focuses on firm strategies and actions at the time of the commercial 
introduction of a new technology. Suarez (2004) divides competition for technology 
dominance into five phases. The first milestone, ‘R&D build-up,’ denotes the 
beginning of the competition, with an organisation pioneering applied research and 
development. The second phase, ‘technical feasibility,’ begins when the first working 
prototype emerges. ‘Creating the market’ starts from the launch of the first 
commercial product, and ‘decisive battle’ begins when a clear early front-runner 
appears. The start of ‘post-dominance’ denotes the time when one alternative becomes 
a dominant design (Suarez, 2004). Following Suarez (2004), the dissertation focuses 
on phases termed ‘creating the market’ and ‘decisive battle,’ and the emergence of 
‘post-dominance’.  
The empirical context is the first years of digital television in the U.K. consumer 
markets, which should act as a representative example of network externalities 
(particularly indirect network externalities). Information technology is a widely used 
scope when investigating network externalities (Shapiro & Varian, 1999a). The 
chosen empirical scope imposes certain biases and might set limits on the wider 
application of results. The possibilities to participate in the adoption of innovation 
might be more limited in the television industry, because of the worldwide economic 
difficulties in television markets during the period in which the research was set. The 
broadcasting and television industry is also characterised by significant regulation, 
which affects competition in various parts of programming and distribution.   
While the dissertation provides a discussion of the importance of complementary 
products and services, a more in-depth investigation is limited to the major 
companies. The investigated time period is relatively short, whereas evolutionary and 
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ecological framework approaches have typically investigated longer time frames (e.g. 
Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). However some proponents of these frameworks do claim 
that qualitative inspection and shorter periods are suitable when investigating 
particular phases in organisational development (see e.g. Barron, 1998). 
The unit of analysis is firm competitive strategy, manifesting as patterns of observable 
actions (VandeVen, 1992; Das & Van de Ven, 2000). Observations are carried out by 
examining retrieved firm announcements and reported news stories. The method is 
chosen to give a reliable account of the facts as they happened. The focus is on events 
evidenced by the public outside of a particular organisation. There is bias in this 
method, because there is more information available about firms in which the public 
has a wider interest. These include large companies, publicly listed companies, and 
companies with a state interest, while small firms receive less attention. Retrospective 
interviews were conducted to correct this bias and to complement the case 
description. Their expert opinion provided a narrative that focused on the most 
intensive phases of competition. Various sources of information were used during 
data gathering in order to provide triangulation. Efforts to combine different methods 
and data sources do have the drawback of drawing resources away from a greater 
depth of analysis or a superior command of methodology. 
1.7 Structure of the dissertation  
This first chapter sets the research question, and clarifies the central concepts and 
methods in this study.  Theoretical and phenomenon related literature will be 
reviewed in chapter 2. The review of the network externality phenomenon uses 
bibliometric methods in describing the discussion relating to network externality, and 
then maps the discussion into the wider framework. The insights from the previous 
research will be further elaborated into a nomological map. The research approaches 
of the evolutionary view of economics and population ecology will be further 
discussed. Chapter 3 clarifies the research setting and methods. Chapter 4 is an 
empirical account of digital diffusion in the United Kingdom, and is followed by a 
summary of results in chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides a more elaborate synthesis, 
including a nomological map of the phenomenon. A discussion of the contributions of 
the study and suggestions for further research conclude the dissertation. 
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2 LITERATURE RESEARCH 
This chapter aims to map and review the relevant research. A methodological 
objective of this dissertation is to suggest a new bibliometric approach for literature 
reviews. The methodological contribution lies in a stepwise, unobtrusive mapping of 
core literature within its wider context. The benefits and drawbacks of the method 
used are discussed in this section and the appendices. The five stages of the literature 
research consist of both qualitative and quantitative elements. 
Firstly (chapter 2.1), the bibliometric method is presented. The bibliometric method 
produces an identification of the de facto structuring of the discourse related to the 
phenomenon (Parvinen, 2003). Most of the information about the data retrieval 
processes and methodological details is left to the appendices. 
Secondly (chapter 2.2), I conduct a bibliometric mapping in order to link research on 
network externalities to its wider context. Co-citation relationships emerge between 
the network externalities discussion and other theoretical frameworks in social 
sciences. The stage produces an illustration of how the network externality discussion 
is connected to the wider discourse on firm and organisation. Visualising the links 
provide information about the relative isolation of network externalities and other 
fields. The scientific map suggests that studies on innovation and market structure act 
as a figurative intellectual link or bridge between the network externality group and 
the wider community.  
In the third stage (chapter 2.3), an attempt is made to map the discourse around 
network externalities. The mapping of the network externality discussion is done 
without theoretical preconditions using bibliometric tools, and is focused on the 
phenomenon-related work. The retrieved documents are clustered, and the contents of 
those clusters are described.  
Fourthly (chapter 2.4), I will explain the insights of the retrieved major documents 
with some newer research. The work on network externalities is summarised, and 
visualised in a nomological map. The map is a conceptual framework to guide my 
empirical examination later in the study.  
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In the fifth stage (chapter 2.5), two theoretical frameworks investigating positive and 
negative mechanisms are reviewed. The evolutionary perspective on economics 
(Nelson & Winter, 1973, 1974; Nelson & Winter, 1982) and population ecology 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Carroll, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 1984) emerged in the 
first section of literature research, and have the potential to guide the following case 
study. There is an overlap between the insights of the network externality section and 
the presentation of these theoretical frameworks. The frameworks advise on what type 
of information to look for in the empirical examination.  
The structure of the literature research aims to give the reader a view of the history of 
the assumptions and definitions of the topic, and also to serve as an attempt to justify 
the later choices made in the dissertation (Hart, 1998). With this procedure I have 
wanted to describe the substantive research, and its relationship to the selected 
theoretical frameworks. To restate in metamorphic terms, I use the concepts offered 
by the substantive researchers as labels or boxes, which are later filled with the ideas 
generated by the theoretical frameworks.   
2.1 Bibliometric method  
In order to carefully map out the scientific landscape, this literature research uses a 
stepwise procedure. This chapter describes the methodology of bibliometric research, 
which has been widely used in social science (Ratnatunga & Romano, 1997). 
Bibliometrics, or bibliometric research processes, uses information on authors’ names, 
origins, titles, publication outlets, dates, and other quantitative information to re-
structure this data for different purposes (Weinstock, 1971). The importance of the 
method in structuring scientific discussion has risen with the general expansion of 
research (Oliver & Ebers, 1998). Following most authors, the words ‘reference’ and 
‘citation’ are used here interchangeably (Osareh, 1996a). 
The most popular affiliations or cited documents can be described as the major 
building blocks in the discourse. Citations can be used as indicators of present and 
past activity in discovery and creativity (e.g. Garfield, 1955; Garfield et al., 1964; 
Small, 1973; Garfield et al., 1978). An approach called citation analysis is a 
bibliometric method that uses reference citations found in texts (e.g. Garfield et al., 
1978). The existence of a citation is taken as a measure of the significance allocated to 
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the reference or its author. A citation can be thought of as a symbol that an author 
wants to give to his written idea (Small, 1978).  
 Co-citation is a link between two documents that is created by later documents. The 
cited documents are closely related to each other if they are cited in the same articles 
(Small, 1973; Cawkell, 1976; Garfield et al., 1978). Different patterns of citations 
may be seen as different discussion streams. Co-citations emerge and are later 
superseded by the actions of a community of specialists who are themselves writing 
on the matter (Garfield et al., 1978). The changing linkages can illustrate the changing 
pattern of scholarly activity (Small, 1973; McCain, 1986).  
Research published in a valued scientific journal is evaluated as having more weight 
in the scientific discourse than that which appears in more practitioner-orientated 
journals, or in journals held in lower esteem (e.g. Parvinen, 2003). Therefore, citations 
in an article from an appreciated outlet help to form a better pattern of high-level 
scientific discussion than citations from the entire publication population.  
The use of citations as a basis for studying the state of science has faced some 
criticism (for reviews of this topic see e.g. MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 1989; Osareh, 
1996b). There are concerns relating to bias in citing, the measurement of only 
publicised articles and books, variations in citation rates, and the technical limitations 
of citing (MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 1989). Co-cited documents differ from many 
other networks, as their interaction does not continue. Information is shared in the 
citer articles, but the amount and quality of information is unknown. The citing author 
may have referenced in a positive or negative sense, whilst still appreciating its value 
in their article (Gmür, 2003). The growth of databases may have reduced the 
problems of Roman script, and especially English bias, which had earlier received 
much attention (e.g. MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 1989). Defenders of citation analysis 
have countered this issue by arguing that they represent ‘random noise’ with only a 
minor effect (Cawkell, 1976). Additionally, the size of data warehouses has grown in 
recent years, due to cheaper and more efficient technology. 
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2.1.1 Social network analysis in bibliometric research 
Social network analysis is an aid to analysing actors and their relationships in a 
networked system. It studies the attributes of pairs of individuals, including distances 
and similarities (Borgatti & Everett, 1997). Social network analysis provides a set of 
mathematical and visual techniques for analysing and visualising the structures of 
interactions among agents (Borgatti & Everett, 1997; Venkatraman & Lee, 2004).  
In bibliometric studies, social network analysis tools can indicate the different roles of 
documents in the network externality discourse. In this context, the nodes are cited 
documents and links are the citing articles. Social network analysis uses bibliometric 
data to also describe the importance of an individual document, author, or discipline. 
Citation analysis has been used with the tools for social network analysis in the social 
sciences (e.g. Oliver & Ebers, 1998; Phillips & Phillips, 1998; Parvinen, 2003).  
The questions of an individual’s centrality are of major importance in social network 
analysis. Centrality can be motivated by the idea that an individual close to others will 
have access to more information, status, power, prestige, or influence (Freeman et al., 
1991; Friedkin, 1991), or by the idea of centrality as betweenness on the paths of 
communication (Freeman, 1977; Freeman et al., 1991). The centrality measure is also 
a descriptive property of the network (Stephenson & Zelen, 1989), and is applicable 
when describing the structure of discourse, even with the difficulties of interpreting 
the results. 
The social network analysis method applied with bibliometric analysis is explained in 
more detail in Appendix 7.3, ‘Details on using social network analysis’.  
2.1.2 Bibliometric clustering 
Clustering a scientific discussion highlights its intellectual structure (Culnan, 1987). 
In clusters, the order of documents is re-arranged so that the most similar documents 
appear closest. More generally, clustering is an unsupervised classification of patterns 
(data items, observations, feature vectors) into groups. The methods are widely and 
differently used (Jain et al., 1999).  
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The major approaches are ‘bottom-up building’ of hierarchical agglomeration, and the 
‘top-down splitting’ of iterative partitioning. In the former, pairs are gradually joined 
in larger clusters, and it is this approach that has been the more popular of the two in 
use with co-citation data (McCain, 1990). Among the approaches, there are several 
methods for providing clusters, and consistency and interpretability can be seen as the 
most important factors in deciding particular method (McCain, 1990). Average link 
method was used for further analysis, because it produced clusters more continuously 
than the other hierarchical methods. Clustering methods are explained in more detail 
in Appendix 7.2.   
2.2 Network externalities as part of wider discussion   
The network externalities discussion is part of social sciences. In this chapter I will 
conduct a bibliometric study to map the network externalities topic in its wider 
context. The chapter attempts to show and understand how the network externality 
discussion is related to scientific streams on firm strategy and organisational science. 
Firstly, I describe the idiosyncrasies of the data retrieval process. This is followed by 
a mapping of the scientific texts, and a description of the groups containing texts that 
are related to each other by co-citations. Data retrieval process on this bibliometric 
study is found from Appendix 7.5.1   
As the aim was to locate the network externalities discussion in its broader context, all 
of the journals published in 2003 in the ISI Web of Science Social Science Index were 
used for data mining. A search was made to find all articles citing a particular 
research article or a book, which represents a scientific framework.  
Figure 1 illustrates how the network externalities discussion relates to other streams of 
non-economics research. The scientific map covers many streams, and therefore the 
associations are different than in more limited discussions such as network externality 
discussion. The group limits have been drawn subjectively, consulting standard 
teaching material e.g. reading lists of strategy courses. 
                                                 
1
 This bibliometric study was conducted after the bibliometric study on network externality discussion, 
which has some implications on the data retrieval procedure. I have presented the wider 
discussion first, as an attempt to serve readers by providing a prologue to network 
externalities.   
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Figure 1 Streams of discussion related to network externalities 
2.2.1 Group I 
The group includes some of the most influential articles on the resource-based view, 
including Barney (1991). The documents have dense links between them. These 
documents investigate how firms develop their competitive advantages by nourishing 
and leveraging their idiosyncratic competencies and resources whilst matching their 
competitive environments. The documents include also Barney (1986), Penrose 
(1959), Wernerfelt (1984), Amit (1993), Peteraf (1993) and Dierickx and Cool 
(1989). This group connects well to all of its neighbouring groups, indicating its 
significance in the larger discourse. A visual inspection suggests that other groups 
could be regarded as outer-circles of this influential group. The resource-based view 
could be characterised as being the core of the literature related to the network 
externality discussion. 
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2.2.2 Group II 
The second group is a dispersed extension of the RBV approach, discussing how 
knowledge related issues create a valuable asset, sometimes in rapidly changing 
environment. The group includes documents on the knowledge-based view, social 
capital, and dynamic capabilities with performance implications. These documents 
have often been co-cited with RBV texts, but also with members of groups three and 
five. Some of the most prominent articles are Cohen (1990), Prahalad (1990), March 
(1991), Nonaka (1995), Kogut (1992), and Teece (1997). 
2.2.3 Group III 
Between the two RBV associated groups and the network externalities documents is 
group three. It discusses innovation, market structure and macro level change. In 
addition to Tushman and Anderson’s (1986) ‘Technological Discontinuities and 
Organisational Environments’, the group consists of, e.g., Schumpeter (1934) and 
Henderson and Clark (1990).  Henderson and Clark (1990) is co-cited at the chosen 
level with all of the other members, while the others are co-cited less with the group 
members.  
2.2.4 Group IV 
The active network externality authors are located on the bottom-left corner (group 
four).  The new network externality group is distinctive from other groups in this 
bibliometric effort. The distinctiveness in relation to other fields is noticeable, 
especially when the discussion seemed dispersed in the earlier examination. Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) acted (article ID 24) as an original proxy for the network externality 
discussion, but received close co-citation links with Arthur (1989) and David (1985), 
forming a single group. The graph suggests that somewhat different fields have cross-
fertilised the co-citers’ work. These articles cover complexity in network markets, and 
especially increasing returns and path-dependence of innovations. 
2.2.5 Group V 
The fifth group investigates learning, adaptation, and selection in and among 
organisations. It has a more descriptive approach than the second group, having links 
especially to groups two, three and seven. Members are documents focusing on 
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organisational learning, evolutionary economics, and population ecology. The group 
members attach to the previous group, especially Nelson and Winter’s (1982) 
‘Evolutionary Theory’. Other documents in the group are far less cited e.g., Cyert and 
March (1963), March (1958), Hannan and Freeman (1984, 1989) and Nonaka (1994).  
2.2.6 Group VI 
An outlier group on the left, group number six discusses the implications of industry 
structure for firm strategies. The group has an emphasis on industrial organisation 
economics e.g. Porter’s (1980) ‘Competitive Strategy’ and competitive dynamics. It 
includes Lieberman and Montgomery’s (1988) ‘First-Mover Advantages’.  The lack 
of co-citations at the level seen in the graphical presentation would have kept the 
latter from the more coherent stream. Similarities occur only at lower levels.  
2.2.7 Group VII 
The seventh group consists of two co-cited triangles of documents, discussing power, 
control, uncertainty, and trust. Transaction cost economics, agency, and power 
dependence theories are streams of discussion that are represented in the group. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) was the most cited document.  The documents located in 
the periphery only have strong co-citation links to members of one other cluster, 
except Williamson (1975), (1985). Another sign of possible instability of the group is 
inclusion of the methodological article of Eisenhardt (1989) amongst the most popular 
documents in the cluster.    
2.2.8 Group VIII 
The top-right corner consists of research that studies different features of how 
embeddedness in social structures affects economic actions. Uzzi (1996, 1997), 
Granovetter (1973, 1985) and Coleman (1988) compose this tightly knitted group. 
The group is not strongly linked to the other groups.  
2.2.9 Summary of the related research mapping 
The groups and the map in the previous chapter illustrate the core-periphery type 
structure of the related research discourses. The network externality discussion is in 
the periphery if we evaluate non-economic social sciences. The core of the wider 
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discussion is the resource-based view group to which the other fields connect. The 
RBV links to the field of network externalities via groups II, III, and indirectly via V. 
Evaluating the texts by groups, the path can be followed from one stream to another. 
These groups focus on firm resources, innovation, market structure, knowledge, 
learning, adaptation, and selection, all of which have something in common with the 
network externalities.  
2.3 Mapping network externalities discourse  
The second, and more focal bibliometric study is used to search for relevant literature 
about the network externalities phenomenon. The section first describes the retrieval 
of data. After being identified, the most important documents in the network 
externality discussion are clustered. The core of the network externality discourse is 
located, in addition to other distinctive clusters. After clustering, the reader is 
introduced to the insights provided by the clusters. The aim is to describe the structure 
and content of the extant literature, and finally to summarise the insights. 
Emphasising the most cited scientific works in this discourse is motivated by the 
assumption that they will have the power to intellectually structure the discussion. 
2.3.1 Manipulation of data  
Bibliometric analysis was conducted to explore the written and published scientific 
discourse on items covered by this study. The main emphasis is to find and classify 
the articles and books that have been seminal for researchers, and to describe the 
advancement of the discussion, especially in the field closest to strategy research.   
The ISI Journal Citation Report was primarily used for journal selection, with the 
evaluation of journals carried our using their impact factors. The service claims that 
this measure can be used to evaluate journal’s relative importance compared to other 
journals in the same field (http://www.isinet.com/).  
The evaluation included journals rated in the top 20 ISI Journal Citation Report of 
2002, in the areas of economics, management, and business.  In order to check the 
reliability of journal selection, some more recent journal-ranking related articles and 
research was consulted (Siggelkow, 2001; Parvinen, 2003). Following Parvinen 
(2003), a procedure was made to ensure that the most appreciated journals were 
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included. The additions were based on information from a readership survey amongst 
the faculty of prestigious U.S. business schools’ strategy, organisational behaviour 
and economics departments (Siggelkow, 2001). As a result, 66 journals were 
included. 
Two article searches were conducted using the combined journal list. A search was 
made to find articles concentrating on the topics of network externalities, published in 
the above journals in 1986-2003. The articles were retrieved from the Social Sciences 
Citation Index of ISI World of Science. As the aim was to analyse the discussion of 
network externalities, the search words were chosen accordingly. The search words 
were ‘network externality’, and ‘network effect,’ including plural forms. The data 
retrieval included 120 articles citing 3955 other documents. After bibliometric 
procedures, there were 108 articles citing 103 influential texts. A more detailed view 
on forming the data corpus is given in Appendix 7.1.   
2.3.2 Structure of the network externality discussion 
This chapter describes how bibliometrics and social network measures portray the 
network externality discussion. The bibliometric results are classified by reading the 
particular documents. 
Some visible patterns are found when analysing the network externality discussion. 
The core of the network externalities discourse is seen in Figure 2, mapping 
information of co-citation data2.   
 
  
 
                                                 
2The Netdraw procedure of Ucinet 6 was performed to illustrate the position of articles. The size of an 
individual edge (article) reflects the number of absolute number of citers the article possesses. 
The labels are identification numbers for the articles. The software positioned nodes by their 
node repulsion, geodesic distance, and line. 
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Figure 2 Co-citation map of 103 articles 
 
The most dominant articles in the discussion are articles number 40, 46, 59 and 62 in 
the centre of the picture. 3 
The most important articles are from two groups writing in economics journals. 
Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro wrote their ‘Network Externalities, Competition and 
Compatibility,’ for the American Economic Review in 1985 (article id 59), and their 
‘Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities,’ was published in the 
Journal of Political Economy in 1986 (id 62). The RAND Journal of Economics 
published ‘Standardisation, Compatibility, and Innovation’ by Joseph Farrell and 
Garth Saloner in 1985 (article id 46) followed by their ‘Installed Base and 
Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements and Predation’ for the 
American Economic Review in 1986 (id 40). In addition to having similar a citer 
                                                 
3
 Articles number 40, 46, 62 were partly overlapping and therefore moved slightly to get number 40 
visible. Articles 33 and 93 are positioned close may have a similar citer profile, but have not 
been so widely referenced. Therefore, they are not as influential as their more referenced 
network neighbors are. 
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profile, they are the most cited articles in the search. This can be observed from the 
graph, as their corresponding circle symbols are much larger than the others. These 
articles set up the network externality discussion, while they themselves share some 
common ancestors, e.g. Rohlfs (1974).  
Clusters in the network externality discussion were found with the major different 
methods. The same core articles establishing the concepts in the discussion appear in 
one cluster irrespective of method.  
The average-link method suggested eight clusters (A to H), where each cluster was 
separable at certain similarity level. Some clusters are not as distinctive, and there 
exists some overlap between clusters. Clusters E to H seem to have their respective 
cores and peripheries, or dual cores. Further sub-clustering was then tried by lowering 
the similarity level. The sub-clustering was supported by qualitative inspection. On 
the other hand, clusters A to D had a shared emphasis on economics, and the clusters 
could have merged on grounds of content4. 
Identifying and reading the most important documents in the cluster provided 
information for describing the content of the cluster. Here, the documents with high 
centrality were considered as having more impact on the discourse. The centrality 
measures were Freeman’s betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1977), information 
centrality (Stephenson & Zelen, 1989) and number of citers5.  
A new reading provided information about the content of the group documents. Often 
documents in a particular cluster seem to share certain themes, rather than belonging 
to a specific scientific framework. Certain overlapping categories emerged to the 
investigator after an iterative reading of the highly valued documents. Descriptions of 
the different clusters will follow.  
The importance of a document is evaluated in relation to this discourse only. Several 
important articles from diverse scientific fields received only a few citations in this 
                                                 
4
 Four clusters (E-H) could have been divided with lower similarity levels. Qualitative reading of the 
documents supported the possibility of sub-clusters for clusters E and F. Combining the ideas, 
the new grouping would have produced seven groups: A-D, E.i, E.ii, F.i, F.ii, G, and H. 
5
 There is no clear theoretical guidance as to the relative importance of different centrality and citation 
count measures. The documents are in Table 21 in Appendix 7.3, in which the documents 
passing any of the thresholds are in bold letters. There were 46 documents that passed the 
threshold, and these were further examined. 
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bibliometric study. In evaluating the discussion about network externalities these are 
not judged to be important in this context. For example, a classic of a different 
discussion belonging only vaguely to the network externality discussion had only a 
marginal impact on the cluster in this effort. This has implications for the 
classification. 
2.3.2.1 Economics clusters from A to D 
The content of clusters A to D suggests that they could be merged together. A low 
impact cluster A is located in the field of economics and industrial organisation with 
no major impact on the wider discussion. None of the eight documents in the cluster 
passed citation count or centrality thresholds. Common themes are interactions 
between firms, economics of innovation and planned obsolescence. Theoretical 
concepts and modelling are used to investigate the subjects. The document with most 
information centrality in this cluster is ‘Theory of Industrial Organisation’ (1988) by 
Jean Tirole, while ‘Network Externality, Compatability Choice, and Planned 
Obsolence’ (1994) by J.P.Choi received the most citations.  
Cluster B does not have strong input to the discussion. There is an emphasis on issues 
such as compatibility, bundling, standardisation, and market structure. Theoretical 
concepts and modelling are used to investigate the subjects. There are seven members 
in the cluster, and the only influential article is ‘Network effects, software provision, 
and standardisation’ (1992) by Jeffrey Church and Neil Gandal. By examining the 
software provision decision of software firms they find that when consumers place a 
high value on software variety, there is a sub-optimal amount of standardisation by 
the market. The articles mostly fall into the realm of economics.  
The major themes in cluster C are compatibility, standardisation, information, 
switching costs, and comparisons of product components and systems. The documents 
develop theoretical concepts and modelling, and they belong to the frameworks of 
economics and transaction cost economics. This cluster is more important than the 
other economics counterparts. Five documents exceeded the threshold from this ten-
member cluster. The most influential of them is Matutes and Regibeau’s (1988) 
article ‘Mix and Match – Product compatibility without network externalities’.   
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Cluster D, with its eight texts, primarily contributes to the development of market 
structure. The only two influential articles according to measures used are ‘Second-
sourcing as a commitment – monopoly incentives to attract competition’ (1988) by 
Joseph Farrell and Nancy Gallini, and ‘Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs’ 
(1988) by Farrell and Carl Shapiro. They investigate switching and set-up costs and 
the implications of overlapping product generations. Economic modelling is the most 
widely used approach, favouring the merging of this cluster to others in the economics 
cluster.  
2.3.2.2 Cluster E: Network externalities  
This is the most important cluster, and the core of the network externality discussion 
with 16 documents. From these, 13 are appreciated as being influential. Hierarchical 
clustering suggested that it is quite easy to divide this cluster into two sub-clusters, 
and this is supported by qualitative analysis. If divided to two sub-clusters, the 
subcluster E.i would include 10 documents, whilst E.ii, with its more empirical 
context, would have three documents.  
All but one text in sub-cluster E.i is considered influential, and they define the 
theoretical framework of the discourse. Sub-cluster E.i contains the most influential 
documents found in the studied discourse, and they lay the theoretical foundation for 
the network externality research. Articles called ‘Standardisation, Compatibility, and 
Innovation’ (1985) and ‘Installed Base and Compatibility – Innovation, Product 
Preannouncements, and Predation’ (1986) by Farrell and Saloner belong to this 
cluster, as well as articles by Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro called ‘Technology 
Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities’ (1986) and ‘Network 
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility’ (1985). The sub-cluster also captured 
articles by Jeremy Rohlfs (1974) and Shmuel S. Oren and Stephen A. Smith (1981), 
which can subjectively be regarded as the most important predecessor articles. Studies 
in the sub-cluster have used modelling in the economics framework, with anecdotal 
references to the empirical world, especially telephone networks.  
Sub-cluster E.ii is differentiated from the former by having less impact on the 
discussion, and with an approach that is more empirical. Models are tried using data 
from colour television, computer software sales, and the diffusion of bank automated 
teller machines. Although the framework is principally in economics, the sub-cluster 
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contains pioneering marketing article on diffusion called ‘A New Product Growth 
Model for Consumer Durables’ (1969) by Frank M. Bass. The most influential 
document in this context is ‘Hedonic Price Indexes for Spreadsheets and an Empirical 
Test for Network Externalities’ (1994) by Neil Gandal. 
2.3.2.3 Cluster F: Path dependence 
Cluster F contains 19 documents, with 13 influential documents. The tree-diagram of 
the average-link clustering suggests that it could be divided into two groups. The first 
sub-cluster, F.i, contains nine influential documents dealing with issues of instability 
in markets, technology diffusion, high-tech market structure, and technological lock-
in.  The most important article in the sub-cluster is ‘Systems competition and Network 
Effects’ (1994) by Katz and Shapiro, which compiles the themes researched in the 
network discourse.  
F.ii is a small but influential sub-cluster having four texts, which are respected even 
more widely outside of the network externalities discourse. In fact, most of the 
articles do not explicitly investigate network externalities, but concentrate on path-
dependent or idiosyncratic progress of a firm or industry. These themes are major 
streams that can be found in a wider context of research investigating firms in society: 
the evolutionary model of technological change (Anderson and Tushman, 1990), first-
mover advantage (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988), and firm resources and 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).  
2.3.2.4 Cluster G: Collective action  
The 14-member cluster G is a group with a strong impact on social sciences, as it 
studies several aspects of collective action, but with only four influential documents 
in this context. All of them are part of sub-cluster G.ii, suggesting that G could be 
treated as one entity. Both sub-clusters possess similarly wide significance for social 
science, and they have important documents on marketing and organisational ecology. 
The texts of G.ii investigate issues about how collectives of individuals shape market 
structure. The influential articles are about increasing returns (W. Brian Arthur, 
1989), the diffusion of innovation (Everett M. Rogers, 1962), the evolutionary 
perspective on economics (Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, 1982), and threshold 
models (Mark Granovetter, 1978).  
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2.3.2.5 Cluster H: Decision making 
Cluster H, with 20 documents, is the largest, and has eight documents ranked as 
influential. The cluster concentrates on decision-making, and could be divided into 
two, because of the cluster structure. However sub-cluster H.i produces five articles, 
of which none is influential. H.ii has 15 documents, with eight of major importance. 
They cover a variety of business strategy issues, with eight influential documents. 
Documents have a normative tone, as they often offer suggestions to firm managers. 
There is a belief that a firm’s competitive structure is something that a manager can 
and should act upon. Authors use econometric modelling, or back up their reasoning 
with anecdotal evidence. The most influential document, ‘Technological 
Discontinuities and Organisational Environments’ (1986) by Tushman and Anderson, 
uses longitudinal data from different industries to validate their claims. Some of the 
other important contributions include ‘Competitive Strategy’ (1989) by Michael 
Porter, ‘Profiting from Technological Innovation – Implications for Integration, 
Collaboration, Licensing and Public-Policy’ (1986) by D.J. Teece and ‘Inside the 
Black Box: Technology and Economics’ (1982) by Nathan Rosenberg.   
2.3.3 Summary of the network externality discourse mapping 
The section provided an illustration of how co-citation data about the network 
externality discourse could produce scientific mapping. Identifying the structure of 
the discourse produced one very distinctive core. Irrespective of other citations, a 
researcher publishing an article about network externalities in a scientific journal is 
more likely to cite the core articles than any others. The network externalities 
discussion relates most often to the articles ‘Network Externalities, Competition and 
Compatibility’ and ‘Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities’ 
by Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro and ‘Standardisation, Compatibility, and 
Innovation’ and ‘Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product 
Preannouncements and Predation’ by Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner.  
 
Figure 2 reveals the most important individual articles, but their key role shadows 
other contributors and hides the patterns among and between groups of works. As 
many of the citers cite the core articles, uncovering the more hidden pattern of 
citations linked to other important articles may be informative. Figure 3 is an 
illustration produced after the normalisation, showing the clusters linked by their co-
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citers. The map offers more information about closeness of different clusters 
compared to the dendrogram (More details about the procedure in Appendix 7.2).  
  
 
 Figure 3 Mapping of the clusters of network externality discussion  
Legends: Clusters a and b = triangle pointing upward; cluster c = triangle pointing downward; 
cluster d = piled upward and downward triangle; cluster e = +; cluster f = diamond; cluster g = 
o; cluster h = square  
 
Using citation and social network analysis, some further conclusions about the 
structure of discussions can be made. Cluster E forms the centre of the discourse with 
the most influential documents in the field. The documents that established the 
network externality discussion (cluster E) are located in the left-bottom corner of the 
graph.. As most of the new contributors cite the core articles, the citing pattern of 
stays similar i.e. they are cited by almost everyone.  
In the bibliometric clustering, economics literature dominated the groups from A to E, 
and they were spread also over remaining clusters. A description of the content in the 
clusters shows that the economics clusters (A-D) could be merged, at least for the 
purposes of a non-economics study. This bibliometric effort showed that the 
discussion of network externalities has been driven by two pairs of economists, and 
has been largely theoretical in nature. The influential non-economics texts have 
provided less focused input to the network externality discussion, or they have been 
Clusters A-D 
Cluster E 
Cluster E 
Cluster G 
Cluster F Cluster H 
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concentrating on issues that are not directly involved with network externalities. The 
other disciplines have taken an important role in the discussion, as evidenced by the 
better scores of documents in clusters F (path dependence) and H (decision-making). 
Articles citing cluster G (collective action) documents do not cite the documents 
found in the other clusters.  
The unevenness and differences among and between clusters are partly due to the 
small size of the discussion, in which a small number of citers produces less cited core 
documents. A citation works as a symbol for a shared idea only if there are many 
citers, because only a few citers may not necessarily cite for the same reasons (Small, 
1978). Unstable clustering may reflect not only a mathematical or technical problem, 
but may imply that the investigated discussion has not been along paradigmatic lines. 
The bibliometric investigation suggests that network externality discussion is neither 
well developed nor coherent. The economists have formed the core of the network 
externality discussion, but studies on path-dependence and decision-making are 
gaining more popularity. A further examination of the key concepts is required, to 
shed light on the phenomenon and the discussion about it.  
2.4 Insights from the network externalities literature   
The present chapter describes how the most influential documents in the network 
externality discussion view the phenomenon. I present the insights from the most 
influential documents of the network externality discourse, while attempting to judge 
their relevance especially from firm strategy point of view. The topics cover the types 
of network externalities; origins and characteristics of network externalities; and their 
implications for firm strategies.  
The articles chosen for closer inspection represent the most influential cited 
documents in the network externalities discourse, in the chosen sample of quality 
journals of economics, firm strategy and management6.  The established network 
externalities literature was published some years ago, which is problematic for an 
extensive literature review. Since I also wanted to include influential new articles, I 
                                                 
6
 The importance and association of the qualified cited documents to the subject is based on my 
subjective judgment. I have not included each instance when a citer has cited the documents. 
E.g. if a cited document is a book, the citers may have referenced with different motives. My 
reading of the text can differ from the judgments by the citers.  
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used different approach. In order to be considered as an important recent article, a 
document had to be published during 1998-2003 in one of the 20 most influential 
business strategy journals, and cited at least once in addition to authors themselves.7. 
In the articles the use of the concept and empirical domain varies greatly.   
The documents are often incommensurable. They include articles and books, and their 
orientation can be empirical, theoretical or pedagogical in nature. In addition, the 
focus of an individual document may or may not be network externalities. Moreover, 
there are documents that do not mention the phenomenon, but that have still been 
contributing to research around the subject. In the following chapters, books or 
articles that do not specifically investigate network externalities, but which are 
important members of the clusters and as such are significant articles in the 
discussion, are typically described with an expression such as ‘a related article’. 
Due to the variety of the retrieved texts, a unified approach is needed to structure the 
literature review8. The bibliometric mapping and the chapter highlighted the major 
topics in the discussion. Based on these insights I created a nomological map, which 
serves also as a structure for the review.   
2.4.1 Nomological map of network competition   
In this chapter, I will summarise the findings from the discussion and explain some of 
the problems with the network externality research tradition. A nomological map is 
based on the literature identified in the bibliometric research. The later chapters 
provide more detailed description of the major concepts and research about them.    
                                                 
7
 The data is from ISI Web of Science, and details are provided in Appendices 7.1 and 7.4. The twelve 
recent articles cover economics, marketing, and firm strategy issues. They include modelling 
with and without empirical evidence, reviews, case studies, and hypothesis deduction with 
quantitative testing. The retrieved twelve business journal articles represent network 
externalities in a fragmented manner, as most of the articles cover only part of the 
phenomenon 
8
 Most reviews give similar treatment on classification, origins, and characteristics of network 
externalities. These include (e.g. Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Economides, 
1996; Yang, 1997). Their example is not as consistent on firm behaviour, which is the focus of 
the dissertation. Behaviour, and especially firm strategy in a network environment, has 
received different treatment in recent studies and reviews. There are examples evaluating firm 
strategies (e.g. Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1999b) with 
different motivation and line of argumenting. In addition many other retrieved texts refer to 
firm strategy, especially concerning first mover advantages, and diffusion implications. I have 
also included more recent, or other closely related articles, when evaluating the insights of 
establishing literature. 
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The network externality discourse relies heavily on work in economics, in which 
empirical work and firm strategies have received less attention. The investigated 
discourse suggested that the modelling tradition in economics is at its strongest when 
considering homogenous groups, static states, or other models. 
More recent work on the subject has been following the theoretical emphasis set by 
the core articles (Majumdar & Venkataraman, 1998; Schilling, 2002). The recent 
articles discuss extensively the pricing decisions in networked markets, a topic which 
received less attention in the mainstream discussion. There are efforts to take different 
participants into account, but the field is rather undeveloped. Marketing researchers 
have made the most empirical work on diffusion, evaluating different adopter 
categories without reference to network externalities, with the exception of e.g. Gupta 
et al. (1999). Their elaborate simulation model is complex and they suggest further 
additions e.g. by adding strategic behaviour by complementor firms.  
The following nomological map offers a summary of the relevant concepts and their 
relationship to firm strategies in a competition for dominance in a network setting. 
Figure 4 is the original nomological map of concepts and relations based on the 
previous part of the literature review, which serves as a theoretical case (Yin, 2003). 
The arrows indicate the direction of influence. Several researchers have modelled the 
feedback loop in their papers, often giving it a visual form. The map follows the 
advice by Dickson et al. (2001), which underlines the graphical presentation of 
feedback loops. The article claims that visualisation is important as a tool to shift the 
focus from states of nature to rates of change of states, or flows.  
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Figure 4 Nomological map on theoretical case based on the literature on 
network externalities 
 
2.4.2 Competitive framework 
2.4.2.1 Direct and indirect network externalities 
The box in the left deals with the competitive framework, namely the origins and 
limitations of networks. This chapter attempts to clarify the concepts and applicability 
of different types of networks, and it is largely based on reading of the cited 
documents primarily found in the cluster E identified earlier in the bibliometric 
analysis. 9 
Rohlfs (1974) described network externalities as occurring when the utility that a 
customer derives from a service increases as others join the system. The article 
classifies this as “a classical case of external economies in consumption”. Telephony 
services are seen as an example in which a universal service policy can be seen to be 
justified if the new entrants pay for their incremental costs, even if it this is short of 
the average costs (Rohlfs, 1974). Network externalities were first identified with 
physical networks (Rohlfs, 1974; Katz & Shapiro, 1986a). Network externalities can 
                                                 
9
 The clustering of network externality discussion was not proved practical for providing chapter 
division because of the group overlaps. Cluster E including the core articles on network 
externalities had most to offer to the this chapter, while documents found in other groups 
contributed more sparsely. 
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also be described as consumption benefits, as they create an economy of scale on the 
demand side (e.g. Farrell & Saloner, 1992).  
Research has widened the scope of analysis and made a distinction between direct and 
indirect network externalities (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1986a; Shurmer, 1993). Direct externality occurs when the number of users 
directly influences a product’s utility (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1986a; 
Economides, 1996). Direct network externalities can be observed in communication 
networks, electrical distribution, and railroad industries (Rohlfs, 1974; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1986b, 1986a; Church & Gandal, 1992; Economides, 
1996). 
An indirect network externality is present when demand is indirectly influenced by 
the availability of complementary products (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 
1986a; Church & Gandal, 1992). Industries in which indirect network externalities 
have been identified include the personal computer industry, the recording industry, 
the credit card industry, and the television and broadcasting industries (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1986a; Church & Gandal, 1992; Katz & Shapiro, 
1992, 1994; Cottrell & Koput, 1998; Gupta et al., 1999; Gandal et al., 2000; Le 
Nagard-Assayag & Manceau, 2001). In Shurmer’s (1993) definition, the indirect 
network externalities are derived from features extrinsic to the product, which 
increase with the number of adopters, and which add value to the product for the 
participants (Shurmer, 1993).  
Strongly complementary products may be described as forming systems, even if 
consumption of these products is not fixed. Some authors describe the situation as 
system markets (Katz & Shapiro, 1994), or a hardware-software paradigm (Church & 
Gandal, 1992). Even though companies would otherwise be separate, network 
externalities create interdependency (Church & Gandal, 1992; Antonelli, 1993; Wade, 
1995; Gupta et al., 1999; Le Nagard-Assayag & Manceau, 2001). An increased 
number and variety of externalities improve the total offering (Matutes & Regibeau, 
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1988; Church & Gandal, 1992; Cusumano et al., 1992; Shurmer, 1993; Gandal, 1994; 
Arthur, 1996)10.  
There is some terminological confusion also as to how the literature may use the same 
terminology linked to indirect network externalities, whilst referring principally to a 
wider network context (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Gabel, 1987; Matutes & Regibeau, 
1988; Church & Gandal, 1992; Farrell & Saloner, 1992; Shurmer, 1993; Besen & 
Farrell, 1994; Gandal, 1994; Brynjolfsson & Kemerer, 1996). 
The limits of network externality markets are not clear-cut. In addition to direct and 
indirect externalities, Katz and Shapiro (1985) also consider a situation in which 
positive consumption externalities rise due to the quality and availability of post-
purchase service. Even with this addition, the list of sources is not exhaustive. They 
add more subtle links between benefits and sources in their footnote, such as product 
information for more popular brands; the role of market share as a signal of product 
quality; and bandwagon effects (Katz & Shapiro, 1985), which differentiate from 
externalities phenomenon. Banking and insurance companies’ offerings and its 
interdependence with the customer base have many similar features to the industries 
mentioned (Arthur, 1996). 
Cusumano et al. (1992) differentiate bandwagon effects from network effects. In the 
article, bandwagon effect refers to situations in which early sales or licensing of a 
particular product lead to rising interest. Support for one standard over another can 
become especially dynamic and self-reinforcing if customers perceive there to be 
value in owning that standard. For Cusumano et al. (1992), network externalities refer 
to whether or not there is a usage pattern that depends on such a complementary 
product, as well as how and how much customers use the complement with the main 
product. The bandwagon relates closely to the communication necessary for realising 
the possibilities of an emerging network. David (1990) calls a ‘bandwagon’ a 
dynamic process, which overcomes coordination and communication problems 
among potential network adopters.  
                                                 
10
 Liu et al. (2004) shows by economical modeling that multiplication of television channels does not 
necessarily increase consumer welfare, depending on the broadcasters’ cost of quality 
provision . 
.   
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Arthur (1996) describes network effects as a reason for increasing returns. Increasing 
returns describe networked, or interdependent markets with positive feedback loops, 
which magnify the importance of a small events in the early stages of diffusion, or in 
the path of history (Arthur, 1989, 1994, 1996). 
The confusing use of terms has not been remedied by the recent research. Some of the 
more contemporary documents (the evaluated 12 journal articles) do not necessarily 
mention indirect network externalities explicitly but substitute the term with network 
externalities (Schilling, 1998; Bhargava et al., 2000; Van Hove, 2000; Kauffman & 
Walden, 2001; Schilling, 2002). The more traditional form of ‘direct network 
externalities’ is also often equated with  ‘network externalities’, (e.g. Schilling, 1998; 
e.g. Hellofs & Jacobson, 1999; Kauffman & Walden, 2001; Schilling, 2002). 
Majumdar and Venkatamaran (1998) made a distinction between the different types 
of effects that networks have. Schilling (1998) equated the term ‘network 
externalities,’ including both direct and indirect network externalities, with ‘positive 
consumption effects’. Van Hove (2000) uses the term consumption effect to 
underscore communication patterns affecting perceptions, while preserving the value 
of large network of a product (Van Hove, 2000). 
Following the core documents in the network externality discussion, I recognise that 
network externalities are present when growth of a network improves the product 
offering. This network feature differentiates the concept from ideas based on 
communication about the network. Network features and communication about the 
network might be observed simultaneously.  
Indirect and direct mechanisms are created from different network structures and 
product offerings. With indirect externalities, a core product or service offers a link 
between customers and different complementary products, rather than links among 
customers. Externalities are derived from features extrinsic to the core product or 
service. A rising number of adopters or complementary products adds value to the 
offering. Therefore, industries facing significant indirect externalities have strong 
reliance on complementary products e.g. customers value highly features that are not 
offered by the core provider, but by complementary ones.  The distinction between 
core and complementary products can be unclear, because some firms bundle more 
features in the core product while leaving a smaller role for complementary products.  
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In addition, the most important network externality articles are not able to identify, 
when an industry is facing significant indirect network externalities. For this reason, 
the industry listings seem quite subjective. This problem is not easily solved, because 
indirect externalities can be quite diverse. The effects vary by product attributes, with 
externality-sensitive attributes gaining more from the increased availability of 
complementary products (Basu et al., 2003).  
Both direct and indirect externalities affect adoption patterns, because of the increased 
interdependence of decision-makers. Interdependence initially increases after some 
time-lag in early adoptions, but the same mechanism encourages adoptions after new 
complementary products arrive in the market to improve the total market offering 
(Gupta et al., 1999). Above a certain point, ‘critical mass’, the adoption of new 
products is strongly enhanced by the interdependence in demand derived from 
different parts of the offer (Antonelli, 1993)11.  
The different implications of direct and indirect externalities can be found, for 
example, from Gupta et al.’s (1999) study on the evolution of television markets. The 
aim was to forecast the sales of high definition television in the U.S. market. The 
article models both direct and indirect dependence and considers also consumer 
heterogeneity. The interactive model including consumers, as well as core and 
complementary products produced several results. A major contribution is to show 
how indirect network externalities produce different adoption curves than in markets 
without that effect. The authors claim that forecasts that ignore indirect effects lead to 
results biasing towards HDTV. Authors also argue that contrary to the beliefs of 
television manufacturers, sponsoring equipment was not efficient to spur sales, 
because a major segment of the audience (‘Videophiles’) is price insensitive. Instead, 
a lack of HDTV programming would seriously hamper sales. Gupta et al. (1999) 
acknowledge that their model is complex and demands much information. They argue 
that an explicit treatment of indirect network externalities should be carried further. 
They give an example of possible avenues for this by modelling strategic behaviour 
with respect to other firms.  This would include the inter-firm interactions of 
complementor firms, by incorporating competitive reaction variables.  
                                                 
11
 The analogy of “critical mass”, borrowed from physics, is rather problematic in societal diffusion 
e.g. there cannot be a pre-determined certain point when evaluating human behaviour. 
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2.4.2.2 Switching costs 
The ‘direct and indirect network externalities’ of the map are affected by the 
technology used. The potential cannot be reached because of e.g. technological 
limitations, or differences between available technologies, or networks. Network 
competition is affected by switching costs, which are incurred when a firm, or a 
customer has to change from one supplier or technology. Switching costs may weaken 
competition and raise prices, as it segments the market. This grants some monopoly 
power to the original provider, which companies may leverage by increasing prices 
(Klemperer, 1987; Farrell & Shapiro, 1988; Beggs & Klemperer, 1992). It is also a 
first-mover advantage (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Switching costs can be 
divided into transaction costs, learning costs and artificial or contractual costs. An 
example of the first category is a fee for switching an account or customership. 
Learning costs are incurred when a customer has to learn how to use a new product. 
Artificial or contractual costs arise at the firm’s discretion e.g. brand loyalty 
‘frequent-flier’ programs (Klemperer, 1987; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). 
Arthur (1996) terms switching costs as related items such as up-front costs and 
customer groove in. The latter describes a situation where the more consumers use 
e.g. a particular piece of software, the more they become attached to the software and 
its upgrades.  
Switching costs borne by buyers may lead to technological lock-in for sellers (Porter, 
1980; Farrell & Shapiro, 1988). This may be particularly so if the complementary 
products form tightly connected systems (Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Arthur, 1996). The 
systemic nature of product production and offering distances the market from the 
perfect market ideal (Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Arthur, 1996).  
There is anecdotal evidence of how the greater market power of a dominant firm 
could also lead to the exclusion of new entrants (Porter, 1980; Farrell & Shapiro, 
1988). In a related article, Kerin et al. (1992) propose that higher switching costs or 
costs of mistakes give differentiation advantages to the first-mover. They also argue 
that the advantages related to switching costs are more important in consumer markets 
than in industrial markets, because the industrial market is more competitive (Kerin et 
al., 1992). 
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Switching costs are higher when there is no compatibility between systems. In the 
early stages of industry evolution, competitors compete intensely to build their 
installed bases if they have incompatible products (Katz & Shapiro, 1986a; 
Klemperer, 1987; Besen & Farrell, 1994). The possibility to have a proprietary, 
profitable, and sustainable installed base is a strong incentive to compete and even to 
sell under costs in the beginning of the adoption process. Resource-draining 
competition eases if the firms decide to make and market compatible products in 
normal competitive terms. The first-mover advantages, and therefore the incentives to 
compete fiercely, are diminished if the products are compatible in a new industry 
(Katz & Shapiro, 1986a; Economides, 1989; Besen & Farrell, 1994). The situation 
may change as the industry matures (Katz & Shapiro, 1986a). Compatibility improves 
variety, and secures second sourcing (Matutes & Regibeau, 1988; Katz & Shapiro, 
1994).  
2.4.3 Competitive tactics and expectations management 
This chapter (see second box from the left in Figure 4) evaluates research dealing with 
what firms do; their tactics, or ‘manoeuvres’ to win the competition for technology 
dominance (Suarez, 2004). A major issue in the network externality context is the 
installed base of customers and suppliers, which provides the incentive for many of 
the actions. Creating credible and favourable beliefs about the installed base is a 
major strategic consideration for managers (Padmanabhan et al., 1997). Firms try to 
use the installed base effectively, because it affects further adoption and it is a 
potential entry barrier for competitors (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Farrell & Saloner, 
1986a).  
Besen and Farrell (1994) contrast network externalities with the somewhat similar 
situation of economies of scale, or learning by doing. With the latter two examples, 
current or cumulative sales are the basis of decisions and action. However, network 
externalities are interested in the increasing value of expanding networks. Therefore, 
the current state is not as crucial in network markets as is the expectation of the 
ultimate state of the network (Besen & Farrell, 1994), see also (Cusumano et al., 
1992; Shurmer, 1993; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Padmanabhan et al., 1997).  
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Network externalities as a network feature and signalling about the network benefits 
are closely tied. The emphasis on managing expectations about the network may lead 
to firm policies on giving an audience exaggerated, or even wrong information about 
the base.  
Announcements on product launches and upgrades are used to lure customers to wait 
for a firm’s product, discouraging them from using competitor’s products, or old 
technology (Porter, 1980; Farrell & Saloner, 1986a; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Arthur, 
1996). Some evidence shows that adopters use diverse information channels for 
purchasing decisions, which implies that it is difficult to give individual false 
statements in an effective, or a long-lasting manner (Shurmer, 1993). Announcements, 
even when not truthful, may have a significant impact. A provider of existing 
technology, or an industry leader, could develop an installed base with major 
momentum, unless the challengers can provide reliable information about a 
significant improvement at hand (Farrell & Saloner, 1986a; Besen & Farrell, 1994; 
Arthur, 1996). The preannouncement can also cannibalise the firm’s own portfolio, as 
customers delay their purchases whilst waiting for new versions (Besen & Farrell, 
1994). In a related compilation, Rosenberg (1982) deduced how expectations may 
lead to longer adoption times for discontinuous innovations. The introduction of a 
new substitute technology often evidences improvements in the former technology, so 
it is rational for potential adopter to wait for events to unfold (Rosenberg, 1982). 
Signalling about the good reputation of the seller may convince others to join the 
network more readily (Katz & Shapiro, 1994). Perceived product quality is a device to 
manage expectations. Rosenberg (1982) argued that in their initial technology 
selection, potential adopters prefer a provider that will upgrade its products if there is 
a chance that the technologies used will become obsolete (Rosenberg, 1982). 
Padmanabhan (1997) modelled a situation in which a firm offers its single product 
sequentially to different customer groups. By introducing a lower quality product for 
the network externality market, a firm can capture the network externality benefits by 
selling improved upgrades. It was shown that it was more profitable to delay full 
quality products and serve first the higher value customers, than to serve everyone 
well at once. This reasoning is based on assumption that customers do not have full 
knowledge of the value of network effects. The authors acknowledge that in reality 
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the race for an installed base may be more important in shaping product entry policies 
(Padmanabhan et al., 1997). Other long lasting commitments such as a wide product 
offering and other sunk costs by the seller also act as a hostage in the eyes of the 
potential entrants (Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & Shapiro, 1994). 
Firms weigh the costs and rewards of pre-announcing, keeping in mind both 
consumer (demand stimulation) and competitive behaviour (pre-emption), suggests a 
related article by Eliashberg and Robertson (1988).  The article derives part of its 
hypothesis from the works of Farrell and Saloner (1986). The authors claim that in 
their data, preannouncement was most readily seen with products having switching 
costs. The other important motives for pre-announcing were a challenger position, a 
small size of the firm, or an attractive, but non-combative competitive environment 
(Eliashberg & Robertson, 1988).  
Announcements on product variety signal the benefits of indirect network 
externalities. The value of a product improves, when there are more complementary 
and compatible products available (Matutes & Regibeau, 1988; Church & Gandal, 
1992; Cusumano et al., 1992; Shurmer, 1993; Gandal, 1994; Arthur, 1996). Variety 
widens the access of the network, which actually leads to an improved product (Katz 
& Shapiro, 1994).  
Church and Gandal’s (1992) model shows how an increasing number of software 
products improve the value of a technology. This leads to a larger network and 
increased sales of hardware, enhanced market demand for software, and improved 
software profitability (Church & Gandal, 1992). Katz and Shapiro (1985) analysed 
indirect effects on the purchasing decision of computer hardware. For example, an 
agent purchasing a personal computer will be concerned with the number of agents 
purchasing similar hardware because the amount and variety of software that will be 
supplied for use with a given computer will be an increasing function of the number 
of hardware units that have been sold (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). A consumer’s adoption 
decision has an impact on the future variety or prices of components, and vice versa 
(Farrell & Gallini, 1988; Shurmer, 1993; Katz & Shapiro, 1994).  
For a dominant firm, the benefit of inviting new suppliers, even competitors, is most 
profitable, when there are significant set-up costs involved in buying a new product. 
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Customers feel more committed to the offering, when there are more suppliers 
providing e.g. second-sourcing, open source architecture, variety and quality, which 
then translates to more rapid diffusion (Farrell & Gallini, 1988; Besen & Farrell, 
1994; Katz & Shapiro, 1994).  
Sponsoring the enlargement of the installed base may take also other means, by, for 
example, inviting a large buyer to the network. A committed large buyer, such as a 
government agency, may take the lead and sponsor further enlargement (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1994). Garud and Kumaraswamy (1993) describes how Sun Microsystems 
has sponsored an open standards system. The article illustrates that it has been an 
efficient way to build customer base, while it has implications for the product cycle. 
Because customers and rivals can free ride on a firm’s research and development 
work, the sponsor must continually substitute its own products with improvements 
that customers appreciate i.e. cannibalising previous products. The improvements 
must be introduced rapidly, while economising R&D efforts, in order to outpace 
competitors and stay profitable (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993). In case of 
sponsoring firms, the supplier of the superior technology of tomorrow will be likely to 
dominate the market (Katz & Shapiro, 1986b). The proposition does not hold if the 
market has a significant bias against old technology, or insufficient friction (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1992). The installed base is less important in an era of technological change 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Anderson & Tushman, 1990). The incumbent network 
has less value if the challenger’s offer is self-evidently better (Katz & Shapiro, 1992; 
Arthur, 1996; Brynjolfsson & Kemerer, 1996). If the new technology is built upon the 
former competences, i.e. it is competence-enhancing technology, the incumbent 
market leader will often pioneer the adoption. In the case of competence-destroying 
technology, the newcomers benefit from their new way of thinking (Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986; Anderson & Tushman, 1990).  
Predatory or penetration pricing also exploits the installed base effect, as it can 
prevent future entries (Farrell & Saloner, 1986a; Katz & Shapiro, 1986a, 1994). From 
a supplier firm’s point of view, sponsoring its technology may seem to be an efficient 
way of building up a self-sufficient installed base (Rohlfs, 1974; Katz & Shapiro, 
1986b; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Arthur, 1996; Brynjolfsson & 
Kemerer, 1996). 
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With moderate network externalities, new sellers with no installed base are inclined to 
more aggressive pricing, leading to the expansion of their market share and the 
decline of the earlier market leader (Farrell & Shapiro, 1988). As new entrants 
emerge, the dominant position of the industry leader deteriorates (Beggs & 
Klemperer, 1992). There is no such need for sponsoring if there has been strong 
demand since the beginning, and if there are less network externalities involved 
(Teece, 1986).  
2.4.4 Processes of standardization and diffusion 
Many of the core networks externality discussants treat the adoption rather 
mechanistically. Therefore, some articles more in the periphery of the discussion have 
contributed to this chapter looking at the processes of standardization and diffusion. 
Because the process highlights the interactions of actors, it overlaps with the previous 
chapter.  
As noted earlier, the mechanisms working in a network externality context create a 
need to manage, or even to manipulate the expectations of participants by product 
announcements, and other public statements providing favourable information on the 
future firm and its products, often in comparison to the others at the early stages of 
market evolution (Katz & Shapiro, 1986b; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1998; Shapiro & Varian, 1999a; Lee & O'Connor, 2003; Suarez, 2004),  
see also Figure 4.  
Expectation management dealt with firms competing against each other, and product 
diffusion. The topics are overlapping but e.g. diffusion deals with issues where there 
is no rivalry among similar products or companies. But, both firm competition and 
diffusion are present when firms strive to get their offering in a dominant position. It 
is widely seen that a customer benefits from buying a de facto standard product or 
technology (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Gabel, 1987; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Shurmer, 1993; Besen & Farrell, 1994). The benefits are diverse and dispersed among 
different participants. Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) review the contribution of the 
network externality literature on standards. The positive aspects connected to network 
externalities and communities of users are the following: the possibility to share 
information, a larger market for complementary goods and reduced market power of 
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sellers, increased price competition, and a greater second-hand market. Offsetting 
aspects of standardisation are reduced product variety or diversity, excess inertia, and 
efficiency loss if a ‘wrong’ standard is imposed (Brynjolfsson & Kemerer, 1996). 
There is a trade-off between standardisation and variety, assuming a firm is selling 
only a single good (Farrell & Saloner, 1986b). The standardisation process is similar 
whether the benefits arise from network externalities of the product network, or in 
learning-by-doing externalities (David, 1990). Econometric models and empirical data 
show that multiple technologies may co-exist, assuming consumer heterogeneity and 
product differentiation (Shurmer, 1993; Katz & Shapiro, 1994). Nelson (1998) and 
Suarez (2004) review research on path-dependencies (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989) and 
network externalities, or standards in particular (Katz & Shapiro, 1985), as different 
ways to explain the existence of a dominant design. The difference between path-
dependencies and network externalities is that research into the latter stresses the 
systemic aspects (Nelson, 1998).  
Arthur (1989; 1994; 1996) included the competitive context for explaining potential 
inefficiencies in the standardisation process. The process magnifies the effect of 
small, even random events early in the history of standardisation. If someone gets 
ahead by chance or cleverness, the magnified advantage may result in lock-in in the 
market (Arthur, 1996). The path-dependent process may lead to locked-in technology, 
which may not be the optimal one. The situation occurs only with technologies or 
systems that offer increasing returns. (Arthur, 1989). 
Rogers (editions in, 1962, 1971, 1983, 1995, 2003) analyses the diffusion of 
innovations. Diffusion is described as being a social process, in which an innovation 
is communicated through certain channels over time, among the members of social 
system (Rogers, 1995). Bass (1969) mathematically re-formulated the same ideas. He 
modelled new product diffusion, especially concerning the timing of the initial 
purchase of a product. In the model, innovators make their decisions on adoption 
independently, whilst imitators follow them. The formulation is the following: An 
initial purchase is a linear function of the number of previous buyers.  The model 
implies exponential growth of purchases until close to a peak and then exponential 
decay. Calculating the model, the ultimate number of purchases is used. In 
forecasting, this requires a subjective judgment by the researcher. In the model, 
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buyers do not make expectations on the future size of the network, only on the current 
number of purchases (Bass, 1969). Valuing a network involves not only network size, 
but also other features of the network. The relative importance of features may differ 
between different adopter groups (Shurmer, 1993). In a related article, Granovetter 
(1978) emphasises the variations of preferences within an interacting group, which 
may lead to inconsistent and hard to predict collective behaviour. A threshold is a 
point at which the perceived benefits to a potential actor exceed the costs. Social 
structures make the threshold models more complex; e.g. an action of a friend is more 
significant to an individual than an action of an alien (Granovetter, 1978). Rogers also 
acknowledged the reciprocal influence of the later adopter on the earlier adopters in 
interactive innovations. The S-shaped adoption curve ascends later but the incline 
becomes more radical than with other innovations (Rogers, 1995). This reciprocal 
addition emphasises the significance of critical mass, which is a system level 
illustration of a social threshold at which the diffusion of an interactive innovation is 
self-sustaining. Below that point, the number of adopters of an interactive innovation 
is so small that the innovation gives significantly less value to the potential adopters 
(Rogers, 1995).  
The diffusion may not reach the critical mass. Van Hove (2000) describes the failure 
of a smart card trial and explains the problems using network externalities, and 
negative dynamics prior to reaching critical mass. The case illustrates the close 
relation of network externalities as an asset and expectations about them. The initial 
problems were magnified because of the self-enforcing loops. Word-of-mouth and 
mass media provided the necessary channels to communicate negative perceptions. 
Merchants and consumers iteratively downgraded their expectations of the future state 
of the network, and the trial proved unsuccessful (Van Hove, 2000). 
Different network theories on adoption can be classified on the basis of their view of 
what the benefits of networks actually are. In their review, Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf (1997) include network externalities as part of an increasing returns 
mechanism, in which growing networks give objective benefits. They propose that the 
network theories reviewed share the view that the potential adopter feels bandwagon 
pressures to adopt, but that the mechanisms differ. The second group, ‘learning 
theories of bandwagons’ is based on the idea that potential adopters learn about an 
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innovation’s profitability from the existing adopters. Growing networks offer a larger 
base for such information. ‘Fad theories of bandwagons’ focus on who has adopted, 
as this generates social bandwagon pressure to conform (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 
1997).  
Robertson (1993) investigates the problem of diffusion from the point of view of an 
individual firm. The article points out that time-to-market is a critical, but largely 
neglected aspect of competitive advantage. Rapid market penetration is seen as being 
most important where product life cycles are short. The objective is reached with five 
policies which are: to be first in the market; to preannounce before market 
availability; to innovate constantly; to occupy a market with multiple brands, 
positioning, segments, and by building alliances; and to manage the customer 
purchase decision process (Robertson, 1993). 
The first-mover firm has an advantage to establish its offering as an industry standard 
(Teece, 1986; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Arthur, 1989, 1994, 1996). 
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) define first-mover advantages as the ability of 
pioneering firms to earn positive profits in excess of cost of capital. Mechanisms 
leading to first mover advantages are thought to be technological leadership, pre-
emption of scarce assets and buyer switching costs (Lieberman & Montgomery, 
1988). Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) identify two main sources of benefits from 
choosing a first-mover strategy. Firstly, an early entrant can block the competitors’ 
way through the pre-emption of valuable resources, such as prime physical locations 
or patents. Secondly, the first-mover strategy may give a firm an opportunity to alter 
the cost structure of customers. Network externalities represent alterations where 
customer preferences are shaped to favour a pioneer’s product (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1998). If the first-mover can hold its position, delaying the entry of a 
first generation technology provider will increase its profits and in an extreme case 
could deter competitors’ subsequent entries altogether (Katz & Shapiro, 1992).   
In an article reviewing and synthesising research on the first-mover advantages of a 
firm Kerin et al. (1992) summarise theoretical-analytical explanations for this. These 
include explanations arguing that first-mover advantages are due to entry barriers; the 
first-mover finds least resistance among the most potential customers; learning by 
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customers gives an upper hand to the first-mover; and the first mover will have 
differentiation advantages (Kerin et al., 1992).  
Theoretical explanations quite often overlook the uncertainties involved and the 
possible distinctiveness of later entrants (Kerin et al., 1992). In addition, industry 
pioneers have more expensive costs of regulatory approvals, educating customers and 
suppliers of factor inputs, and so forth (Porter, 1980). The adoption process may have 
difficulties at the start, especially if there are even more improvements to come 
(Rosenberg, 1982). Innovations seen as experimental are not appreciated by the 
majority of users (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). In non-cooperative standard setting, 
a firm is more willing to comply with a new standard if someone else has pioneered 
the switch (Farrell & Saloner, 1985). Teece (1986) investigates how the position of a 
first-mover is also more at risk if the innovation is easily imitated and the firm does 
not hold in conjunction other valuable complementary capabilities or assets. 
Commercial success may even pass from the provider of a monopoly technology to 
the owner of valued co-specialised asset e.g. a distribution channel. In order to profit 
from first entry strategies, the firm has to hold proprietary technologies or valuable 
complementary assets (Teece, 1986).     
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) partition first-mover disadvantages in four main 
areas. Firstly, later entrants may be able to ‘free-ride’ on a pioneering firm’s 
investments. Secondly, late movers can delay their entry until technological and 
market uncertainties are resolved. Second-mover advantage may surface if the 
competing firms are sponsoring their technologies. Customers avoid locking in to 
older, possibly inferior technology (Katz & Shapiro, 1986b). Thirdly, new entrants 
may see and exploit new technological discontinuities that were not earlier available. 
Fourthly, a pioneering firm may be locked-in to outdated assets, or be reluctant to 
make radical changes with existing product lines, or may have become otherwise 
organisationally inflexible (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Rapid growth shifts 
the emphasis to the future, placing a competitive pressure on firms. Cusumano et al. 
(1992) describes how competitive mass consumer product markets often experience a 
slow standardisation, which favours the follower firms who can avoid the pitfalls of 
their predecessors (Cusumano et al., 1992). Kerin et al. (1992) propose that in the case 
of the rapid evolution of markets, the first mover’s cost and differentiation advantages 
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shrink (Kerin et al., 1992). If technologies become obsolete, the installed base loses 
its significance. It follows that lock-in effects do not play a part, and that prices fall. 
Current profits and expected total discounted profits may be lower in rapid growth 
industries (Beggs & Klemperer, 1992). The ‘late-mover advantage’ stream focuses on 
the difficulties of holding onto leadership, especially on the technological front. The 
notion of strength in building strong complementary assets (Teece, 1986) could be 
judged as a first-mover strategy in firm relationships and networks. Provision of large 
variety by a later entrant can also be a strategic manoeuvre to defeat a first-mover 
firm that is stronger in innovation (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Cusumano et 
al., 1992). In the rivalry for the dominance of the VCR-standard, groups of firms 
organised themselves to produce and distribute a product in sufficient numbers, which 
usurped advantage of the former industry leader. Later, the producers of 
complementary products aligned strategically, which reinforced the acquired 
advantage. The complementary producers’ action possibly cut the predecessor’s, or 
the first-mover’s chances of survival even as a second format. Both periods were 
marked by the importance of complementary parts of the network and the efficient 
management of the network (Teece, 1986; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; 
Cusumano et al., 1992; Besen & Farrell, 1994). 
2.4.5 Competitive outcomes   
Positive feedback loops in network markets lead to a tendency towards 
standardisation (Arthur, 1989; David & Greenstein, 1990; Cusumano et al., 1992; 
Shurmer, 1993; Arthur, 1994; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Arthur, 
1996), see Figure 4. In a network market, or with complex products, firms and 
technologies enjoy first-mover advantage because a rapidly established base of 
customers and complementary products provides increasing returns (David, 1985; 
Klemperer, 1987; Arthur, 1989, 1994; Tegarden et al., 1999). The imitation of an 
industry leader by follower companies is one way of managing risk with uncertain 
technological solutions (Porter, 1980). When the adopters start to switch systems, the 
change may take only a short time once one provider has gained initial edge. Potential 
adopters are prone to tipping, as they do not want to be stuck with an inferior network 
(Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & Shapiro, 1994). Network markets are described as 
‘tippy’ - referring to the network participant behaviour close to the ex post critical 
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mass point. The unstable co-existence of incompatible products may lead to the 
sudden defeat of competitors after one standard or company has had an initial 
advantage (Besen & Farrell, 1994). Excessive inertia may take place, supporting the 
dominant players, even in cases where improved products were soon available 
(Arthur, 1996). Often, the described process ends up where ‘winner-takes-it-all’ (Katz 
& Shapiro, 1986b; Besen & Farrell, 1994; e.g. Arthur, 1996; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1998; Shapiro & Varian, 1999a).  
David (1985) demonstrated the story of the diffusion of the QWERTY keyboard 
typewriter as an example of the success of inferior technology12. The major reason for 
premature resolution was a decentralised, path-dependent adaptation process, where 
chance elements can dominate. Technical interrelatedness created system scale 
economies. As QWERTY gained a slender lead, more typists were ready to switch to 
the system and the firms’ costs of acquiring the system decreased. Learning efforts 
put into typing skills were also quasi-irreversible investments strengthening path-
dependence. A growing network was also a signal for manufacturers. Non-QWERTY 
manufacturers saw growth opportunities in serving a wider clientele, and changed 
their product offering accordingly (David, 1985).  
The firms have to possess the capacity to initiate technological changes, or to respond 
rapidly (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). In knowledge-intensive industries, evolving 
markets are more unstable and hard to predict, placing more strain on managers who 
have to adapt to rapidly changing situations (Arthur, 1996). Firms may have 
difficulties in keeping pace with the industry, which has implications for performance. 
The first-mover firm has to have both the willingness and resources to manage its 
early lead or it will lose its advantage (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Arthur, 
1996). Arthur (1996) argues that weak firms have only two alternatives; “slow death, 
and graceful exit”. The former leading firms may still remain in the industry for a 
long time, but playing only a side role (Arthur, 1996). 
The case of the videocassette recording system has been quoted as another example of 
a technologically inferior winner, but this time with a second mover who triumphed. 
                                                 
12
  There is criticism outside of the core documents, which argue that the story of QWERTY is 
misrepresented (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1990" Journal of Law and Economics, April 1990, 
33:1, 1-26) 
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Cusumano et al. (1992) describe how the VHS-system overtook the position of Beta, 
formerly the leading format for home VCR-equipment. The case differs from insights 
given by David (1985) and Arthur (1989) in stressing that the competitive situations 
and the eventual outcome reflects the deliberate, and timely actions of the major 
participating firms (Cusumano et al., 1992).  
2.4.6 Summary of the network externality review  
This chapter pulls together the previous insights, and provides help for interpreting 
Figure 4.  
A networked market is often seen as resulting in a situation in which the industry 
leader will dominate the market (e.g. Katz & Shapiro, 1986b; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Arthur, 1996). Initial successes, or 
failures draw the different paths of firms even further apart, because of path-
dependence (Noda & Collis, 2001). Positive feedback or increasing returns tend to 
magnify even small events which occur during the change in the development of an 
industry (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989, 1990). Path-dependence, network inter-
dependency, and high adoption rates after critical mass create firms with strong 
incentives to dominate the market and to use first-mover strategies, which often leads 
to a ‘winner-takes-it-all’ situation (Katz & Shapiro, 1986b; Besen & Farrell, 1994; 
e.g. Arthur, 1996; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998; Shapiro & Varian, 1999a).  
There are three kinds of closed feedback loops in the nomological map. The first loop 
is the installed base of customers and a network of complementary products and 
services, each side of the equation acts on the observed and anticipated changes of the 
other (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1986a; Church & Gandal, 1992; 
Shurmer, 1993; Schilling, 1998; Gupta et al., 1999). 
The second loop is between the installed base and the role of expectations and 
management, which has variety of implications. An installed base of customers gives 
information to potential adopters about the viability of the offering. Firms try to 
manage how others perceive the network growth, because new customers are attracted 
to join a viable and growing network of existing customers (David, 1985; Farrell & 
Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Farrell & Saloner, 1986a). Later-adopters look 
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for information to back their adoption decisions. The role of expectations implies 
several tactics that are available to managers to influence their customer base. These 
include active announcements about the installed base, a complementor network, and 
other signs of the viability of the offering (Cusumano et al., 1992; Shurmer, 1993; 
Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Padmanabhan et al., 1997). 
Announcements are future orientated in order to convince current and potential 
customers, and are of major importance to managers. As the networked market tends 
to favour early-mover strategies, a firm may be willing to restrain the success of its 
major competitors. Therefore, predatory and aggressive information towards 
competitors may be included (Porter, 1980; Farrell & Saloner, 1986a; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1986b; Eliashberg & Robertson, 1988; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Arthur, 1996; 
Padmanabhan et al., 1997). However the situation is different, if a competitor is a 
member of the same network. Building a viable market is an opportunity for all the 
participants (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). The distinction between a hostile or co-operative 
attitude lies in the evaluation of competitors related to their complementary role in the 
firm’s own network and to the growth phase of the market (Church & Gandal, 1992). 
Building a good complementor network offers more variety, and is therefore an 
improved offering for customers (Katz & Shapiro, 1994). The third loop consists of 
the complementary network and the role of expectations. All of the network 
participants, whether they are firms or customers, evaluate the current and future 
quality of the network. As with the installed base, a viable network attracts more 
actors to join the network. Efficient management of a complementor network can 
offer strong later-movers a chance to overcome the incumbent (Teece, 1986; 
Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Cusumano et al., 1992; Besen & Farrell, 1994). 
Pricing and other sponsorship is a way to invite new members to join the network, 
whilst preventing the competitor’s marketing efforts. Sponsoring can be targeted to 
other firms as well as to customers. Sponsoring lowers switching costs, so it is a way 
to capture new customers, whether they are potential adopters of technology or 
existing customers of competitors (Rohlfs, 1974; Farrell & Saloner, 1986a; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1986a, 1986b; Farrell & Shapiro, 1988; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1994; Arthur, 1996).   
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First-mover advantages are not explicit in the map, as they are a combination of 
different activities, or motivations for such actions. First-mover advantages include 
switching costs, which discourage people from switching from the product or 
network. This has an effect on both the current adopters and the potential adopters. 
The first group has a preference for staying with their original supplier, thus favouring 
the first mover (e.g. Porter, 1980; e.g. Farrell & Shapiro, 1988; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988; Kerin et al., 1992). For the latter group, the higher perceived 
costs of selecting poorly and switching later may act as a hindrance to adopt in the 
first place (Farrell & Gallini, 1988; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & Shapiro, 1994). 
Firms may be willing to participate in standardisation, compatibility and sponsoring, 
which lessens the switching costs (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Gabel, 1987).   
The summary above emphasises the future-orientation of network participants. It 
seems that although researchers emphasise path-dependence, history is left out of the 
modelling effort. Researchers have suggested that small events are magnified in the 
course of history (Arthur, 1989, 1994, 1996), but the path-dependence models do not 
include the effects of separate but influential overlapping paths. The network 
externality researchers widely support the idea that the dynamic setting leads to one 
actor or technology having a dominant position. However, there are opposite 
examples present, such as competitors of the Windows operating system with their 
respective software. The problems are a sign of a research gap in the understanding 
about what actions firms take in a network context, and how firm dynamics evolve.  
The reviewed discourse does not provide an entirely concise view of firm strategies. 
The cited documents emphasise first mover strategies, or strong, even aggressive 
second mover strategies, at least for firms that are offering key technologies, or core 
products in an offering. There is some work covering how the other firms react when 
one firm is striving to dominate the market e.g. (Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1994; Arthur, 1996), but their chosen approach limits their applicability. The 
articles underline the dynamism, but the used approaches (economic modelling, or 
static multi-firm data) do not necessarily reveal well how events unfolded.  
The scope for network externality concepts has been growing and evolving since 
Rohlfs (1974). A shift to more knowledge-intensive modes of production with more 
positive feedback loops affects industry evolution, leading to an expansion of the 
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applicability of network concepts (Arthur, 1996). However, the boundaries of network 
competition are not clearly defined. For a firm, the positive effects of the enlargement 
of a network should be weighed against the negative effects of increased competition 
(Church & Gandal, 1992). Porter (1980) argues that industry growth is critical in 
emerging industries but that managers have to change their focus to be more firm-
centred when the industry matures (Porter, 1980). Even the proponents of networked 
economy acknowledge that expansion has its limits. Arthur  (1996) claims that a more 
traditional ‘decreasing returns regime’ which usually produces repetitive outputs with 
low knowledge content in approximately perfect competition will survive, often in the 
same industry, and even in the same company (Arthur, 1996). 
2.5 Approaches to industry evolution 
The nomological map summarising the insights in the network externality discussion 
(Chapter 2.4.1) illustrated how different factors contribute to the success of a firm or 
technology in network externality markets. However, a fragmented and theory-
orientated discourse did not offer clear guidance on the relative importance of the 
factors. This suggests that there is a need to find a different, unifying theory able to 
capture processes in competition. The dynamic approach, with heterogeneous actors, 
is one of the major challenges of the existing literature. There is a need to find 
approaches that are relevant to network externalities, whilst having the ability to 
capture dynamism in real-world settings. The mapping of related research streams 
(Chapter 2.2) and research fields used concepts that might be fruitful for investigating 
network externalities. The highlighted groups focused on firm resources, innovation, 
market structure, knowledge, learning, adaptation, and selection. 
One of the insights in the network externality discussion is the emphasis on feedback. 
Amongst the related research fields, the different evolutionary frameworks take into 
account the longitudinal development with feedback mechanisms, which could be 
helpful in answering some of the open questions in the current discussion. In the 
following chapter, the evolutionary approaches included in group V of the previous 
bibliometric study are further examined13. Firstly, the positive feedback mechanism is 
                                                 
13
 Other potential candidates for further review were resource-based view, the knowledge-based view, 
and approaches focusing on social capital and dynamic capabilities, which widely share 
learning related concepts.  
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discussed, concentrating on the evolutionary perspective on economics (Nelson & 
Winter, 1973, 1974; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Research on institutions and the 
resource-based view are covered in this section. Secondly, the negative feedback 
mechanism is discussed. Here, the focus is on population ecology (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977, 1984), which assigns more impact to competition and selection 
mechanisms. Thirdly, a summary is given that highlights the differences between the 
approaches. 
2.5.1 Underlying theoretical perspectives 
The evolutionary perspective on economics and population ecology are closely related 
to the work of Joseph Schumpeter, whose ideas on dynamism have been the catalyst 
for much of the empirical and theoretical work investigating the links between 
technological change, population, organisation, and individual outcomes (e.g. Nelson 
& Winter, 1974; Barney, 1986; Tushman & Nelson, 1990; Nelson, 2002). In reviews, 
Schumpeter’s work has been evaluated as being a challenger to classical economic 
modelling. The latter focuses on short-term market equilibrium, and has largely 
limited the scope of economic action to optimisation procedures involving profit 
maximisation motivation and a diminishing returns mechanism (see critique e.g.  
Alchian, 1950; Nelson & Winter, 1974; Clark, 1988; Arthur, 1989, 1990; Dickson et 
al., 2001; Clark & Rowlinson, 2004). In classical tradition, profit-maximisation was 
focused on a firm’s close domain, while changes in technological regime or tastes in 
utility function are left for exogenous forces (Antonelli, 1997). In classical economic 
modelling, intentional action on industrial structure does not play a role (Antonelli, 
1997).  In a critique, March and Simon (1958) claimed that classical economic theory, 
with its organisational theory counterpart, failed to make explicit the subjective and 
relative character of rationality. There are several assumptions in the classical 
theories, such as that all the alternatives of a choice are given, that consequences are 
known, and that the rational man has a complete utility-ordering for all of the possible 
sets of consequences. None of these assumptions hold true in natural settings (March 
& Simon, 1958).   
In contrast, Schumpeter and like-minded researchers have offered a view, in which 
technology change is treated as being endogenous; differentiating from neo-classical 
economists’ modelling (Nelson & Winter, 1974). In evolutionary thinking, firms were 
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seen as optimising their actions, or potential outcome distribution, instead of seeking a 
unique profit-maximisation solution which logically cannot exist in an uncertain 
environment (Alchian, 1950). The evolutionary perspective on economics (Nelson & 
Winter, 1973, 1974; Nelson & Winter, 1982), and population ecology (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977; Carroll, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 1984) theories investigate how 
variation, selection and retention take place. Both assume that organisations do not 
change easily and quickly, but that the past will affect their propensity to adapt to 
changes (Barnett & Carroll, 1995).  
Ecological and evolutionary perspectives make inquiries about the same historical 
processes (Singh, 1990). The latter has also been described as a subset of the former 
(Meyer, 1990), while there have been times when the opposite has been suggested 
(Barney, 2001). There are also some differences between the perspectives. At the 
outset, the ecologists also viewed evolution as Darwinian, compared to Nelson and 
Winter’s (1982) Lamarckian view of acquired heritable characteristics (McKelvey, 
1994). The primary focus of research has also divided the frameworks. Population 
ecology has concentrated on studying processes of selection and retention, while 
variation has been more central to the evolutionary perspective on economics 
(Ginsberg & Baum, 1994). Population ecologists have claimed that they include 
competition, whilst others do not pay it serious attention (Freeman & Boeker, 1984). 
Evolutionary arguments are more interested in how the structural properties of 
organisms influence their adaptation to changing environmental conditions, whilst the 
ecological perspective gives primacy to environments that shape populations (Meyer, 
1990; Singh, 1990; Meyer, 1994; Aldrich). Adaptation and selection have been seen 
as conflicting views in organisational science (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; 
Burgelman, 1991).  
Other theoretical views provide additional linkages between the ecology and 
evolutionary perspectives. Both underlying perspectives share a view that institutional 
theories can contribute significantly to organisational science. Institutional processes 
may play a decisive role in the primacy of ecological or evolutionary forces (Meyer, 
1990). The proponents of both perspectives have explicitly claimed to include 
institutional theory (e.g. Meyer & Scott, 1983) in their theorising (e.g. Hannan & 
Freeman, 1987; Carroll & Hannan, 1989a; Nelson, 2002). Concepts of learning and 
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problem-solving (e.g. March & Simon, 1958) are used both in the first major studies 
in the evolutionary economists’ framework (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and in the 
ecology view (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), albeit in a more supplemental manner with 
the latter. 
2.5.2 Positive feedback mechanism and evolutionary perspective on 
economics  
In a review, Gavetti and Levinthal (2004) suggest that the evolutionary economics 
framework (Nelson & Winter, 1982) provides a conceptual apparatus that is 
consistent with the research interests discovered in the recent firm strategy discourse 
(Gavetti & Levinthal, 2004). Firm strategy research has embraced a view that treats 
managerial choice as intentionally rational, but without the strong rationality 
assumptions of neo-classical economists. The evolutionary perspective incorporated 
incomplete information and an uncertain future in the analysis (Alchian, 1950). 
2.5.2.1 Path-dependence and accumulation of knowledge  
The evolutionary perspective on economics investigates how variation, selection and 
retention shape firms, and especially their knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1973, 1974; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982). A routine is the basic unit of analysis in studying 
organisational evolution in this framework. The selection process weeds out 
unsuccessful routines or firms, while the successful ones are carried forward. 
Routines are idiosyncratic, and successful copying of them from one firm to another is 
difficult (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
Successful retention of routines is a sign of path-dependence. Path-dependence and 
accumulation of knowledge are found in an organisation, a technology, and at 
industry level (Nelson & Winter, 1982; David, 1985). A search for new suitable ways 
of doing things is most likely to come from within the firm, or very close to the firm. 
Technological advancement tends to be cumulative, and improvements proceed along 
particular lines, reflecting the available understanding of technology and market 
demands (Nelson et al., 1976; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1998). Firms 
following a technological trajectory within a certain technological paradigm find it 
difficult to change the developmental path (Dosi, 1982, 1988). A trajectory is the 
pattern of the problem solving activity following the paradigm (Dosi, 1982). Wijnberg 
(1995) posits that technology trajectories and paradigms should include also the users’ 
  57 
and customers’ point of view; “ [a] technological trajectory represents technological 
change in time as seen through the eyes of the only competent observers and judges of 
the process of competition: consumers (Wijnberg, 1995)”. Stuart and Podolny (1996) 
propose that firm’s role in networks constrains the direction of learning (Stuart & 
Podolny, 1996). Noda and Collis (2001) argue that cognitive feedback is relevant to 
firm strategy functions primarily at the level of individual managers, while the other 
positive feedback types – economic and socio-political - is evident in the industry and 
in the organisation (Noda & Collis, 2001).  Path-dependence is suggested to be found 
when positive feedback mechanisms are present, especially density-dependent 
legitimation, learning-by-doing, economies of scale, and network externalities 
(Carroll & Harrison, 1994).  
According to the resource-based view, firms can be seen as bundles of idiosyncratic 
resources (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991)14. In the RBV argumentation, a sustainable 
competitive advantage may arise from a competitors’ difficulty in copying firm’s 
resources (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). In order to exploit its strengths and to keep 
ahead of competition, a firm has to constantly renew its resources (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Learning processes recombine existing resources to create new knowledge that forms 
a basis for future growth (Penrose, 1959). The processes of recombination makes 
learning path-dependent in nature (Kogut & Zander, 1992). The path-dependency of 
learning is sometimes further reinforced by increasing returns dynamics (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990). A firm’s specific asset positions constitute and create a class of 
feedback effects which create a firm’s evolutionary path (Dickson et al., 2001).    
2.5.2.2 Institutions and mutualism 
Research on institutions has investigated how the established behaviour patterns, 
social rules and conventions, ‘habits’ or ‘social technologies’ affect economic actions 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1991; Nelson & Sampat, 2001; Nelson, 2002; Hodgson, 2003). The 
                                                 
14
 The resource-based view has been characterised as a derivation of evolutionary economics (Clark & 
Rowlinson, 2004). The close links of the RBV and evolutionary frameworks are also 
evidenced by the fact that the classic RBV article of Barney (1991) was originally positioned 
as an evolutionary study. Barney (2001) argues that only the strong position of population 
ecology in the 1980’s diverted the resource-based view from the evolutionary streams. His 
article further clarifies that Nelson and Winter (1982), and more recent work on the 
evolutionary perspective on economics, shares the same basic building blocks as the resource-
based view; the concept of firm routines being analogous to firm resources in RBV (Barney, 
2001). 
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institutional research stream has theorised that organisational structures arise as 
reflections of rationalised institutional rules. Conformity to institutionalised rules 
often is often contrary to efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organisations may 
respond to uncertainty by conforming to others through imitation (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). 
Nelson and Sampat (2001) argue that some of the notable institutional theorists have 
shifted their view towards thinking that institutions are developed without a 
coordinated, rational effort to increase efficiency, but in a more evolutionary manner 
leading to, e.g., cross-country differences. Path-dependence has recently received 
more attention from institutional investigators, and this concept increases the focus on 
the expectation aspects of institutions (Nelson & Sampat, 2001). 
Institutional concerns have also been rigorously investigated using different 
frameworks, well before the emergence of institutional theory (Aldrich, 1999; Scott, 
2003). Borrowing from population ecology and network externalities, Wade (1995) 
analysed how market success arises not only from technological superiority but also 
from the support from within the organisational community that the technology 
attracts. Organisational support from other stakeholders is a necessary resource in the 
first stages of technology diffusion, in an industry characterised by the existence of 
network externalities. These arguments stress path-dependence and first-mover 
advantage (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989).  
The emergence of a technological dominant design can be seen as a product of 
community organisation dynamics. Rosenkopf and Tushman (1994) argue that 
community evolution is parallel to the evolution of technology. The network of actors 
and their relationships have a structure similar to the technology itself in a technology 
cycle (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). At first, only a few linkages exist among actors, 
but ties emerge around competing variants, producing clusters. More powerful actors 
have a better ability to shape and influence the path of change (Rosenkopf & 
Tushman, 1994). For Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992) the community involves 
suppliers, manufactures and users, but also governmental agencies, standards bodies 
and professional societies (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). The social evolution can be 
seen as progression of numerous interrelated acts of variation, selection, and retention 
over an extended period of time (VandeVen & Garud, 1994). The co-evolutionary 
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concept was developed on the assumption that changes may occur in all interacting 
organisations, permitting change to be driven by both direct interactions and feedback 
from the system (Baum & Singh, 1994a). 
Distinct subgroups in a population, termed strategic groups, can be identified by 
evaluating strategic and structural organisational characteristics (McGee & Thomas, 
1986; Thomas & Venkatraman, 1988). Managers in a strategic group anchor their 
development of strategy in their evaluation of competitors’ strategies (Thomas & 
Venkatraman, 1988). A cognitive perspective on strategic groups involves the shared 
perceptions and cognitions of competitors’ strategies and group structure by the 
managers of related companies, a cognitive structure which is a force in creating 
institutional isomorphism (Reger & Huff, 1993). There is empirical evidence that 
strategic groups act as reference points to their members when forming firm strategy 
(Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995). The organisational or technological community 
concept differs from strategic groups in how they see similarity between 
organisations. Community refers to interdependence of product design, or 
sponsorship, while strategic group relates to similarities in organisations’ strategies 
(Wade, 1995).  
Mutualism15 describes a situation in which organisations enhance each other’s 
viability (Barnett & Carroll, 1987) when their life chances are positively related 
(Barnett & Amburgey, 1990). Barnett and Carroll (1987) analysed the relationship 
between early telephone companies’ competitive advantage and membership in a 
given technological system (Barnett & Carroll, 1987; Barnett, 1990). They explained 
how both competition and mutualism occurred simultaneously among the 
organisations. Firms with similar resource requirements are expected to compete 
more, while more complementary functions increase the potential for mutualism 
(Barnett & Carroll, 1987; Barnett, 1990; Baum & Singh, 1994b). Mutualism may be 
the direct result of differentiated organisations referring potential customers to each 
other, or of organisations’ linked complementary functions. Indirect, or diffuse forms 
of mutualism are legitimacy in the eyes of customers, and embeddedness of a 
particular population within the wider institutional environment (Barnett & Carroll, 
                                                 
15
 Researchers working on ecology have contributed to our understanding about mutualism. However it 
is reviewed here, because of its focus on positive feedback.  
  60 
1987; Barnett, 1990; Baum & Singh, 1994b). Both types were found to operate in the 
dispersed market of early telephone companies, where large firms could improve the 
telephony offering of the companies. A large organisation was seen to improve both 
partner and network viability (Barnett & Amburgey, 1990). The reasoning and 
empirical focus of, particularly, Barnett (1990) is very close to views offered by 
network externality theorists (e.g. Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Barnett (1990) 
differentiates the ecology and network externality perspectives by stating that 
“ecological theory identifies the importance of competition within and mutualism 
between environmental niches. Consequently, technological compatibility is not 
enough” (Barnett, 1990). Empirical results did not support the network externality 
hypothesis, which may be due to the simplicity of the operationalisation. The article 
deduced a network externality hypothesis based solely on the benefits of joining a 
growing network, ignoring the competitive effects (Barnett, 1990). 
2.5.2.3 Technology diffusion with positive feedback  
Increasing returns, which can be designated as a synonym for positive feedback 
mechanisms (Dickson et al., 2001), manifests itself in path-dependent evolution of a 
successful technology diffusion. After a synthesizing work by Suarez (2004), I review 
representative empirical work relying on the ideas of positive feedback mechanism in 
networked markets.  
Suarez (2004) focused on a description of competitive phases in technology 
competition of network markets and the tactical implications of the segmenting. The 
article develops its propositions by reviewing relevant literature, in which it posits 
network externality literature next to ‘dominant design’ and ‘diffusion’ literature, 
addressing different facets of technological trajectories. Suarez (2004) highlights three 
major findings derived from network externality models, starting with the firms’ 
installed base. Second is the role of consumer expectations, which is shaped by image, 
pre-announcements, and information availability, whilst the third is the importance of 
the dynamic elements of firm strategies, such as pricing and licensing policies. Fusing 
insights also from studies of the sociology of science and technology, Suarez (2004) 
describes firm- and environment-level factors that influence the outcome of 
technology competition. When firms are creating the market, strategic manoeuvring is 
most important. This includes entry timing, pricing, licensing and relationships with 
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complementors, and marketing and public relations to manage expectations. The 
market creation is a phase that ends at the start of the ‘decisive battle’. The transition 
point is when the market has achieved critical mass. During the ‘decisive battle’, the 
most important competitive factors are credibility/complementary assets, installed 
base and network effects and switching cost (Suarez, 2004).   
A representative contemporary network externality discussant is Melissa Schilling, 
who (1998; 1999; 2002; 2003) has emphasised that firms should influence the 
virtuous circle of a growing size of installed base and the availability of 
complementary products (Schilling, 2002). Growth is managed with distribution, 
alliance and marketing strategies. The virtuous circle received empirical support using 
multi-industry survey data (Schilling, 2002). The perceptions and expectations of the 
installed base may be different from the actual base, which was demonstrated in the 
evolution of U.S. video game industry (Schilling, 2003).  
Lee and O’Connor (2003) proposed a model for product launch strategy and the 
performance of network effects products (Lee and O’Connor, 2003). It includes 
penetration pricing, product bundling, mass targeting, and pre-announcing as part of a 
firm strategy to enhance the extrinsic value of a new product. In addition to these 
network-related features, there are also product-related, intrinsic value drivers, such as 
the order of entry and relative product advantage. The interim performance measures 
are the size and development of the installed base. These attract more customers and 
complementary products, although the loop mechanism is outside the scope of the 
conceptual model concentrating on firm strategies (Lee & O'Connor, 2003). 
Dickson et al (2001) categorises feedback effects into two major classes. Positional 
advantages include investments benefiting from economies of scale, mostly in 
production but also in utilisation of networked products. Learning dynamics help to 
create positional advantages. These include contagion, learning-by-doing, learning-to-
learn, routines and rules and surveillance of others (Dickson et al., 2001). The figure 
by Dickson et al. (2001) of generic network market feedback (Figure 5) attempts to 
capture the evolution of market dominance. The Dickson et al. (2001) model is not 
clear concerning the demand side of positive feedback. The proposed usage utility 
efficiency measure has left out positive direct network externalities among 
consumers, although they were mentioned when the propositions were built. Dickson 
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et al. (2001) supports these ideas with anecdotal evidence on the success of 
Microsoft’s Windows95 operating system. Previous work on software diffusion has 
emphasised the role of both direct and indirect network externalities (e.g. Gandal, 
1994). A contribution of Dickson et al. (2001) is its illustration of how the 
mechanisms are affected by exogenous inputs. The supply feedback loop is fed by 
demand, but also by pulses of supplier innovation. On the demand side, buyers induce 
innovations, giving new input to the feedback. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Adapted from Dickson, Farris and Verbeke (2001) generic model of 
market feedback 
     
Gallagher and Park (2002) examined competitive dynamics in the U.S. video game 
industry, evaluating the succession of major game platforms by analysing documents 
using a historical method. Included among the findings was that ‘tipping’ was rare, as 
a number of challengers persisted with non-dominant designs (Gallagher & Park, 
2002). Lowering switching costs helps challengers to enter a market (Gallagher & 
Park, 2002) but the success is largely dependent on the hesitation of the leader to 
match the action. The article suggests that switching costs are elevated e.g. with 
branding and supply-distributor management (Gallagher & Park, 2002). The article 
acknowledges the multiplicity of relevant tenets in firm management when striving to 
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achieve market dominance in network industries, but the proposed causalities are not 
as elaborate. The proposed framework is explicit on the feedback between the 
installed base and complementary goods, and with their relationship to switching 
costs. Firms are expected to learn (Gallagher & Park, 2002), which is a driving force 
in competition Figure 6.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Adapted from Gallagher and Park (2002) conceptual framework of 
competitive success  
 
Shankar and Bayus (2003) disaggregated the feedback loop in their study of the video 
gaming industry. The networks were featured in terms of the size of the installed base, 
but also the strength of the network; i.e. implying a situation in which the marginal 
additions had a larger impact on demand. The contribution of the article is that they 
find statistical support that networks can be qualitatively different.  The major finding 
was the notion that challengers could overcome the leader if their smaller networks 
were stronger. In conceptual terms, the strength was the result of an interactive sense 
of a community among customers. The article proposes that some communities, e.g. 
Harley-Davidson and Apple users, are born without managerial action, but in other 
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cases the community is affected by marketing mix decisions (Shankar & Bayus, 
2003).  
Baum et al. (1995) investigated a service provided by facsimile transmission firms in 
Manhattan, from 1965 to 1982. They found support for the hypothesis that dominant 
designs and competitive processes influence founding and mortality rates in industries 
with significant network externalities. The rise of positive network externalities 
invited more entrepreneurs, which further supported the viability of the industry in a 
manner that earlier dominant design models could not explain (Baum et al., 1995).  
2.5.3 Negative feedback mechanism and population ecology 
Organisational ecology was originally concerned with how social conditions influence 
rates of creation, change and demise of organisational forms and organisations. 
Ecological perspectives, which are also outside of the sociological domain, have a 
common feature of focusing on selection processes (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Hannan 
& Freeman, 1977; Wholey & Brittain, 1986; Meyer, 1990; Singh & Lumsden, 1990; 
Meyer, 1994; Carroll & Hannan, 1995; Aldrich, 1999). Freeman and Boeker (1984) 
criticise the evolutionary perspective by Nelson and Winter for “…[failing] to 
conceptualise competition as a relationship between specific firms” with an erroneous 
understanding of stability in the markets (Freeman & Boeker, 1984 p.83). Carroll 
(1984) classifies three levels of analysis of organisational ecology: the organisational, 
the population, and the community level. Population ecology concentrates on 
population growth and decline and on interactions among populations (Carroll, 1984), 
Therefore “the population-ecology perspective seeks to understand how 
environmental conditions and interactions within and between populations shape the 
diversity of organisations in society” (Hannan & Freeman, 1987). Ecological models 
are interested in the distribution of fitness across a population, which has implications 
for the applicability of the models. The concepts are most appropriate when applied at 
the field, or population level instead of the single organisation, and over a relatively 
long time span (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Freeman & Boeker, 1984).  
A basic tenet in initial population ecology theorising is that strong organisational 
inertia restricts organisations’ ability to change, and thus they are vulnerable to 
changes in the operating environment. Competition and environmental constraints 
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lead to uniformity of organisational responses, and leaves little room for strategic 
management (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Meyer, 1990, 1994). Oliver (1988) made a 
distinction between the institutional and ecology view of why organisations have 
similar characteristics in a population: “Although both explanations attribute causal 
supremacy to the environmental context of organisations for shaping organisational 
structure, the former predicts isomorphism from organisational competition, while the 
latter predicts isomorphism from organisational interconnectedness” (Oliver, 1988). 
Population ecology theories started as an attempt to underline selection processes, 
compared to theories based on organisational adaptation. Natural selection is seen as 
the dominant mechanism of social change (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Carroll, 1984). 
In ecology terminology, selection is the elimination of certain types of organisations. 
Mortality can take the form of dissolution, absorption by merger, or radical 
transformation (Carroll, 1984). The environment selects out combinations of 
organisations, which contrast with the view of intentionally, or rationally adapting 
organisations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Carroll, 1984; Utterback & Suarez, 1993). 
The initial work on population ecology focused on selection processes, leaving 
adaptation processes and intentional change without careful investigation (Freeman & 
Hannan, 1989; Mezias & Lant, 1994; Greve, 1996). A further critique is that the 
theoretical and empirical work was not developed in parallel (Hannan et al., 2003). 
Population ecology started with a premise that structural inertia hindered individual 
adaptation, a process that was principally seen only at population level. Isomorphism 
was viewed to be a result of competitive pressures forcing organisations with similar 
constraints to behave similarly (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Hannan and Freeman 
(1984) proposed that structural inertia is a consequence of a selection process, rather a 
precondition for it. The market is seen to favour organisations that do not make risky 
changes (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Because of the stability of organisational 
features, ecologists have most often seen the creation of new organisational forms as a 
way to propel organisational changes (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 
1987).  
Different organisational density models are used to explain regularities in the growth 
and decline of organisational populations (Carroll & Hannan, 1989a). According to 
the model, the competition and legitimising effects can explain why the number of 
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organisations in a population typically follows a concave pattern of growth and 
decline (Carroll & Hannan, 1989b). Increased legitimacy encourages more new 
market entries, while competition has the opposite effect (Hannan & Freeman, 1987; 
Carroll & Hannan, 1989b). The indirect and simultaneous measurement of 
‘legitimatisation’ is criticised in e.g. Zucker (1989), Baum and Powell (1995) and 
Delacroix and Rao (1994). 
2.5.3.1 Niches and networks   
The market position relates to the concept of niche in ecological theory, borrowed 
originally from biology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). A niche is defined using 
information on external resources (Podolny et al., 1996). The idea of a niche has been 
criticised, because it is very difficult to define the limits of a niche in an evolving 
organisational setting, compared to a situation in biology (Young, 1988). In 
organisational ecology, firms can define the market boundaries by their activities 
(Barron, 2001), and each population of firms are thought to occupy their own niche 
(Geroski, 2001). A niche consists of the social, economic, and political conditions that 
can sustain the functioning of organisations (Carroll & Hannan, 1995). Successful 
firms in a new niche attract new firms (Haveman, 1993), and eventually the niche will 
be filled, leading to the emergence of new firm strategies (Freeman & Boeker, 1984). 
Because the success of firms in any position is determined by competition within the 
position and competition from firms in positions nearby, positional markets are very 
complex (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Greve, 1996).   
Network-attributes are a dimension to be considered when evaluating the viability of a 
single organisation. An organisation’s niche in a network is manifested in its points of 
contact with the activities of other organisations (Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny et 
al., 1996). Especially in dynamic environments, the link between past performance 
and present ability is often considered to be tenuous. An organisation’s status is 
largely a function of a relational position that the organisation manages in the market 
(Podolny, 1995; Podolny et al., 1996). A central position with many ties to other 
members in an uncrowded niche improves the life chances of an organisation or 
innovation. The positive effect of status declines with crowding. Empirical evidence 
from the semiconductor industry supports the hypothesis that status and crowding 
have an effect on the survival on firms, though the evidence on technological change 
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was not as clear (Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny et al., 1996). Podolny and Stuart 
(1995) consider that some evolutionary theorists may have an over simplistic view 
when concentrating on a local search about technological aspects. The relational 
context adds another dimension in which organisations have to operate. Keeping the 
resources for local search constant, the focus shifts from the properties of the 
technology itself to relational aspects (Podolny & Stuart, 1995).  
2.5.3.2 Organisational change and learning  
Population ecology research has shifted its understanding of change and learning, 
which has brought it closer to the evolutionary perspective on economics. A growing 
body of research examines the link between the adaptive dynamics of firms and 
industry (Amburgey et al., 1993; Barnett & Burgelman, 1996; Barnett & Hansen, 
1996; Henderson & Mitchell, 1997; Greve, 1998b; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2004).  
New ecological thinking has developed novel approaches to understand inertia. 
Amburgey et al. (1993) concluded that organisational inertia can be linked with inert 
but also with active organisations; “[an] Organisation in motion, tends to stay in 
motion” (Amburgey et al., 1993). Change does not necessarily have to be special per 
se, as certain forms of change can themselves become routine, while other forms of 
change remain unusual and, hence, risky (Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991; Barron, 
2001). 
Ecological concepts have been used to investigate mimetic behaviour when analysing 
organisational change (Haveman, 1993; Mezias & Lant, 1994; Greve, 1996, 1998a). 
Gimeno et al.’s (2005) review found that inter-organisational mimicry can be 
explained by externalities among the strategic actions of organisations, competitive 
reactions, and non-competitive referential processes, which include information spill-
over, vicarious learning, psychological, and socio-cognitive factors. Empirical 
evidence from the U.S. telephone industry’s international expansion moves supported 
the competitive explanations, while vicarious learning and cognitive aspects were not 
as evident (Gimeno et al., 2005). Mezias and Lant (1994) propose that mimetic search 
may guide an organisation’s experimental learning process, leading to organisational 
change. Haveman studied diversification, and found that successful firms attract new 
firms until the competitive effects overrule the legitimation effect (Haveman, 1993). 
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In a study of Manhattan hotel industry, Baum and Haveman concluded that new 
ventures tend to be located close to established ones and have similar pricing, but 
differentiating with size (Baum & Haveman, 1997). In series of studies on the market 
positions of radio stations, Greve (Greve, 1995, 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 1999) suggests 
that managers mimic others in their reference group to search for relatively 
uncrowded niches (Greve, 1996, 1998a). Uncertainty can be resolved by turning to 
imitation rather than inaction (Greve, 1996). Actions have a greater propensity to be 
mimicked if they are observable, and if they have potentially strategic relevance 
(Greve, 1998a). A manager having too much, or unreliable information, may find it 
beneficial to rely on a competitor’s visible choices, even without corresponding 
performance data. Because the decision-manager’s attention is focused on 
competitors, their example sets the agenda and influences judgements (Greve, 1998a). 
In Lee and Pennings’ (2002) model, the firms imitate their peers and evaluate the 
overall market situation. Both market feedback and amplifying firm level effects are 
part of the institutional process (Lee & Pennings, 2002). 
In a review, Hannan et al. (2003) state that one of the rather isolated theory fragments 
spawned by organisational ecology and demography is ‘Red Queen’ evolution 
(Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Barnett & Sorenson, 2002). Using the term coined by Van 
Valen (1973) for biological evolution, Barnett and Hansen (1996) discuss ‘Red 
Queen’ competition.  
‘Red Queen’ competition refers to competition in which a company that is immersed 
in competition responds to it through a localised search, learning, and capability 
development process. As this response marginally increases the competition faced by 
the responding firm’s competitors, it triggers similar actions by competitors (Noda & 
Collis, 2001). A firm’s actions trigger similar responses, and the self-reinforcing 
competitive cycle starts gradually driving industry dynamism and evolution. 
However, when observed from within the system, there do not seem to be any 
significant changes taking place with respect to the competitive positioning. As the 
business system starts evolving, subsequent competitive actions aimed at coordinating 
the evolution or jockeying for a position lead to immediate pre-emptying of the action 
by alert competitors. The responses induce further responses and the self-reinforcing 
competitive cycle gradually starts driving industry dynamism and evolution. When 
  69 
observed from the outside, the system was developing with great speed (Barnett & 
Hansen, 1996; Barnett & Sorenson, 2002).  
The situation can be applied to network evolution. The focal companies compete in 
similar manner e.g. emphasising efficiency requirements. There is less incentive to 
stay in the market, because the profits are lost to benefit suppliers and customers. If 
continued, this ‘Red Queen’ competition leads to the deterioration of the existing 
firms, giving room for new ones.  
The idea of ‘Red Queen’ competition is a further development of learning and change 
related research in the population ecology stream. It focuses explicitly on the dynamic 
nature of competition, acknowledging the intentions of managers and the boundaries 
of their actions. There has been work around aspects of ‘Red Queen’ competition 
(Barnett & Hansen, 1996), but its explicit applications have been scarce (e.g. Barnett 
& Hansen, 1996; Barnett & Sorenson, 2002; Sorensen & Sorenson, 2003).  
2.5.4 Summary of the theoretical approaches  
This chapter provides a summary of the previous sections on positive feedback 
mechanisms, especially the evolutionary perspective on economics (Nelson & Winter, 
1973, 1974; Nelson & Winter, 1982) and negative feedback focusing on the 
contributions from population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984). Both 
theoretical approaches evaluate variation, selection and retention on various levels of 
analysis, suitable for firm strategy research (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996). Previous 
work on network externalities and network externality market contexts provide a 
modern empirical setting to investigate the issues raised in these traditions.  
The research suggests that positive feedback in the forms described would be clearly 
evident, and the loop would have wide repercussions. In evolutionary theory, the 
emphasis is on successful retention of routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The path-
dependence is observable at an organisation, at a technology, and at industry level 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; David, 1985). Research built on evolutionary perspective 
has reasoned that there are various positive feedback mechanisms working inside the 
firm (e.g. routines, effective leveraging), among the firms (e.g. adaptation to a certain 
set of behaviour, increase in complementary firm entries) and in the firm’s market 
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(e.g. interdependent demand, variety and diffusion as sign of product quality, 
diffusion of knowledge on the network offer). Cumulative technological 
advancements proceed along particular lines, reflecting the current understanding 
(Nelson et al., 1976; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1998). The processes of 
recombination also makes learning path-dependent in nature (Kogut & Zander, 1992) 
reinforced by increasing returns dynamics (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Positive 
feedback magnifies small events, and makes the different evolutionary paths diverge 
(David, 1985; Arthur, 1989). The increased value of a large or varied offering is 
another, distinctive factor fuelling positive feedback mechanisms (e.g. Schilling, 
2002; Suarez, 2004).   
The ecological theory focuses on the survival of organisations, emphasising 
competitive pressures (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Carroll, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 
1984; Hannan & Freeman, 1987). After the population has reached legitimacy, 
learning-related and market-related competition work against the success of an 
individual firm (Carroll & Hannan, 1989b). Ecology arguments stress exhausting 
exploitation, compared to an exploration. Firms adapt to changing environments with 
inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) or by following someone who has performed the 
required move earlier (Amburgey et al., 1993; Haveman, 1993; Mezias & Lant, 1994; 
Greve, 1996, 1998a).  
In the ecological perspective tradition, the exploitation of existing relationships and 
stretching the limits of current networks is preferred to more explorative initiatives 
(Baum & Haveman, 1997; Gimeno et al., 2005). As the exploitation continues, above-
normal returns are competed away (Haveman, 1993). Localised search and learning 
with capability development processes builds a situation in which a firm’s behaviour 
leads to similar competitive search (Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Noda & Collis, 2001). If 
firms compete intensively against each other, the benefits of competition flow to other 
participants, e.g. suppliers and customers. The continuing ‘Red Queen’ competition 
leads to the deterioration of the focal firms, while the business system is advancing 
rapidly (Barnett & Hansen, 1996).The summary of evolutionary and ecological 
approaches is in Table 1.  
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Table 1 Evolutionary and ecological implications to network market 
investigation 
Item Evolutionary emphasis 
(positive feedback 
mechanism) 
Ecological emphasis (negative 
feedback mechanism) 
Main focus Retention and adaptation 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Nelson, 1998) 
Selection (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; 
Carroll, 1984) 
Source of 
advantage 
Cumulative advancement 
suited to environment 
demands (Nelson & Winter, 
1982; Nelson, 1998); 
Inimitable resources 
(Barney, 1991); 
Learning e.g. (Penrose, 
1959) 
Central position in an uncrowded, viable 
niche (Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny et 
al., 1996) 
Key 
competitive 
actions 
First-mover actions (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1986b; Lieberman 
& Montgomery, 1988; 
Besen & Farrell); 
Adaptation to environment 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Nelson, 1998); 
Managing expectations 
(Besen & Farrell, 1994) 
Actions repeat organisation’s former 
pattern, which is similar to patterns found 
with other surviving firms (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977); 
Imitation if one has to explore (Haveman, 
1993; Mezias & Lant, 1994; Greve, 1996); 
Imitative responses (Barnett & Hansen, 
1996) 
Relationship to 
other firms 
Source of support as well 
as competition (Wade, 
1995); 
Co-evolution (Baum & 
Singh, 1994a) 
Competitive if occupying the same niche 
resource-space, or using similar resources 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Carroll, 1985; 
Barnett & Carroll, 1987; Barnett, 1990; 
Baum & Singh, 1994b).;  
A source of legitimacy in a new market 
(Carroll & Hannan, 1989b; Haveman, 
1993) 
Source of 
change, 
conflict, crises  
Internal, or internalised 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982) 
(Meyer, 1990; Singh, 1990; 
Meyer, 1994) 
External as the niche becomes 
unsupportive or over-crowded (Meyer, 
1990; Singh, 1990; Meyer, 1994). 
Mechanism of 
positional 
change 
Positive feedback loop 
leading to divergence 
(Arthur, 1990; Dickson et 
al., 2001; Noda & Collis, 
2001) 
Negative feedback loop leading to firm 
convergence (Noda & Collis, 2001) 16 
                                                 
16
 Researchers studying product attributes and strategies in network environment use different terms to 
describe similar issues. Categories of positive and negative feedback (Arthur, 1990; Dickson 
et al., 2001) bear resemblance to the classes of a firm’s institutional and technological 
strategies (Das & Van de Ven, 2000), extrinsic and intrinsic product strategies (Lee & 
O'Connor, 2003), or external/market related factors compared to internal factors (Ehrhardt, 
2004) in choosing a competitive strategy. All of them investigate the evolution of industries, 
firm strategies, and networked products. While the last three emphasise the difference between 
the network related and product related attributes, the first emphasises the difference on the 
end-states of competition. Negative feedback is an equilibrating regularity, while positive 
feedback is feeding itself (Dickson et al., 2001).  
For Noda and Collis (2001), an economic, socio-political or social network, and cognitive positive 
feedback create divergent forces, while imitation is a source for convergence (Noda & Collis, 
2001). Simulation study by Oliva et al. (2003) showed that strong growth strategies for new 
entrants are very vulnerable. The same positive feedback mechanisms that power the growth 
can become vicious cycles if there are constraining factors, e.g. low quality in product offering 
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that leads to customer churn or inadequate infrastructure (Oliva et al., 2003). Another example 
of a vicious circle is a fall in sales which leads to a raise in price because of the cost structure. 
The raise in turn leads to a further fall in demand (Dickson et al., 2001). 
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The chapter explains the methodological choices and case setting of the study. The 
chapter provides justification for the use of the case research method (e.g. Yin, 2003). 
Later, it provides arguments for why the particular case was selected for scrutiny. It is 
followed by a description of the different analyses used to investigate the case 
evidence. Finally, the chapter discusses efforts to ensure the reliability and validity of 
the study.    
3.1 Case study as a research strategy and a set of analytical 
tools 
3.1.1 Motivation for case study method 
The case method was selected after deductive logic hypothesis testing was judged to 
be impractical. There are three overlapping reasons for selecting the case study 
method for this particular topic.  
Firstly, the character of available data makes large-scale hypothesis testing improper. 
This dissertation follows Yin’s (2003) definition of case study research strategy, in 
which a case study is used to empirically investigate a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context, especially when the context and boundaries of the 
investigated phenomenon are not clear-cut (Bonoma, 1985; Jensen, 2002; Yin, 2003). 
The dynamic nature of a networked market with various feedback mechanisms makes 
an investigation of adoption and competition issues difficult. Dynamic competition 
offers a multiplicity of possible variables, but few even potentially similar markets for 
comparison. The case study incorporates more variables of interest than data points, 
relies on multiple data sources, and benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2003). The research area 
involves all of the above, which was one motivation for using a case study 
methodology.  
The evolutionary and ecological frameworks have been claimed to be most applicable 
over long time periods (e.g. Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). Barron (1998) argues that the 
mainstream research strategy suffers from some drawbacks. Covering long periods 
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would limit the possibilities to study particular periods in the organisation’s 
development. In addition, qualitative historical sources add depth to the analysis and 
provide an alternative means of analysing the impact of the investigated variables 
(Barron, 1998). The selected timeframe can be evaluated as being critical to the 
particular network’s evolution, supporting the methodological choices. There is a 
strong tradition of favouring using one or few in-depth industry cases when 
investigating the relative importance of feedback mechanisms and competitive actions 
during a transformational period (e.g. Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Barron, 1998; 
Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Afuah, 2000; Kauffman et al., 2000; Klepper & Simons, 
2000; Murmann & Homburg, 2001; Gallagher & Park, 2002). 
The second reason for favouring a case methodology concerns the merging of 
different research conventions. The dissertation uses concepts, ideas, and findings 
from research traditions. Even with theoretical (Suarez, 2004) and observed 
bibliometric links to the network externality discussion, the applicability of 
evolutionary approaches to the network externality concepts and context is not clearly 
established. For example, network externalities have not been seen as relevant when 
studying business processes (Kauffman & Walden, 2001). As these fields are clearly 
developing, more explorative work is needed. A case study provides a possibility to 
examine further whether evolutionary ideas and findings apply also in the context, 
and in relatively short time periods. 
The third reason relates to the openness of the research structure. My objective is to 
evaluate how the evolutionary perspective on economics and population ecology 
explains firm strategies for the competition in this context. A hypothesis-testing 
setting would have imposed severe restrictions on available results, and their validity. 
A case study as a more exploratory venture is suitable if a researcher wants to be 
open-minded about unanticipated results. In addition, one of the objectives of the 
dissertation is explanation building, which can be performed by a case study 
(Cunningham, 1997; Yin, 2003). 
One point of criticism is that case study terminology is rather vague. The term case 
method, case research, or case analysis has different definitions, whereas in Yin 
(2003), above, there is only one. Bonoma (1985) defines a case study as a description 
of a management situation, while for Eisenhardt (1989) a case study is a research 
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strategy, which focuses on understanding the dynamics within single settings 
(Bonoma, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989). In fact, the endeavours required to provide 
process models of organisations most often derive from case studies (Bryman, 1992). 
Case study research and grounded theory use partially overlapping terms (Mäkelä, 
2004). A baseline design in grounded theory research is to make inductive inferences. 
Eisenhardt (1989), notably, has suggested that the case study can be used as an 
inductive method for theory building (Bonoma, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989). Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) underlines that a researcher brings his past into the research, but warns 
“of too strict adherence to existing theory” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). As a researcher I 
have tried to remain sensitive to the new emerging insights that the data offers (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967), while explicitly acknowledging the role of prior theorising (Strauss, 
1987; Cunningham, 1997; Yin, 2003).   
A historical method, as in Golder (2000), bears great similarities to the case study 
research. This dissertation has paid attention to data informant quality, borrowing 
from the methodological advancement of historical methods (Golder & Tellis, 1993; 
Tellis & Golder, 1996; Bedeian, 1998; Golder, 2000; Gallagher & Park, 2002). After 
discussing with historical methodologists, it seems clear that the dissertation follows 
more closely to case study traditions. Case studies make an effort to answer ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions, which contrasts with many historical studies  (Yin, 2003).  The case 
study may have a prior theory to work with (Yin, 2003), while historical methods start 
by selecting a topic and collecting evidence (Golder, 2000). The difference is subtle, 
as some historians advocate formulating hypotheses before data gathering (e.g. Savitt, 
1980).  
Case study methodology has been claimed to have difficulties in conveying the 
trustworthiness of results. Case research concepts and techniques to meet demands on 
reliability, replicability, and external validity are not fully developed, despite 
significant efforts (Numagami, 1998). Case study as a research methodology has been 
criticised mainly for the problems of generalisation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Tsoukas, 1989; 
Bryman, 1992; Yin, 2003). Numagami (1998) stated that reliability, replicability and 
external validity should be pursued only if the search was on a universal and invariant 
law. However, the assumption of the existence of invariant laws in social science 
differs can be doubted. The regularities are often a result of human conduct, and 
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human beings are able to reflect on acquired understanding, leading some of the 
regularities to perish. According to Numagami (1998), this reduces the role of 
reliability, replicability and external validity. For Numagami (1998), the aim of 
research is to guide discourse, and there is no need to find law-like regularities 
(Numagami, 1998). A less radical view is that case study offers a theoretical 
generalisation but it does not offer a possibility to infer findings from a sample apply 
them to a population (Yin, 2003). For some methodologists (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2003), the quality of case research can be judged on how it has met the requirements 
of different aspects of validity and reliability. Tsoukas (1989) offers a different view 
on how to value explanatory case studies. In realist epistemology, explanatory 
idiographic studies are in a position to make general claims about the world. For a 
realist, event regularities are not necessarily an identification of a causal law, and so, 
e.g., replication itself does not offer generalisability. Idiographic explanatory research, 
such as case studies, sheds light on the specific contingent conditions under which the 
postulated generative mechanisms operate (Tsoukas, 1989).  
3.1.2 Case study design 
The general analytic strategy in case research helps to define further analytical work 
(Yin, 2003). In the study, the general strategy involves definition and testing of rival 
explanations, especially rival theories (Yin, 2003). All of the rival explanations do not 
have to be included in the beginning of the research process, but may become 
apparent during the course of research, as happened also in this study. In comparison 
to the hypothetic-deductive method, the inclusion of rival explanations is even 
desirable (Yin, 2003). 
The dissertation is both exploratory and explanatory. The research is conducted as a 
single-case study, which is appropriate both for testing a well-formulated theory, or in 
exploratory studies (Yin, 2003). An element of multiple-case study has been included 
in this dissertation. A nomological map is constructed that serves as an initial, or 
theoretical case (Yin, 2003). Following Cunningham (1997), the approach used here 
can also be described as a comparative case study. After investigating the differences 
between the case and the nomological map, the map is revised.  
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The case analysis comprises qualitative and quantitative information, involving 
different analytical tools (Bonoma, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989; Bryman, 1992; 
Cunningham, 1997; Yin, 2003). New sources of information were added during the 
course of research in order to improve quality. The case study is a flexible method 
giving the freedom to make adjustments during the data collection process 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Network analysis and structured content analysis was used to 
complement historical analysis, and in the course of work, interviews were added to 
triangulate findings and gain additional insights. In the process of answering my 
question, I found it necessary to get more definitive answers from my set of 
qualitative data. For a new and smaller set of questions, I turned to qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA), which offered a methodology to evaluate comparable 
events (Ragin, 1987; Ragin, 2000).  
3.2 Research setting 
A case study involves theoretical sampling or rationalisation, instead of statistical 
sampling, or random selection of cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). Miles and 
Habermas (1994) suggest sampling parameters such as settings, actors, events and 
processes.  
Table 2 Summary of the methodological choices of the study. 
Sampling parameters Choices 
Settings Introduction of new technology in television broadcasting in the 
United Kingdom 
Actors Firms and their managers, consumers, regulatory bodies and their 
key personnel 
Events  Market entry, exit, managerial actions (channel listing, partnering), 
regulatory actions, announcements about them 
Processes Competition, imitation, diffusion, evolution 
Applied from Miles and Habermas (1994).  
The dissertation has an embedded case design, as the analysis includes the outcomes 
of different organisational levels. Holistic case design would instead concentrate only 
on a single level of analysis (Yin, 2003). The main level of analysis is a firm, and the 
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three other levels are the market level, the firm network level, and the managerial 
level. The actors are managers active in their firms, consumers, and personnel with 
administrative powers in regulatory bodies, such as the government or European 
Union, but also in industry associations.   
Case research studies should carefully consider the justification of that particular case. 
Yin (2003) compares different kind of case studies based on their rationales. The 
choice does not fit into only one decision criteria. However, the selection here mostly 
follows a critical case rationale, because the case is confirming or challenging the 
previous work on the issue, and also extending the applicability of theoretical work in 
this context (Yin, 2003). The intensity of the markets contributed to the surfacing of 
elements, which could not have been observable in other settings. At the same time, 
the chosen market has a value also as a unique case, because it was the leading market 
in this field at the time of study (Duffy et al., 1998). The industry represents a typical 
case rationale, because previous researchers (Gupta et al., 1999; Shapiro & Varian, 
1999a; Le Nagard-Assayag & Manceau, 2001) have argued that the selected industry 
is representative of networked markets.  
3.2.1 Choice of industry 
The setting of the initial case is the transformation from analogue to digital television 
broadcasting. From the perspective of networked business systems dominance, the 
transition to digital television technology provides a setting for a typical case. There 
are four main reasons for this. Firstly, the digital television industry provides a 
classical case of indirect network externalities. Each additional network member - be 
it a new digital channel, interactive digital service provider, or a digital television 
viewer - raises the value of the television network both directly and indirectly 
(Shapiro & Varian, 1999a). Direct network effects are, or will be present when 
interactivity is provided and the viewers can reach other viewers in a similar manner 
as through telephone networks. Indirect network effects are present when the 
increasing number of viewers makes it more profitable for new content providers to 
join. Gupta (1999) modelled how indirect network externalities are a major factor 
influencing market penetration of digital television (Gupta et al., 1999). Boardman 
and Hargreaves (1999) showed that the network externality apparatus is also useful to 
evaluate the value of particular programs. Consumers may feel that watching a 
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popular program is worth more because they can discuss it in different communities, 
while smaller isolated audiences do not enjoy network benefits. For example, an 
increase in the number of viewers of sporting events adds both to the value of the 
event and the broadcasting network (Boardman & Hargreaves-Heap, 1999). Secondly, 
the digital television broadcasting industry involves several independent, but 
intertwined firms providing complementary products and services (Gupta et al., 1999; 
Papathanassopoulos, 2002). Thirdly, there is a multi-layer race for de-facto standards 
since it is believed that the market cannot support many designs (Papathanassopoulos, 
2002). There is competition between different means of transmission – satellite, 
terrestrial, and cable – and between different receiver technologies used to receive 
digital signals. In addition, there is competition among the digital television-
broadcasting firms and among complementors that create content for the digital 
television broadcasters. 
3.2.2 Choice of market and timeframe 
The researched events took place between 1998-2002 in the United Kingdom. The 
visibility of the competition provides the reasoning for the case to be classified as a 
critical case. The intensity and publicity of competition in the U.K. digital television 
market helped to surface aspects in competition that might be more difficult to detect 
in more static settings. The basic assumptions set by the network externality theorists 
are well met by the particular case. However, intensity will bring about series of 
actions and counter-actions that have been outside of the scope of network externality 
theorists more familiar with economic modelling.  
The country specific setting also provides unique features, because of the pioneering 
role the market has taken in the diffusion of digital television. The U.K. has been a 
leading digital television market in the world (measured by penetration in households 
and by the diversity of channels). The United Kingdom was the first country to have 
digital television in three forms, satellite, aerial, and cable (Duffy et al., 1998). 
The industry includes different types of firms, and the dissertation discusses the 
importance of various complementary firms. The empirical investigation is largely 
focused on four commercial platforms. The initial focus was later widened to include 
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British Broadcasting Company (BBC), because of its importance to most aspects of 
U.K. television.   
The researched period, of 1998-2002, focuses on Suarez’s (2004) phases III to V of 
the technology dominance process. The beginning of the researched period was the 
launch of digital television in the U.K. consumer market, which Suarez (2004) 
describes as the beginning of Phase III, ‘creating the market’. In Phase IV a ‘decisive 
battle’ starts as a clear early front-runner appears, and ends when one alternative 
design becomes dominant, starting phase V, ‘post-dominance’ (Suarez, 2004). In 
terms of population ecology, at the end of the study period only one of the major 
service providers had not been selected out by elimination, as all of the major 
competitors went through radical transformation, or into bankruptcy (Carroll, 1984) in 
2002. The research period covers the competition from the launch to market 
domination. The industry structure has kept evolving since 2002, but later 
developments are outside the scope of this dissertation. 
3.3 Source of data and analyses  
3.3.1 Use of archival data  
Using Yin’s (2003) classification, the data collection used here includes 
documentation, archival records and interviews. The starting point of the study is 
documentation material, because of the distortions in retrospective informant data. 
Bernard et al. (1984) reviewed research on informant accuracy and summarised the 
findings by stating that half of what informants report about past events, behaviour or 
circumstances is probably incorrect in someway (Bernard et al., 1984). More 
specifically related to studies on strategy, informants are argued to have difficulties in 
describing ex-ante perceived decision-making contexts in different points in history 
(e.g. Golder & Tellis, 1993; Tellis & Golder, 1996; Das & Van de Ven, 2000; Golder, 
2000; Gallagher & Park, 2002). In response to such criticisms, the market entry 
studies of Golder and Tellis (1993, 1996), Golder (2000), the network competition 
study of Gallagher and Park (2002), and the strategy process study on technology 
competition by Das and Van de Ven (2000) used unobtrusive data sources and 
analysis. Tellis and Golder (1996) argue that surveys or interviews with current 
survivors may be considered retrospective, and resp
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the oral tradition of the firm being surveyed. They propose using information that has 
been written or recorded when the events have actually occurred. The second 
advantage of the historical data gathering methodology stems from the possibility of 
using multiple narratives of neutral observers, such as reporters, experts, and students 
of the market. Firm managers tend to focus on positive aspects of action, which can 
be balanced by scrutinising other media reports (Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Using 
several kinds of data, the approach is more likely to collect data that is factual rather 
than interpretive (Tellis & Golder, 1996; Das & Van de Ven, 2000; Golder, 2000). 
Firm strategies can be investigated by evaluating series of observable actions by 
interacting organisations (Bettis & Weeks, 1987; Smith et al., 1991; Chen et al., 1992; 
VandeVen & Garud, 1994; VandeVen & Poole, 1995; Ferrier et al., 1999; Das & Van 
de Ven, 2000; Ferrier, 2001). The public knowledge of these actions relies on the 
publicly available information recorded at the time that the events occurred (Das & 
Van de Ven, 2000). The strategy is operationalised using retrieved firm 
announcements or reported news stories. I performed analyses that relied on publicly 
available event data, published by the business system participants. Using news 
reporting and press releases at the time relieves the self-reporting biases associated 
with the sole use of informants.  
Unobtrusive case data comprises qualitative information on news events, and 
numerical firm and aggregate level performance data. The recorded unit in each case 
database is an event representing a news item or an announcement about a firm. 
Alliance announcements and new digital channel introductions by any of the actors 
active in the introduction of the digital television system in the United Kingdom 
provided firm network analysis data. The statements or quotes by persons were used 
for content analysis. The principal news information sources were the Digital 
Television Group’s news archives, read and filed from site www.dtg.org between 
summer of 2002 and January of 2003. The group is an industry-wide organisation 
sponsored by the companies involved. A trade journal as a source has the advantage 
that it can cover more industry items than a general public newspaper (Smith et al., 
1991). Channel line-ups were recorded from annual reports and separate 
announcements. Each event was entered into research database. Care was taken to 
crosscheck the events and their timings from multiple sources e.g. the Media 
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Guardian newspaper (paper and internet versions), Advanced Television’s news 
archives, trade association papers, and trade journals, as well as Internet newsletters, 
interviews, and company internet sites. Internet discussion forums gave information 
about, e.g., when the companies did not fulfil their promises on channel delivery. The 
reported events included texts that were not directly comparable to each other e.g. 
product announcements written by public relations officer, and critical comment by a 
journalist. Trade associations and government agencies provided important 
supplementary data including, among others, the quarterly subscriber figures. Annual 
and quarterly reports by the major firms provided figures on subscription and 
financial data. 
3.3.2 Interviews 
Unobtrusive, historical data gathering offers only a partial explanation. Shortcomings 
include the invisibility of intentions that were not communicated to the public; not 
every event is reported and often the motives of the original reports remain unknown. 
Van de Ven and Garud (1990) describe that events captured in field-research 
represent a sample of indicators describing what happened over time. They are neither 
a population nor a random sample. It is necessary to compensate for these limitations 
by conducting interviews and gathering additional information (VandeVen & Garud, 
1994). Van de Ven and Garud’s (1994) article on the co-evolution of technical and 
institutional events analysed individual events in the unfolding of processes. Their 
historical narrative of a cochlear implant told a story in which no single event and no 
single process was sufficient to explain industry emergence (VandeVen & Garud, 
1994). Similarly, interviews were used here in helping to create a narrative, and 
served also for data triangulation purposes (Cunningham, 1997; Yin, 2003). 
Interviewees were selected based on information given by academic experts and 
information provided by company Internet sites. Only those prospective interviewees 
that represented ‘public interest’ i.e. government, or other regulatory bodies, a public 
broadcasting company, or a consumer association were willing to be interviewed. The 
above institutions seemingly use each other as a pool for recruitments, which can be 
seen from the individual careers paths of the interviewees. As the interviews were 
used to improve reliability, the problem of bias was reduced. There were four open-
ended interviews carried out in November-December 2004. The interviewees had 
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been in managerial and expert roles at the time of the interview and the investigated 
period. Interviews lasted from 1 to 2 hours, and were conducted at meeting rooms 
with no other people present. The interviews were recorded with interviewee 
permission and transcript verbatim. The information received from the interviews 
reached saturation, which may partly be due to their late usage in the research process 
(see appendix 7.6.1 on case protocol). 
The corporate executives of privately owned companies have been reluctant to be 
interviewed on this issue. The reasons could be an unwillingness to assist research 
with no clear financial benefits, and the desire to leave behind, or ‘forget’ some 
aspects of competition (Goodwin, personal communication, 2005). If the latter is an 
issue, it does not have an effect on the importance of the topic, but raises problems 
with bias of the available data. The private corporate view was added by using 
secondary interview material. In an academic book section, Goodwin (2005) gives a 
detailed account of digital terrestrial television, interviewing one major executive. In a 
book, Horsman (1998) focuses on the satellite platform, interviewing several 
important actors. Both of them quote interviewed people, and their published texts 
were used in this dissertation as well. 
3.4 Analyses 
3.4.1 Analyses of archival data 
The original unobtrusive case database was used for three analyses. Firstly, it 
provided material for qualitative inspection of material that was present in the public 
arena. The aim was to understand the structure and dynamics of the market. Secondly, 
the events were recorded for social network analysis. That used dichotomised data on 
firms and dyadic relations. Thirdly, the statements or quotes were used in content 
analyses. 
As mentioned in the literature research section, social network analysis methods have 
come to mean a set of mathematical and visual techniques for analysing and 
visualising the positions and relations of actors in networks, as well network 
structures (Borgatti & Everett, 1997; Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). The focus is on the 
attributes of pairs of individuals. These include the distances and similarities of the 
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participants (Borgatti & Everett, 1997). Centrality based measurements are of major 
importance in social network analysis, because a central actor in a network has a good 
access to information, status, power, prestige, or influence (Freeman et al., 1991; 
Friedkin, 1991). Also, a central actor can be thought to be between different paths of 
communication (Freeman, 1977; Freeman et al., 1991). An actor with a high 
betweenness value may facilitate, or limit communication between the nodes of its 
linked points (Freeman, 1979).  
Social network analysis has also long been an established practice for analysing the 
behaviour of organisational actors in a networked business system (Oliver, 1988). For 
the purposes of this study, I analyse the relative structural positions of the main actors 
in the network and the changes in network structure over time. I perform analysis by 
constructing industry matrices for each of the five years from 1998 to 2002. In the 
adjacency matrices, columns and rows represent each firm. An entry in a cell 
represents the establishment of a link between two firms. Entries comprise both the 
digital line-up of the major platforms, and digital alliance announcements reported in 
trade journals. I used the Bonacich measure of power centrality (Bonacich, 1972, 
1987) to track the digital television industry actors’ changing network position. Data 
included channel listings and co-operative announcements, which makes cross-
sectional comparison unfruitful. Comparison between firms can be done only on firms 
that have similar behaviour on announcing channels and other agreements.  
Content analysis was used to make inferences from the data about their context 
(Krippendorff, 1980). I used content analysis for two separate analyses. The 
description of the quantitative analysis of news stories and announcements follows 
here, while the analysis for investigating interview data is described in the next 
chapter. 
My quantitative analysis of media texts can be classified as discourse analysis, as I 
was interested in characteristics of manifest language, and word use (Neuendorf, 
2002). The purpose of this analysis was to check the robustness of results from the 
other investigations. 
Content analysis using newspaper sources has been used in various fields in social 
sciences, including firm strategy research (Jauch et al., 1980). The public statements 
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are intentional, and they are signalled to other network participants. The media 
disseminates and produces a common body of knowledge available to and used by 
firm managers (Hambrick, 1982). The media has also an important role in linking 
firms with stakeholders, in the process building industry macro-culture (Rindova & 
Fombrun, 1999). 
I retrieved news stories and firm announcements including quotations by managers, 
which were dichotomised based on the evaluation of the perception of competition. 
The  focus was on signalling action events, which are part of the competitive action 
repertoire (Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier, 2001). A more fine-grained classification 
seemed improper because of the relatively small number of cases. More importantly, 
most reported actions can be seen as signalling, which is theoretically an interesting 
concept for this dissertation. The publication of a retrieved statement was usually 
dated for the same or following day after the act of stating.  
The news stories, firm announcements, quotations, and other data were also used for 
qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin, 1987; Ragin, 2000). The investigated case 
embeds smaller comparable events (Yin, 2003) which were analyzed using the 
Boolean logic approach of QCA (Ragin, 1987). QCA used binarised data on 
conditions leading to a specific outcome. The mini-cases were different competitive 
topics found in the earlier stages of the research process. Following the QCA 
argument, the cases are as configurations of conditions (Ragin, 1987). In this research 
these different configurations were different conditions leading to a specific type of 
competitive behaviour. The set of smaller comparative cases are embedded in the 
larger case.  
3.4.2 Analysis of interviews and other texts 
Qualitative reading of the acquired material was used to look for unifying themes or 
patterns (Cunningham, 1997) in four open-ended interviews and with two 
complementary additional texts. I used open coding to code transcript data, and 
worked with Atlas.ti text analyzer software. Here I was interested in the characters in 
the story; their difficulties, choices, conflicts, complications, and developments, 
which are described as being part of the narrative stream of analysing texts 
(Neuendorf, 2002). In coding the interviews, I followed an inductive ‘constant 
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comparative method’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), whilst acknowledging the guiding role 
of my earlier work on the problem.  
I coded the text after other data gathering had been done. I looked for words and 
sentences commenting or evaluating issues, which I had found potentially important 
in the earlier data gathering. The items related to competitive dynamics, network 
externalities, and to firms’ idiosyncratic differences. As I tried to remain open to 
emerging concepts, I aimed to sense the different significance that the various data 
sources gave to the concepts. Texts in interviews emphasised some aspects that were 
observable in earlier retrieved texts, but the interviews gave them different 
importance. Following Strauss (1987), the axial coding was followed by selective 
coding. The categories were merged, and abstraction level was raised. Finally, 
relations among different categories were established (Strauss, 1987). Raising 
abstraction and linking the new higher-order categories involves researchers’ 
imagination and understanding on the subject, as the interviewed persons did not 
express their views on them explicitly.  
The case narrative was written several times after the original case data was compiled. 
I wrote new versions to reflect revised understanding of the case, in preparation for 
the interviews, and after the interviews and their categorisations.  
3.4.3 Reliability and validity  
Researchers frequently evaluate the quality of case studies, considering four separate 
aspects. The commonly used tests include construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity and reliability (Yin, 2003). Construct validity is about establishing the correct 
operational measures for the concepts. This study used the proposed (Yin, 2003) 
methods to meet the criteria: using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain 
of evidence and having a key informant review the case findings. Multiple sources 
were the different archive materials from different sources, and interviews. A chain of 
evidence is established with the following procedures. First, the case report cites 
specific documents, observations and interview (Yin, 2003). Second, an outsider can 
inspect the actual evidence i.e. interview tapes, and retrieved documents, and find 
information on the circumstances of data collection (Yin, 2003). Third, the 
circumstances are coherent with the data protocol in relation to interviews (Yin, 
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2003). In relation to document retrieval and analyses, the procedures are written down 
in research diaries as decisions and actions were made. The fourth issue on the chain 
of evidence is about the link between the protocol and initial study question, which 
should be established in a clear manner (Yin, 2003). The protocol written for the 
dissertation has a lesser value in the study, compared to studies where a researcher 
followed the strategy right from the start. The reason for this is that the case research 
strategy was selected in the course of the study, not at the onset. Therefore, a formal 
case study protocol was not produced at the beginning of the research. Research 
diaries were written from the beginning. Comments on the narrative made by an 
informant were evaluated and modifications were made. 
Internal validity is about establishing causal relationships, distinguished from spurious 
relationships (Yin, 2003). The use of explanation-building and the logic model, and 
addressing rival explanations were part of effort to deal with that test (Yin, 2003). A 
section is devoted to qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), which is grounded in 
Boolean algebra of logic and sets. It offers tools to analyse complex causation paths 
with a small to medium number of cases. By evaluating the observed and logical 
combinations of conditions leading to outcomes, the comparative method offers a way 
to summarise data and to evaluate its coherence, and to test a hypothesis and 
assumptions (Ragin, 1987; Ragin, 2000).   
External validity requires establishing the domain to which the findings can be 
generalised (Yin, 2003). An extensive literature review helped to surface the relevant 
theoretical work, advising on the external validity (Yin, 2003). But, the theoretical 
literature is negotiated along the research process. There are new instances in which a 
researcher is evaluating the evidence, and new findings may alter the earlier 
theoretical understanding. The simultaneous work on theory and replication follows 
guidelines on carrying out research under a realist paradigm. Tsoukas (1989) suggests 
that a study should deal with abstraction and theoretical conceptualisation, while at 
the same time investigate the existing contingencies and their interaction with the 
postulated mechanisms (Tsoukas, 1989). Reliability involves demonstrating that the 
operations of a study can be repeated with the same results (Yin, 2003). Data was 
collected and evaluated by a single researcher, increasing the risk of poorer reliability. 
The problem was addressed by using a case study protocol and developing case study 
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databases (Yin, 2003). A case study protocol was created well before the interviews; 
see appendix 7.6.1. A case study should also involve a running commentary on the 
work. The purpose is to manage the overlap of data collection, coding, and analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, separate research diaries were created for three 
separate phases of data collection and analysis. The diary was used to list the choices 
made during the process. The aim was to improve reliability, as some categorisation 
decisions were based on subtle differences found in the material. In addition, field 
notes were taken to assist memorising researcher impressions from the interviews, 
separately from the discussion in the interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989). These field notes 
were included in the interview diary in the 24 hours following the interview.  
Events included in the research database represent both announcements by the 
participant firms and trade journalists’ reporting. The published texts were said or 
written close to the time of publication, which is typical material for media 
organisations to gather and distribute, improving the quality of the material 
(Krippendorff, 1980). The material represents different sources of biases. First, there 
is a bias by the business system participants to overemphasise the importance of each 
new channel and alliance introduction. Firms want to publish good news more eagerly 
than bad news (Das & Van de Ven, 2000). In order to avoid the problem, 
crosschecking from other data sources was used where possible. Das and Van de Ven 
(2000) argues that competitors and government agencies provide information contrary 
to the initial firm when necessary (Das & Van de Ven, 2000), balancing the bias. 
Internet discussions are also a forum to deal with perceived problems. In addition, a 
simple recording procedure in social network analysis was adopted to avoid the 
judgmental problems. Therefore, the events in the original case material using the 
event data were recorded with equal weight. This was done simply by registering 
them as new network elements to the network. The procedure prevented the major 
difficulty in separately weighing the relative significance or ‘the worth’ of each 
alliance announcement. However, there could be some bias the other way round. It is 
likely that some of the recorded events were more important than others, biasing the 
resulting network structure in favour of minor events. Fortunately, the bias can be 
eliminated with a qualitative analysis of the business system evolution, which can 
show the importance of particular events. For this study, interviews were conducted to 
evaluate the need for additional indicators, and for triangulation purposes 
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(Cunningham, 1997; Yin, 2003). Triangulation tests external validity, but the 
interviews may also capture a more holistic view (Jick, 1979) than reported news 
items. 
Another source of bias is that different companies have different policies for 
announcing their alliances or new channel introductions. This would be a problem for 
an investigation on artefacts. But, technology can be seen as a social construct, 
including both the artefacts and knowledge (Das & Van de Ven, 2000). The articles 
and channel listings are a proxy for the social reality of the digital offering that 
influences competitive reactions and customer behaviour.  
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4 DIGITAL TELEVISION CASE  
This chapter describes competition in the commercial television market in the United 
Kingdom with the arrival of digital television. The histories of television and leading 
firms are presented for a better comprehension of the competitive dynamics among 
the focus firms. The chapter continues with a case narrative covering the period of 
1998-2002, evidencing the competition for network dominance. The narrative is 
complemented with a social network analysis of relationships between the actors, 
content analysis of published statements and news events, and qualitative comparative 
analysis on competitive topics.  
4.1 Technological setting 
4.1.1 History of broadcasting  
An Italian, Guglielmo Marconi, discovered the possibilities of earlier inventions and 
developed radio in 1895. He moved to England where he could better demonstrate the 
potential of radio waves a means of wireless telegraphic communication. The effort 
succeeded and radio broadcasting started in 1920. From the beginning, the authorities 
of United Kingdom showed an interest in regulating the broadcasting industry. By 
comparison, in the United States, very liberal entrepreneurship resulted in 50% of 
radio stations failing within a few years. The U.K. government allowed the first 
experimental radio stations to start in 1922, which was also the year that the British 
Broadcasting Company was formed (Cook et al., 2001; BBC, 2004j, 2004d). 
In 1936, a BBC Television service was launched, albeit tentatively. Commercial 
television service began in 1955 as a group of separated regional franchises, which 
later formed a national network system, ITV (Cook et al., 2001). Terrestrial 
transmission was the major means of television program delivery. From the beginning 
of British television, there were ventures cabling blocks of apartments for program 
distribution, which used the signal from a master antenna at the roof-top (Caldwell, 
2001). The first direct-to-home analogue satellite service began operating in 1989 
(Ghemawat, 1997; BBC, 2004g; National Museum of Photography, 2005).  
The industry was highly regulated until the 1990’s (Boardman & Hargreaves-Heap, 
1999; Cook et al., 2001; BBC, 2004g). Independent broadcasters were regulated by 
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the Independent Television Authority, which later became the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority, following the introduction of commercial radio. At that time 
the IBA, as a public authority, acted as ‘the broadcaster’ which granted the franchises 
to the individual television companies (ITC, 2003).   
New regulations suggested by the Peacock Report of 1986 meant that ITV franchises 
were given to the highest bidder, above some quality threshold, and that television 
broadcasters had to buy at least 25% of their content from independent companies. 
This led to the emergence of new companies, whilst the BBC and some of the ITV 
companies were forced to downsize their organisations (Cook et al., 2001).   
The new regulations can be seen as instruments to deal with the globalisation of 
television programming. The upsurge of television channels and broadcasted hours 
increased demand for program content, which has widely benefited U.S. producers 
(Cook et al., 2001). New alliances, and exploring new ways to produce and distribute 
content, are a means to deal with escalating production costs (Cook et al., 2001).  
The Department for Culture, Media and Sport is the supervising ministry of the 
industry. In the study period, the follower of the IBA, the Independent Television 
Commission (ITC) awarded licenses to non license-fee, or non-government funded 
television operators in the UK, and regulated these services through its licenses and 
codes of practice on program content, advertising, sponsorship and technical 
standards (ITC, 2003). ITC handled complaints about programs or advertisements on 
ITV, Channel 4, Channel 5, satellite and cable television, or commercial radio. The 
BBC was primarily a self-regulating institution. However, Broadcasting Standards 
Commission (BSC) processed complaints about violence, sex, and matters of taste 
and decency on any radio or television channel, or about unjust or unfair treatment or 
infringement of privacy (ITC, 2003). At the end of 2003, Ofcom replaced five 
regulators: the Broadcasting Standards Commission, the Independent Television 
Commission, Oftel, the Radio Authority and the Radio Communications Agency. 
BBC channels 1 and 2, ITV3, Channel 4, and Channel 5 have been the dominant 
channels in traditional free-to-view television in UK. License fees cover the expenses 
of the BBC channels, while showing advertisements mostly finances the rest of free-
to-view television. The introduction of digital broadcasting has changed the 
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competitive environment, with a great impact on traditional broadcasters (Cook et al., 
2001). 
4.1.2 History of digital television 
Data compression makes it more efficient to deliver data, compared to the former 
analogue system. Digital television uses digital encoding and compression to 
broadcast video, audio and data signals to television sets. In digital television 
distribution, programs are encoded into a digital stream. Different streams are 
combined, or multiplexed, before being modulated and distributed to homes. 
Combined streams are received on a home set-top box. The set-top box separates 
streams, and decodes them into analogue for the standard television set. Television 
sets with integrated set-top boxes are also being offered (CompetitionCommission, 
1999; Burg, 2003; DigitalTelevisionProject, 2004). As with the analogue system, 
television signals are transmitted on satellite, terrestrial and cable systems.  
Standardisation of digital television (DTV) has been mainly based around two 
initiatives. The European-led effort is called the Digital Video Broadcasting or DVB 
Project. The North American initiative is organised by the Advanced Television 
Systems Committee, or ATSC (DVB, 2003; Wikipedia, 2005). 
Digital technology in production has changed industry practices and ecology (Cook et 
al., 2001). Commercial television broadcasting consist of two markets, one for 
viewers and another for advertisers (Liu et al., 2004). The television value chain has 
traditionally consisted of three separate but sequential phases of value creation; 
namely content production, publishing or channels, and distribution. Research 
conducted at the time of the major commercial launches of digital television 
forecasted that customer interaction was an important new source of value addition. 
Digitalisation increases the number of ways in which customers are paying for their 
television (Duffy et al., 1998), suggesting the importance of pay-TV operators.  
Digital compression of signals, and participants’ views on the process, has started to 
restructure the industry. Digitalisation has opened up possibilities for freer entry to the 
broadcasting industry. The new opportunities are also a challenge for traditional 
television firms active in free-to-view markets, and especially public broadcasters 
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funded largely by license fees. Firms have challenges to cope with in financing their 
operations when there is more competition, and when much of the technology has had 
to be renewed. The technology has given an opportunity for new sources of income 
for the commercial actors e.g. interactive services, giving rise to interest from 
telecommunication companies, and restructuring of the pricing schemes of channels. 
In addition, the equipment needed for recording, storing, transmitting, and receiving 
material is different than in the former analogue systems, which has meant a demand 
for new manufactured goods (Dholakia et al., 1996; Hancock, 1998; Bajon & 
Fontaine, 2001; Cook et al., 2001).    
4.2 Organisational setting  
4.2.1 BBC and Freeview 
The British Broadcasting Company (a public broadcaster) was formed in 1922 with 
strong involvement from Guglielmo Marconi and other manufacturers. The role of 
engineers was significant from the beginning, as was the role of editorial 
independence. The BBC website describes how the first general manager envisaged 
the company as “an independent British broadcaster able to educate, inform and 
entertain the whole nation, free from political interference and commercial pressure “ 
(BBC, 2004d). In 1927, the British Broadcasting Company became the British 
Broadcasting Corporation. 
In 1936, the BBC Television service was launched, but geographically it served only 
a small area (Cook et al., 2001; BBC, 2004e). World War II interrupted the 
development of television broadcasting, whilst radio became ever more important. 
The company established a War Reporting Unit to cover the events. The BBC gained 
its worldwide reputation when, by the end of the war, radio programs were broadcast 
in 40 languages (BBC, 2004f)  
The government guides the activities of BBC by setting regulatory and organisational 
frameworks. A Royal Charter constitutionally established the BBC in 1927, and each 
following charter has had a fixed length of approximately 10 years. The role of 
government is significant as it sets the general framework for where and how the BBC 
operates. The Charter with its accompanying agreement recognises the BBC's 
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editorial independence and sets out its public obligations. Formally the Queen, but in 
practice the government, appoints the Board of Governors that ‘act as trustees of the 
public interest’. The case study investigates events occurring at the time of the eighth 
Charter, covering the period 1996-2006 (BBC, 2004a, 2004c). The charters sets the 
limits of commercial ventures. BBC Worldwide was responsible for most of the 
corporations commercial activities in the UK and internationally. The subsidiary 
owned 50% of the UKTV subscription channels, with Flextech owning the other half 
(CompetitionCommission, 1999). 
When digitalisation and other advancements in technology led to stronger 
competition, the BBC and the regulating authorities legitimised its role by creating the 
‘Extending Choice’ mission, which was to offer a range of programs that 
commercially funded broadcasters would not provide (BBC, 2004h). The company 
gets its revenues primarily from license fees, the price of which is set by the 
government. The annual cost of a colour TV license was £121 in 2004 (BBC, 2004b). 
The BBC has been in active in the digitalisation of television, and it has been present 
in different broadcasting platforms. When the terrestrial ONDigital/ITVdigital went 
bankrupt, the BBC led the effort to launch Freeview in 2002. The other partners are 
multiplex operator Crown Castle (formerly the BBC's transmission division) and 
BSkyB. Freeview is a digital aerial television service that offers channels without 
subscription fees. The channels of Freeview include, but are not restricted to, 
offerings from the BBC and BSkyB (BBC, 2004i; Freeview, 2005).  
4.2.2 Commercially operating free-to-view channels 
4.2.2.1 ITV (Channel 3)  
The BBC television arm faced direct competition when commercial stations entered 
the market in 1955, following the Beveridge Report of 1951. The commercially 
funded alternative, with public service obligations, was established as a network of 
regional firms. Independent broadcasters were given a fixed term regional monopoly 
to show television programs with advertisements. A separate company ran each 
region, and commercials were not allowed to be sold nationwide. The franchise 
owners were allowed to make a profit. The broadcasters had public service 
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requirements, including showing regional content. These obligations were stated in 
the terms of their licenses from the Independent Television Authority.  
The franchise system required co-operation, and the broadcasters formed a national 
network system, although regulations forbade them from merging. The composition 
of the original Independent Television broadcasting companies did not see major 
changes until the Peacock Report of 1986. This suggested competitive tendering for 
ITV franchises with a quality threshold. The implementation of the suggestions of the 
report weakened the strong position of the original ITV broadcasters (Cook et al., 
2001). The free-to-air ITV channels have been popular, e.g., in 1998 ITV (channel 3) 
had 38.0% of peak time viewing, compared to 31.6% for BBC1.  
4.2.2.2 Channel Four and Channel Five 
A new nationwide advertisement funded channel was launched in 1982. The license 
terms of Channel 4 included public service requirements, e.g., offering programs 
appealing to audiences not covered by ITV (CompetitionCommission, 1999; BBC, 
2004g). As a statutory non-profit-making corporation, it originally received its 
funding from advertisements. In 1998 it entered the subscription TV market by 
launching a movie channel on all digital platforms (CompetitionCommission, 1999). 
Advertising was also the source of income for Channel 5, launched in 1997. In 
contrast to Channel 4, Channel 5 is a privately owned company. The major 
shareholders of Channel 5 are UNM, CLT/UFA and Pearson 
(CompetitionCommission, 1999; Cook et al., 2001).  
4.2.3 BSkyB 
British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) was created as a result of ‘war of attrition’ 
(Ghemawat, 1997) between British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) and Sky Television 
for dominance of the satellite television market in the U.K. In analogue satellite 
competition, BSB had made the first announcement about market entry, but Sky 
actually launched the service first, in February 1989. The financially weaker Sky used 
less advanced technology, but provided more channels and Hollywood-films, which 
were valued by viewers. BSB launched in April 1990, and remained behind in 
cumulative installations (Ghemawat, 1997). The cash-consuming broadcasters started 
to negotiate their way out of problems by a merger. In the month earlier BSB was 
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losing £6-7 million each week, and Sky about £2million. At the same time, Sky’s 
parent company News Corporation was facing debt renegotiations (Ghemawat, 1997). 
The announcement of the 50-50 per cent joint venture was made in November 1990. 
The new entity, BSkyB, in reality gave an upper hand to Sky’s owners and managers 
(Ghemawat, 1997; Chenoweth, 2002). One of the four owners of the BSB was 
Granada, a later rival in the competition for network dominance between different 
transmission platforms (Chenoweth, 2002). 
Ghemawat (1997) explains the escalation of competition and the end-result partially 
by the behavioural characteristics of managers in News Corporation, especially the 
Australian-born founder Rupert Murdoch. News Corporation has been described as 
having ‘one of the most aggressive corporate cultures in the world’ with Murdoch 
having run the company as a one-man show for five decades (Chenoweth, 2002). He 
had bet all of his media holdings on the success of digital television in the U.K., but 
similar high-stake operations had taken place before (Horsman, 1998). Already in the 
late 1950’s, Murdoch tried to get a local monopoly in broadcasting in Australia, but 
after failing to get such a concession, raced to become a pioneer in the market 
(Ghemawat, 1997). In 1962, News Corporation forced the winning Sydney franchise 
bidder to offer it a stake. News Corporation pressurised the franchise holder by 
announcing the launch of competitive broadcasting from nearby area, which would 
decrease the value of the franchise (Ghemawat, 1997). A power struggle between 
Murdoch-controlled newspapers and printing press labour unions occurred when 
Margaret Thatcher was the prime minister, which resulted defeat for the unions. The 
events changed the newspaper industry but the News Corporation’s manoeuvres had 
not succeeded without political backing (Chenoweth, 2002). Rupert Murdoch’s strong 
political influence has been seen both as a threat to politicians and as sign of 
ideological kinship (Ghemawat, 1997; Bajon & Fontaine, 2001; Chenoweth, 2002). 
Mr. Murdoch has described the traditional UK broadcasters as elitist, distancing 
himself from the cultural establishment despite his own Oxford-education 
(Ghemawat, 1997; Horsman, 1998; Chenoweth, 2002).    
BSkyB was a profitable as an analogue operation, but preparations for digitalisation 
altered this situation. Quarterly results announced in November 1997 showed a 
decline in profits for the first time since 1992 (Horsman, 1998).   
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4.2.4 ONDigital/ITVdigital and its owners Carlton and Granada 
ONdigital was originally a joint venture named British Digital Broadcasting (BDB). It 
was to have been led by BSkyB, Carlton and Granada, but due to competitive reasons, 
the Independent Television Commission (ITC) would not have given a license if 
BSkyB remained in the alliance. The ITC view was encouraged by the European 
Commission, and BSkyB was forced to leave the consortium 
(CompetitionCommission, 1999). The investment community reacted strongly to the 
break-up, a quarter of the value of BSkyB was lost in a week (Cool et al., 2000). The 
departure of BSkyB led to, e.g., intense disagreements between the companies about 
payments for programming (Chenoweth, 2002), hostilities which began before the 
study period.  
Two of the most prominent ITV companies, Carlton and Granada, launched the pay-
TV platform ONdigital in late 1998, each with a 50% share of the venture. Other ITV 
broadcasters remained outside the ONdigital company. Carlton Communications Plc 
produced five channels for the original ONdigital, and three subscription channels for 
cable companies. At that time, its ITV franchises received a third of ITV’s advertising 
revenue. It was also involved in program making, and the supply of products and 
services to the television, film and video industries worldwide. It owned, e.g., major 
suppliers of technical services such as Technicolor and Quantel, and distributed 
British television programs and films internationally. Carlton also produced over 1700 
hours of television programs. Only one fifth of the programming hours were 
commissioned by ITV, and some of the most popular shows of the BBC and Channel 
4 were made by Carlton. Mercury Asset Management Group and Lloyds TSB Group 
Plc were the major shareholders in the company (Carlton, 1998).  
After original consortium was broken up, Granada sold its BSkyB assets. Granada 
owned shares in BSkyB because of the original satellite merger between British 
Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) and Sky Television, which had formed the company. 
Granada sold its shares to a French company, Vivendi in 1999, a deal seen as 
antagonistic by NewsCorp’s Rupert Murdoch. The CEO of Vivendi, Jean-Marie 
Messier, had a hostile relationship with Rupert Murdoch, and they did not talk to each 
other for weeks after the deal (Chenoweth, 2002). Granada was the largest supplier of 
programming hours to the ITV networks. In addition to supplying programming and 
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television systems, it was also strongly involved with the travel industry.  It began 
operating an ITV franchise in 1956, and in the late 1990’s it held four franchises 
(CompetitionCommission, 1999). Granada and Carlton merged in 2004. 
4.2.5 Telewest and Flextech 
At the start of the study period, Telewest had the largest number of analogue cable 
customers in the UK. It only had franchises in the UK, but the owners included 
MediaOne International (30%) and TCL Communications (22%) 
(CompetitionCommission, 1999).  At that time, TCL was also major shareholder in 
Flextech, one of the largest channel providers for different platforms 
(CompetitionCommission, 1999). Flextech and Telewest merged during the study 
period. Together, Flextech and BBC owned UKTV, a joint venture that supplied 
channels featuring BBC programming (CompetitionCommission, 1999). 
4.2.6 NTL and Cable and Wireless 
NTL has been strongly involved in activities outside of the UK and the cable 
business. The stock has been quoted on the NASDAQ exchange in the US. In addition 
to running cable franchises, its activities in the UK included broadcast infrastructure 
transmission services such as satellite uplink, radio and terrestrial television 
transmission (CompetitionCommission, 1999), In June 1998, Telewest 
Communications and NTL decided not to continue with merger talks. During the 
investigated time period in 1999, NTL bought the cable operations of Cable and 
Wireless Communications plc, making it the biggest cable operator.  
After the study period in October 2005, NTL Incorporated and Telewest Global, Inc. 
announced a merger agreement under which NTL will acquire Telewest. The partners 
stated that the merger will create the second largest communications company in the 
United Kingdom with nearly 5 million residential customers (NTL, 2005). 
  
4.3 Digital television evolution narrative 1998-2002 
This section describes the competitive battle triggered by the transition from the 
analogue to digital television broadcasting business system in the United Kingdom 
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during 1998-2002. The emphasis of the narrative is on the television broadcasting and 
platform operating companies as they build the new digital pay television market and 
compete within it. Digital services in the UK were launched in 1998, and by 2002 the 
intensive competitive period was temporarily over, as all of the major commercial 
players except the winning BSkyB had gone into bankruptcy or debt reorganisation. 
The most visible competitive phases were launching, sponsoring digital boxes and 
content, and major restructure, and it is these phases which receive most of the 
attention in the narrative. These major incidents took place around smaller 
competitive bursts, which are described more briefly. Table 3 provides numerical 
statistics on UK digital television competition during 1998-2002.  
 
Table 3. Evolution of digital broadcasting service providers’ business from 
1998 to 2002 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
BSkyB 
     
Subscribers ('000) 275 2100 4669 5496 6562 
Revenue ('000 000 USD)17 2377 2500 2798 3321 4174 
Retained profit ('000 000 USD)  128 -539 -300 -776 -2079 
ONdigital/ITV Digital 
     
Subscribers ('000) 110 552 878 1253 1207 
Revenue ('000 000 USD)18 0 34 162 253 183 
Retained profit ('000 000 USD) -51 -247 -434 -506 -602 
NTL  
     
Subscribers ('000)   530 1253 1229 
Revenue ('000 000 USD)19 356 834 1518 2069 2074 
Retained profit ('000 000 USD) -534 -735 -2388 -11115 -2376 
Telewest 
     
Subscribers ('000)  110 339 724 857 
Revenue ('000 000 USD)20 335 417 423 474 505 
Retained profit ('000 000 USD) -517 -858 -1069 -2786 -3335 
Freeview 
     
Viewer estimate (‘000)     1450 
                                                 
17
  BSkyB financial figures are on 12 months ending on July 31st of the reported year concerning 
group’s activities. Pounds sterling exchange rate used here is the yearly average from Bank of 
England statistics downloaded from http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/rates. Same rates 
were used for all other companies but NTL, which reports results in US dollars.   
18
  ONdigital / ITV Digital  financial figures are on  12 months ending on Sept 30th of the reported year 
compiled from their parent companies (Granada, Carlton) annual reports concerning their 
respective shares of the joint venture’s operations. 
19
  NTL financial figures are 12 months ending on Dec. 31st of the reported year concerning 
residential/local telecommunication and television units. 
20
  Telewest financial figures are 12 months ending on Dec. 31st of the reported year concerning their 
cable television units. 
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4.3.1 Phase 1: Launch and competition of sponsored set-top boxes  
The preparatory work on digital television in the United Kingdom focused originally 
on terrestrial delivery (Goodwin, 2005). The digital terrestrial television was 
seemingly in a position to leverage the wide penetration of its analogue programming. 
The interviewee 3 describes:  
“All the attention was on DTT, the assumption was that DTT would drive 
digital […inarticulate, not transcript] means of taking those households 
digital because rooftop area was what they were used to. Satellite was 
then a very much a minority platform, sort of add-on. Not any of public 
broadcasters were available on satellite. So, basically you added 
analogue satellite onto your terrestrial, it didn’t replace it.”  
The arrival of digital transmission seemed to favour terrestrial pay-TV and threaten 
the established analogue position of BSkyB satellite platform (Cool et al., 2000). The 
exclusion of BSkyB from the terrestrial consortium was seen devastating for the 
media firm. In 25 June 1997, a column was written in Financial Times stating:  
“This is not the end of BSkyB’s dominance of UK pay television, but it is 
surely the beginning of the end. Slowly but surely, its grip on both 
distribution and content is relaxing. The era when the satellite group 
controlled access to most pay-TV eyeballs will soon be over” (Cool et al., 
2000).  
Despite described as an ‘add-on’ platform, BSkyB had by 1998 created an extensive 
analogue satellite customer base, and a market for pay-TV in the UK. The managers 
at BSkyB thought that their business model needed revitalising as problems were 
emerging. Penetration growth had stagnated, although the average return per 
household had been steadily increasing (Horsman, 1998). BSkyB chief executive 
Mark Booth saw that in the analogue era:  
“We were a TV Sports company with some good TV skills, but we were 
not at the edge of what was happening in the multichannel world…we 
have to reinvent our content. We have to reposition ourselves with the 
consumers” (Horsman, 1998).   
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Elisabeth Murdoch, daughter of Rupert Murdoch, who had responsibility for 
improving Sky’s own programming, offered the following characterisation in 1998:  
“…we were leading [pay-TV market] with a stick rather than with a 
carrot…People say ‘we don’t trust Sky, and you treat us cynically, and 
you put the price up every single year’ and you realise at some certain 
point that if you aren’t putting the value back into your proposition, there 
is going to be switch-off” (Horsman, 1998).  
Other motives for the launch of digital services came from investors. Enough 
investors wanted to see BSkyB as a first mover in offering digital television, and 
when rumours spread of possible delays because of satellite delivery problems, the 
stock price of the company fell (Horsman, 1998).  
Digital television services started in the United Kingdom in October 1998 when 
BSkyB launched its Sky Digital satellite service. Satellite transmission technology 
provided BSkyB with advantages compared to analogue satellite, or terrestrial digital. 
Astra’s satellite technology permitted BSkyB to start with broad coverage without 
extensive up-front investments. Thanks to improved channel carrying capacity, the 
new satellite platform could offer 140 satellite channels (Papathanassopoulos, 2002).  
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) wanted to have satellite access because 
of its stated policy of platform neutrality. However, access was settled only after 
difficult bargaining. BBC’s digital channel offering was a subject of long negotiations 
and intense lobbying in the European Union and in the UK regulatory bodies. As a 
result of these, BSkyB had to give others access to the same satellite platform 
(Horsman, 1998). According to the interviewee 1:  
“BSkyB  didn’t want us [BBC] on at the same time as them, because they 
didn’t want to share the glory of launching digital satellite…And they 
played all kinds of silly games. And in the end we had to threaten to go to 
the regulator… As a result of the BBC lobbying supported by the British 
Government we got a clause in the access Directory, which required Sky 
to offer ‘fair, reasonable and indiscriminatory access’ through it STB. So 
we had a legal ground on which to fight. There was sort of balance of 
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carrot and stick. [A] threat [of] legal action and the carrot…Sky wanted 
the BBC there such that BBC launched its digital package at the same 
time as Sky’s.”  
The negotiations offended traditional terrestrial broadcasters, as described by 
interviewee 1: 
”And there was terrific internal schism about this because BBC and 
traditional broadcasters obviously ITV and Channel 4 as well had a 
duopolistic position in analogue broadcasting and introduction of digital 
would obviously undermine that position. So, there was very strong 
conservative force saying don’t do anything to help it. Don’t get in there 
and supply services, because you will increase the rate of take-up.”  
BSkyB made channel carriage agreements with the BBC and the two commercially 
funded channels, Channel 4 and 5, for its Astra satellite. Although the participants 
reported how difficult the negotiations were, it did not hinder BSkyB from leveraging 
the result; an improved channel offering on the satellite platform. BBC’s and the other 
free-to-view channels on the satellite platform helped to legitimise its existence. 
BSkyB’s satellite subscribers were now able to get highly appreciated public 
broadcasting services for free. Interviewee 3 describes:  
“Sky naturally wants to give the impression that ‘BBC brought to you by 
Sky’, and you have to subscribe them together. They can’t quite say that 
because that it is not true.”  
Despite the satellite platform being the first digital entrant, its emergence was 
somewhat surprising. Political and technological development had focused on the 
terrestrial platform. The emergence of competition through a terrestrial digital system 
(DTT) was driven by the British Government’ White Paper of 1995 and the 
Broadcasting Act of 1996, which emphasised that viewers would get an improved 
variety of channels, programming, and new interactive services (Goodwin, 2005) 
through a competing terrestrial system. Due to technological constraints, terrestrial 
digital broadcasting could not deliver as much program content as its satellite 
competition. The first digital terrestrial television platform was launched one month 
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after BSkyB in November 1998 with an offering of 37 channels. The commercial pay-
TV operator in the digital terrestrial television platform (DTT) was ONdigital (later 
renamed as ITV Digital), while the BBC, a local franchise of ITV, Channel 4, and 
Channel 5 were broadcasting independently on the same platform. By supplying 
highly valued content the latter were also lending their credibility to the platform.  
While terrestrial and satellite were both offering highly valued free to view television, 
the comparison of pay-television offering was clearly in favour of satellite. From the 
beginning, conflict between the major operators was imminent. The initiators of 
terrestrial pay television interviewed in Horsman (1998) thought that DTT was a way 
of educating a mass of consumers about paying for the content, and the only way to 
do this was to have pay-TV without BSkyB and Rupert Murdoch (Horsman, 1998). 
Earlier, during the dominance of analogue television, terrestrial reception had been 
the predominant mode of getting the highest rated programming, while analogue 
satellite content had been seen as a minority platform; a supplement for movie or 
sports enthusiasts (Horsman, 1998). The terrestrial offer aimed to leverage the 
traditionally strong position of terrestrial programming already receivable with 
existing aerials. ONdigital compared the ease of aerials with the installation of 
satellite dishes (BDB, 1997), but their message was not entirely convincing. Low 
transmission power and low digital signal quality led to unreliable coverage and 
forced many customers to invest in their aerial systems in any case, negating the 
attractions of ON Digital’s ‘plug-and-play’ (DTG, 2001a, 2001e).  
A third digital broadcasting service was launched in 1999 when Telewest launched its 
first digital cable service in their franchise. In May 2000 NTL, another major cable 
television company, introduced digital television services. The biggest digital cable 
operators were initially Telewest, NTL, and CWC, a subsidiary of Cable and 
Wireless. However, the cable business of Cable and Wireless was bought by NTL in 
1999. The cable operators regarded it as important to consolidate the fragmented 
cable television industry. 
The following passage from an industry journal clarifies these signs of the times:  
“The news that General Cable preferred Telewest's offer of £649m to 
NTL's £550m came as no surprise. It seems like a lot of money for a 
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company which had not exactly been profitable in recent times, but it 
marks an important stage in the consolidation of the cable industry and 
places Telewest firmly as one of the big boys” (DTG, 1998b).  
An interviewed expert (2) commented that consolidation advantages in cable 
marketing could have been achieved through alliances as well. Consolidation used up 
cable operators’ resources, and as result, their marketing and customer service were 
perceived as low quality. Interviewee 2 commented that:  
“NTL is notorious for the quality--It has a reputation of having not good 
customer service and it manages to fail to meet even these low 
expectations.” 
Price-cutting and free set-top boxes, sponsored by the competing digital service 
providers, were seen as a major driver for the fast development of the digital 
television business system in 1999 and 2000. The increase of new subscribers peaked 
in the latter half of 1999. Competition in the form of subsidies played down the 
significance of switching costs and technological lock-in associated with potential 
positive feedback dynamisms. Since all of the competing digital television 
broadcasters were providing free set-top-boxes, the imitation of strategy failed to 
make a difference, but caused significant financial pressures for the financially 
weaker competing firms. An interviewee (4) described the dynamics in hindsight:  
“ITVdigital had been forced, or felt they were forced by Sky to give out 
receivers, and the whole act subsidising, giving out receivers, was a big 
financial burden. -- That was one milestone, the day Sky decided to give 
away STBs, the rules were changed, because ITV Digital/ONdigital 
decided they have to act upon it.” 
In addition, interviewee 2 questioned the necessity of ONdigital’s imitative strategies:  
“I think they [ONdigital] felt they were forced to compete when Sky was 
giving the services. And, they felt they were forced to do it. I am not 
convinced that they had to. But, they felt they had to.”  
Interviewee 3 shared this view:  
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“In 4-5 months after their launch, Sky was announcing, that they are 
going to give free boxes. They [ONdigital] had to match. Now, the reason 
they had to match was because they had locked-in to this strategy that 
they must compete with Sky. ---This was the decision made in spring 1999 
and it completely changed the market. It also meant that ITV was dead. It 
would take them three years to die, but that was it!”  
4.3.2 Phase 2: Competition over content  
There was a switch in emphasis from set-top box sponsorship to content competition. 
The major phases were overlapping in their timing, because competition in the form 
of programming had already started at the launch of digital television, and is still 
going on. The change in emphasis in the second phase of business system evolution 
can be seen in the relative costs of programming. The latter paragraphs will show how 
the programming content became very costly. Exclusive and even discriminatory 
content supply arrangements took place in this arena of intensified competition.  
There was a market for pay-TV, and different studies showed that customers were 
willing to pay for the premium content (CompetitionCommission, 1999; ATV, 2001). 
Most potential adopters of digital television (especially prior to the Freeview service 
in 2002) were offered a pay service package with additional free-to-view services. 
The pricing of the package is such that the marginal cost of adding a new channel 
declines. Premium pay services include more expensive channels featuring sports and 
movies. Pay per view is a service for films and events programming (Bajon & 
Fontaine, 2001). The ability to provide the most popular, traditional television 
channels with an emphasis on sports and movies was important for the early digital 
television adopters (Consumers'Association, 2001; Theodoropoulou, 2003). This may 
be related to the fact that early adopter households were more likely to have young 
male members or children, compared to non-digital households (MORI, 2001). In a 
survey carried out in 2000, seven out of ten BSkyB customers felt that channel variety 
was the main reason for their choice of service provider (Theodoropoulou, 2003). 
Granada and Carlton were the owners of ONdigital, and the most important franchise 
holders in the national Independent Television broadcaster network (ITV). Granada 
and Carlton saw that platform competition was more important than channel 
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competition, the latter being an arena in which they were familiar. In order to help the 
competitiveness of the terrestrial platform, they also refrained from supplying the ITV 
channels to BSkyB’s satellite platform. Before the commercial launch, BSkyB Chief 
Executive Mark Booth accused ITV of  
"…withholding its channels (from Sky Digital platform) for private gain" 
(DTG, 1998a).  
ONdigital showed BSkyB programming, but remained hesitant to supply its own 
channels to the satellite platform. Interviewee 4 described the arena of competition: 
 “Therefore they went to pay-TV in a big way, half of the digital 
terrestrial capacity. They were in the business of packaging of programs, 
ITVdigital, or ONdigital, as it was then called. They didn’t package 
BBC’s programs, but ITV’s programs and other channels that they bought 
in and included in their three spare multiplexes. They took the view that 
satellite, and cable for that matter, were rivals, in the pay-TV world, and 
as a result they didn’t acquire satellite capacity or seek satellite 
distribution until very near the time of their collapse. They were engaged 
in platform war, head-to-head competition, whereas the BBC was not. 
That is a very big difference.”   
Both commercial terrestrial platform owner companies had traditionally supplied 
highly rated television series for different channels distributed by other broadcasters. 
The original intent expressed was that the platform would build on the programming 
talent and resources of parent companies with some BSkyB premium content. The 
idea of own content is evident both in the tender documents for the DTT license and 
the first channel offering of ONdigital (BDB, 1997). The initial confidence in their 
pay-TV platform eroded, as ONdigital was not able to build on the appeal of its 
owners’ channels. In coming years, ONdigital discontinued many of its own channels, 
and acquired some of the popular BSkyB channels instead. Interviewee 3 did not see 
original content as a distinctive competitive advantage, however. The interviewee 
stresses that the channels offered by the owner companies had not been an appealing 
proposition for customers. The interviewee also raised the issue of imitation of 
BSkyB strategies, now regarding the composition of channels:  
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“Their normal business decisions were distorted by their shareholders’ 
desires to push their channels. They also had the crazy notion that they 
could compete with satellite. This meant for them they had to have all the 
premium channels which satellite has. Which is a problem, because they 
are all Sky Premium channels. So, they were in the unfortunate position 
that their biggest competitor, as they saw it was their supplier of the 
channels they thought they had to have in order to compete. Very tricky 
position, indeed!” 
When ONdigital gave up the opportunity to differentiate with its content, they faced at 
least three problems. Firstly, ONdigital gave up some of the channels of its parent 
companies, which would have helped the owners. Secondly, when ONdigital chose to 
offer the channels of its main rival, this led to a less differentiated proposition for the 
viewers. Third, the terms that BSkyB offered for the supply of BSkyB’s own channels 
to the other platforms were highly unfavourable for competitors. The Chief Executive 
of ONdigital/ITV Digital, Stuart Prebble, commented on the situation later in 2003:  
“Sky charged ONdigital a higher wholesale price than the retail price it 
charged its own customers” (Goodwin, 2005).  
Regulators investigated and later also found evidence that BSkyB really had acted 
anti-competitively and abused its competitive position as a provider of premium 
sports and film channels to rivals ITV Digital, NTL, and Telewest (OFT, 2001; ATV, 
2002). Despite some evidence, there were insufficient grounds for judging that the 
firm had violated its positions as a dominant content provider (OFT, 2002).  
BSkyB chose to pioneer premium digital pay-TV content, specifically sports. Despite 
the supply agreements between BSkyB and its reseller, BSkyB was losing money, 
partially because of the increasing prices of programming rights. Already before the 
digital era, football came to form a cornerstone of BSkyB’s offering. One interviewee 
(1) commented on the competition for sports content:  
“Our [BBC] business analysts modelled what Sky could offer for football 
in 96-97, and we came to conclusion that it was make or break in their 
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business plan.  They had to have Premier League, and therefore they were 
ready to bid what ever it took”. 
Sports programming was a major arena of disagreements. ONdigital accused BSkyB 
of failing to honour its contract to supply Sky Sports 2 on the terrestrial system (DTG, 
1999b). At the same time, the demand for content increased the prices for sports 
rights, and media companies even started to buy soccer teams. BSkyB paid £1.1 
billion (approximately US $ 1.5 billion) in 2000 for a 3-year contract to show live 
English Premier League soccer games. Former BBC Director General Greg Dyke 
described the reasoning for pay television’s enormous interest in sporting rights:  
“Millions of people in Britain pay BSkyB £40 a month just to get their 
football; the advertising revenue involve is worth nothing like that” 
(Dyke, 2004).  
BSkyB could transmit the price to the customers, but only partially. BSkyB’s viewers 
paid, on average, higher revenues per household compared to competition because of 
a wider variety of services and more expensive top-tier packages. According to 
interviewees however, the premium channels were not as profitable for BSkyB as the 
basic channel package. The emphasis on providing premium channels was due to 
‘industry obsession’. Imitation was also visible in competitors’ adoption of BSkyB’s 
channel bundle structure, as well as in the pricing adopted for the channel bundles. 
Interviewee 2 commented:  
“The way they [the channels] are bundled is much more similar [than the 
channels themselves], and it is interesting to speculate about whether that 
is because consumers compare between them and they want the same 
things with the same money, or whether it is because Sky has such control 
of the way the channels are sold. I think it is for both. Partly because Sky 
is doing it, others have to do it. And partly, because it has control over 
certain key rights.” 
The quote above emphasises how the competitors chose a particular way to compete 
favouring one of them. The ‘key rights’ the interviewee mentions refer to the popular 
content that BSkyB was offering on its channels. But, as mentioned elsewhere, the 
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success was not only a result of their perceived quality, and also related to the supply 
decisions of the challenger firms.  
The BSkyB was also successful when measured by churn. Customers tended to shop 
for bargains, but to stick with the highest perceived value offerings. The subscriber 
data shows that customers returned their equipment in great numbers after the subsidy 
periods ended, and switched back to their preferred systems (DTG, 2001a). The 
yearly rate of churn in terrestrial and cable companies was 20-29 percent (DTG, 
2000d, 2000e, 2000c). The result announcements reveal how BSkyB’s churn 
constantly remained significantly smaller than its competitors’. The ability to have 
lower churn had a significant positive impact on BSkyB’s profitability. ITV Digital 
interpreted that the rate of churn correlated with the stage of growth (DTG, 2001g). In 
its analysis, it reasoned that the size of customer base brings stability, implying a need 
for fast growth.  
BSkyB wanted also other content providers to leverage the carrying capacity of 
satellite. Interviewee 3 described how BSkyB developed its network of offerings:  
“They took the advantage of economics of digital to encourage third-party 
channels to really make use of it. The Discovery channel, for example, 
started off as one channel in analogue and in digital it made like 10 
channels. They really encouraged that…”.  
The variety of BSkyB’s channel offering is seen already in the first years of 
digitalisation, which is visible in e.g. Figure 8 Digital television business system 
1999. In addition to widely known channels, the large network provided minority 
taste channels including Asian services. These provided BSkyB with a chance to tap 
into many sub-markets. Also a high value in Bonacich power centrality describes the 
important position of BSkyB among different firms. 
The major content supplier outside of the camps of major platform providers was the 
BBC; it having a policy of platform neutrality. It wanted its channels to be delivered 
through every platform, although this added an extra burden to its license fee funding. 
The corporation also developed services that leveraged new digital possibilities. In 
2001, the BBC introduced multi-channel programming in its traditional coverage of 
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the Wimbledon tennis tournament. The viewers could choose the match they wanted 
to see from a selection of five courts. The BBC offered the service on satellite and 
cable platforms, which could provide the necessary technology. ITV companies 
argued that the Corporation were wasting tax-payers money as they provided a new 
kind of service to two of the three platforms (DTG, 2001c, 2001f). The Culture 
Secretary (Department of Culture, Media and Sport), Mr Chris Smith evaluated the 
role of the BBC as follows:  
"As our principal public service broadcaster, the BBC should continue to 
set a benchmark for the industry as a whole…” (DTG, 1999c).  
The ITV group had been restrictive in not delivering its premium channels on cable 
and satellite, especially to BSkyB in order to support its own ONdigital/ITV Digital 
pay-TV platform. The disagreements over the delivery of ITV channels changed 
during the years, as it became more obvious for the ITV network and its related firms 
to be on satellite. The tone in discussions started to involve how much the ITV 
network had to pay BSkyB for conditional access (CA) in order to get their free-to-
view channels regionally distributed on their the popular satellite platform. The digital 
platform insisted that all the other firms had to pay for their access, even the public 
broadcasters. Before the firms settled, Chris Bryant, a member of the parliamentary 
committee, called for intervention to ensure that ITV programming would be seen on 
the satellite platform. The following excerpt describes his position:   
"Sky homes can't get ITV 1 unless they switch off the satellite receiver. 
That's wrong, I want everyone to be able to get ITV 1. If Sky and ITV can't 
agree a sensible price by the end of the month then Oftel should intervene 
to make sure that Sky viewers don't miss out.”   (DTG, 2001d).  
In their marketing effort, ONdigital was re-branded as ITV Digital in 2001. While the 
platform firms were negotiating on the terms of access of free-to-view channels, the 
premium channels of pay-television were a related area of competition. The launch of 
a new subscription service, ITV Sport, with a budget of £150 million, was made 
available to subscribers of terrestrial ITV Digital and cable company NTL. Following 
BSkyB’s example in their effort to show highly valued football, ONdigital bought the 
rights for the second-tier Nationwide League sports channel for nearly £315 million 
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(approximately US $454 million). The CEO of ITV Digital, Stuart Prebble, explained 
that the high price was justified for on competitive reasons. ITV Digital intended to 
wholesale the channel to BSkyB. The venture would have been proven profitable if 
ITV Digital’s strongest competitor would have delivered their network’s premium 
channel. But, the executives BSkyB did not want to include ITV Sports in their 
package (Goodwin, 2005). The justification stated by Mr. Prebble was highly 
questionable, considering the competitive record of BSkyB and Mr. Murdoch and his 
enterprises. With hindsight, the personal and company experiences could have 
predicted what the BSkyB’s responses were, but the interviewees point to another 
motivational factor. The perceptions about the market and competitors were not 
giving advice for how managers should avoid head-on battle with serious 
consequences. On the opposite, the mindset was constraining managers’ behaviour. 
An interviewee (3) commented on the imitative battle: 
 “They had gone into this position, this mindset that we [ITV Digital] had 
to compete-- that means we must have everything they’ve got and then we 
must have something else as well on very limited bandwidth and without 
the money News Corporation [BSkyB parent] has.” 
An evaluation by interviewee 2 echoes the previous statement. The competition was 
played under rules that were not suitable for everyone:  
“They [ITV Digital] were kind of me-too, kind of forced to play Sky’s 
game and they couldn’t as well as Sky could.” 
Interviewee 1 suggests causality from motivational aspects to the end result: 
“ITV got emotionally engaged in the bidding process -- when they lost 
[Premiership] they were prepared to pay over the odds for second-rate 
package. And that’s what destroyed ONdigital.”  
Emotions and imitation were seen also with BSkyB’s action. Interviewee 3 described 
the end result of series of competitive actions:  
“When I talked with Sky people when I was [describing interviewees 
previous position] I said, ‘why are you obsessed with these people? They 
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will compete with you at the margin, only. The vast majority of potential 
adopters are satellite. They will never going to be interested on taking this 
offering.’ ”    
The quote above emphasises that imitative competition took place, even when it was 
not profitable to anyone. The interviewee quoted above saw that BSkyB was 
following similar pattern to that of ITV digital, and made unnecessary losses for the 
sake of destroying a competitor.  
Cable television companies had enjoyed wide pay-TV customer base already in 
analogue technology, which eased the possibilities for customers to adopt their new 
technology (Papathanassopoulos, 2002). After a major consolidation of the cable 
television industry, still slowed down by their financial problems, both Telewest and 
NTL saw the opportunity to leverage their cable customers more efficiently (DTG, 
2000a). The companies remained confident that they would soon overtake satellite in 
popularity (DTG, 1999c, 2000f; DTG). The technological advancements in the history 
of British cable suggested a business commentator to describe the U.K. cable industry 
as ‘Rolls-Royce of cable systems’ (Spar & Zakaria, 1998). Mr. Barclay Knapp, the 
Chief Executive of NTL, evaluated the situation:  
"I hope people realise that cable will have a competitive advantage. Our 
network has a superior capacity and reliability than any other in the 
country. Sky will reach its target of 7 million customers, but cable should 
pass 12 million in the next few years." (DTG, 2000a). 
Cable companies could strengthen their own value networks. Due to technological 
reasons there were some complementary services that were first introduced in cable, 
e.g., an interactive trading service (DTG, 2000b). The companies also introduced a 
telephony and internet service alongside the television offering, and sold this as a 
bundle.  This ‘triple play’ was an original advantage of cable firms, but the effect was 
reduced by the actions of satellite and terrestrial competitors. BSkyB and ONDigital 
offered internet services and telephone calls using other providers. These included 
firms that were not as active in other aspects of competition, e.g., telecom firms such 
as the former monopoly BT, and the technologically advanced Kingston 
Communications.  
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The terrestrial platform was at a disadvantage because it could not provide as many 
services. It took some time to solve the technical problems in order to offer some of 
these services. ONdigital/ITV Digital tried to manage positive expectations with far-
reaching announcements and trying to compare itself advantageously with its 
competitors. According to the Chief Executive, Stuart Prebble:  
"ONdigital will offer [mostly in year 2000-2001, added by A.S.] a wide 
range of interactive services to its subscribers. Unlike satellite,…” (DTG, 
1999a). 
The comment above shows the antagonism typical in the researched period. A firm is 
solving a problem it is facing, and the equation involves the competitor in one form or 
another.  
4.3.3 Phase 3: Shake-up and re-organisation from 2002 onwards 
The financial figures of BSkyB in Table 3 show that, despite its lead, the company 
was a losing operation.  Despite strong and improving revenues, the free cash flow 
remained negative in the financial year 2002 ending 31 July (BSkyB, 2002).  
For strong growth orientated, network-dependant companies, active networking 
benefits a company as long as there were positive expectations. However, the network 
also transmits problems when they occur. Due to resource-consuming acquisitions 
among the cable operators, and extensive investments in the digital broadcasting 
business, both NTL and Telewest had to make debt-for-equity arrangements and their 
chief executives were ousted from their posts. The most active manufacturing 
company, the UK-based set-top box manufacturer Pace, suffered from the financial 
difficulties of NTL. The problems were transmitted from the buyer (NTL) to the 
supplier (Pace) by insurance companies, which did not want to give more credit to the 
indebted operator (Sabbagh, 2002). CEO Malcolm Miller had earlier been praised for 
his leadership but now was forced to leave office. The Financial Times commented on 
his departure:  
"He is credited with having propelled Pace into a market leading position 
by keeping investment in research and development high, while 
minimising manufacturing costs. But some shareholders said he had 
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failed to spot early signs of the market's deterioration this year and badly 
managed the company's ensuing string of profit warnings…One 
shareholder said: 'He had lost credibility following his misguided 
optimism'“(DTG, 2002b).  
Funding shortages and debt problems ended ITV Digital’s terrestrial operations on 
May 2002 (Marshall, 2002). The network had already shrunk before its closure. Its 
£315 million (approximately US $ 454 million) contract for the Nationwide League 
rights was the final blow to a company that had already used up its financial resources 
for hardware subsidies and building up its network. The manager who led the BBC at 
the time summarised the events:  
“ITV Digital was a broadcast platform with substandard technology, a 
consumer proposition with little appeal and a business model that failed 
to account for a strong competitive market” (Dyke & Abery, 2002).  
A four-year football deal was later signed that transferred the rights of the Nationwide 
League to BSkyB for only £95 million (approximately US $143 million). As ITV 
Digital had also acquired content from its platform competitors, the collapse initially 
worsened their financial situation because ITV Digital did not make payments 
according to contracts. The digital service providers were only able to pass more of 
the costs to the end-customers after the first exit. The relieved pressure on competition 
in the consumer markets were seen in financial statements, though with some delay. 
The annual report for 2002 of BSkyB, ending in July included losses due to the ITV 
Digital’s inability to serve its debts. BSkyB lost a competitor, but also a major 
customer. The change in the business environment was more visible in the first half 
results of 200321. The number of subscribers continued to grow, while marketing 
expenses declined.  The press release accompanying the interim report stated:  
“The Group has marked its return to profitability by delivering a profit 
after tax of £16 million for the period, resulting in earnings per share of 
0.8 pence compared to a loss per share of 71.8 pence for the comparable 
period. This is the first time the Group has delivered positive earnings per 
share since the launch of the free set top box offer in May 1999, which 
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 1 H 2003 ended 31 December 2002 
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resulted in a period of heavy investment in subscriber acquisition” 
(BSkyB, 2003b). 
The annual report for 2003 report ending 31 July 2003 restated the reversal, offering 
bigger numbers: 
“Profit after tax was £190 million, the Group’s first full year of positive 
earnings since the launch of Sky digital” (BSkyB, 2003a). 
Interviewee 3 described the shake-up:  
‘The shareholders of Sky got no dividends for year after year after year. 
They were always promised, it would come…For broadcasters the 
situation has changed, …Sky has [been] going around broadcasters these 
couple of years when their contracts come to renewal and say, “We’ll pay 
lot less”. And all of them have agreed to get less. 
The interviewee 3 had similar view:  
”In the long run, the big winners are Sky’s shareholders who finally 
gained dividends -- they could finally see real money, because Sky took 
the accounting decision early on to write-off all the costs of a [set-top] 
box giveaway--So, huge losses initially. But, now they are in a great 
position, it is all cash. So Sky is a huge winner in the long run, they 
gambled, they came good for them.”  
The new competitive setting affected firms who had less to bargain with. Entrants 
new to television industry had often to choose a partner, and the options were now 
reduced. BSkyB’s leading position in the business system is seen in the comment of 
Michael Loeb, the Chief Executive of TotoPools, when he announced a partnership 
with BSkyB:  
"Access to Sky Digital's nationwide television audience will allow our 
brand to penetrate an entirely new audience of potential players" (DTG, 
2002a).  
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Betting has so far been the single most important interactive pay-service, as 80% of 
interactive revenues came from betting (DTG, 2001b, 2002c), and several sports 
entertainment partners, including technology partners, joined the television value 
chain.  
By 2002, the bidding wars had eased and terms of contract started to reflect the new 
competitive situation. Complementary products were now supplied on BSkyB’s 
terms. An interviewee 1 commented:  
“This is a game of such high cost that only the big boys can play. It’s 
obviously good for the multiplication of independent producers because 
very much more material was needed because channels multiplied. But, 
the kind of budgets that were used were getting lower and lower. So, it 
was sweated labour for indies [independent television production 
sector].”  
The successor of ITV Digital, re-named Freeview, was launched in October 2002, 
backed principally by BBC, multiplex operator Crown Castle (formerly BBC's 
transmission division) and by BSkyB. In the multiplex application, the consortium 
behind the new venture expressed its deviation from the imitative strategies of its 
predecessor (Dyke & Abery, 2002).  
Freeview was operating a free-to-view model with channels paid for by license fees 
and advertisements, and was therefore radically different from the pay-TV model. The 
new role in the consortium suited the BBC well because it had extensive financial 
resources and it had been active almost everywhere else in the business system from 
the beginning of the diffusion of digital service.  
The owners of ITV Digital, Carlton Communications plc and Granada plc, announced 
an agreed merger on October 2002, a deal that came under competitive scrutiny, and 
was approved in 2004 (CompetitionCommission, 2003). The plan proposed a fully 
consolidated ITV that would be one of the leading commercial broadcasters in 
Europe.  
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4.4 Social network analysis of the industry evolution 
Social network analysis was conducted to investigate how the relationships and 
positions evolved during the study period. The networks visible in the charts of this 
chapter include both published channel listings and firm co-operation arrangements. 
The difference in these two categories is visible in the charts.   
Social network analysis provides centrality measures that describe the position of 
firms in the market, with implications for performance (see e.g. Powell et al., 1996). 
Following the centrality scores and different ranks for each separate year, centrality 
offers a longitudinal view on individual firms and on the market. As the data includes 
different kind of relations, an evaluation between different types of firms is not 
possible. For example, a manufacturer cannot have direct access to many channels, 
which have the most significant impact on the social network measures.  
The digital television business system structure at the end of 1998 (after the two first 
commercial platform provider’s digital entries) is visualised in Figure 7. For the first 
nine months, competition for new customers was quite even between BSkyB and 
ONdigital (Goodwin, 2005). The difference between the platforms is visible, but not 
as stark as it was to become. 
 
  118 
 
Figure 7 Digital television business system 1998 
 
 
Legends: Co-operative ties are marked with lines. The major pay-TV platform service 
providers are coloured black, channels mentioned on listings are coloured dark, and co-
operation arrangements with other firms are coloured light. BSkyB affiliated operations are 
marked with triangle, ONdigital/ITV digital with square, NTL with hourglass symbol, and 
Telewest with diamond symbol, respectively. 
 
The race for a dominant digital platform entered a new phase when extensive 
hardware technology sponsorship came into play. The supplier and partner networks 
of NTL and Telewest were initially isolated, reflecting the fact that it took time before 
they were able to get their digital television offerings in place. The corresponding 
business system structure at the end of 1999, after the cable operator Telewest also 
entered the digital market, is shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
BSkyB  
NTL 
 Telewest  
ITV   
Digital 
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Figure 8 Digital television business system 1999 
 
Legends: Co-operative ties are marked with lines. The major pay-TV platform service 
providers are coloured black, channels mentioned on listings are dark coloured, and co-
operation arrangements with other firms are light coloured. BSkyB affiliated operations are 
marked with a triangle, ONdigital/ITV digital with a square, NTL with an hourglass symbol, 
and Telewest with a diamond symbol, respectively. 
 
As markets started to mature and new entrants emerged, BSkyB’s development was 
slower than its competitors. In Bonacich power terms, the lead of BSkyB was clear, 
but the challenger firms were closer in relative terms in 2000. The other platforms 
increasingly shared the same channels, linking the competitors more closely to the 
industry leader. 
In the middle of the graphs emerges a group of channels shared by every platform, or 
by three out of four. The cable platforms’ unique channel offering and partnership 
network seemed to erode between 2000 and 2001 in favour of shared assets. As ON 
Digital’s resources were limited, it started in 2000-2001 to slide to a more isolated 
network position. The change is seen by comparing the figures in Table 4, which 
includes information on the exclusive channels of the platforms. 
Telewest
BSkyB
NTL
ITV digital
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Whilst BBC-branded television channels were the most visible signs of the 
Corporation’s presence, it was also strongly involved in the development of digital 
technology standards and applications. The BBC’s strategy led to a situation where it 
became increasingly central over time in the industry network, measured in terms of 
Bonacich power centrality measures.  
A visual inspection of Figure 9 and Figure 10 further shows BSkyB’s central role. 
The improvement in the digital cable offer is also clearly visible. 
Figure 9 Digital television business system 2000 
Legends: Co-operative ties are marked with lines. The major pay-TV platform service 
providers are coloured black, channels mentioned on listings are dark coloured, and co-
operation arrangements with other firms are light coloured. BSkyB affiliated operations are 
marked with a triangle, ONdigital/ITV digital with a square, NTL with an hourglass symbol, 
and Telewest with a diamond symbol, respectively. 
 
Some of the complementors entered the industry with new kinds of services. There 
was pressure on some other firms or operations providing complementary services to 
secure their positions by having ties with several major actors, but the entrants did not 
act in a uniform manner. Some of them were closely linked to a core platform, while 
others entered the market without strong partners. The latter group has poorer 
visibility in the eyes of the media, and therefore, their activity could have been 
BSkyB
Telewest
ITV digital
NTL
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stronger than the media recorded. The evolution can be seen in Figure 9, where denser 
connections are observable. There was also a pattern of complementary entries in the 
television case. New interactive services joined the value system later than 
manufacturers, and they never had a central position in the network. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Digital television business system 2001 
 
Legends: Co-operative ties are marked with lines. The major pay-TV platform service 
providers are coloured black, channels mentioned on listings are coloured dark, and co-
operation arrangements with other firms are coloured light. BSkyB affiliated operations are 
marked with a triangle, ONdigital/ITV digital with a square, NTL with an hourglass symbol, 
and Telewest with a diamond symbol, respectively. 
 
The collapse of ITV Digital also gave more room for cable companies, and their 
revenues and subscriber figures started growing again. As NTL managed to organise 
its debt structure earlier, it also started improving its channel line-up before Telewest. 
Figure 11 shows that NTL especially started investing in its digital offering despite its 
ITV digital
Telewest
BSkyB
NTL
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financial constraints. The new Freeview platform relied heavily on content shared by 
others, operating on a free-to-view model. The new role of the BBC in the Freeview 
consortium strengthened its role in the industry networks. As the BBC, with BSkyB 
and Crown Castle, were the leaders of the consortium, the positions of these 
companies became more central and similar in social network terms. The BBC’s 
power was second to commercial platforms. Despite their extensive co-operation with 
BSkyB, the companies were involved in disagreements on, for example, channel 
carriage costs. They did not, however, become direct competitors in commercial 
markets, as the BBC primarily remained a non-profit, public service organisation. 
 
Table 4 Network position of major U.K. digital television firms22 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
BSkyB 
     
Exclusive digital TV channels 45 18 18 43 65 
Exclusive channels/ all TV channels 68% 23% 23% 33% 36% 
Bonacich power centrality/ rank in centrality 56.5 / 1 70.5/ 1 75.3 / 1 116 / 1 150 / 1 
ONdigital/ITV Digital 
     
Exclusive digital TV channels 9 2 2 2 2 
Exclusive channels/ all TV channels, % 30% 7% 6% 6% 6% 
Bonacich power centrality/ rank in centrality 29.3 / 2 35.8 / 3 35.5 / 4 33.8 / 4 27.3 / 4 
NTL  
     
Exclusive digital TV channels   11 4 5 
Exclusive channels/ all TV channels, %   16% 5% 5% 
Bonacich power centrality/ rank in centrality 3 / 24 8 / 4 60.3 / 2 69.8 / 2 91.8/ 2 
Telewest 
     
Exclusive digital TV channels  7 4 2 4 
Exclusive channels/ all TV channels, %  14% 57% 3% 5% 
Bonacich power centrality/ rank in centrality 3.7 / 20 41 / 2 54.3 / 3 57.8 / 3 78.8 / 3 
Freeview 
     
Exclusive digital TV channels     2 
Exclusive channels/ all TV channels, %     5% 
Bonacich power centrality/ rank in centrality     24.5 / 5 
BBC 
     
Bonacich power centrality/ rank in centrality 4.8/10 0.5/149 9.0/6 4.0/6 22.5/6 
 
Table 4 illustrates how, in Bonacich power centrality terms, BSkyB led the market, as 
it was ranked first in centrality throughout the investigated period. The Bonacich 
score continued to increase implying that the leader remained the focus of industry 
                                                 
22
 Bonacich power centrality is calculated using attenuation factor 0.0 
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evolution. The Bonacich power is not a relative term, so the score has the ability to 
increase or decrease for all of the participants in the given period. 
The Bonacich centrality formula can possibly tell more about the structure of U.K. 
television. Bonacich centrality can be interpreted as a measure of imitative behaviour 
among challenger firms. A rising Bonacich centrality among challengers is a sign of 
congruence, while a decrease would signal isolation. The challengers received a 
bigger share of BSkyB’s power, as they shared more of the same channels. The rising 
Bonacich centrality for them was at the same time a loss of distinctiveness in terms of 
channels and alliances.  
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Figure 11 Digital television business system 2002 
 
Legends: Co-operative ties are marked with lines. The major pay-TV platform service 
providers are coloured black, channels mentioned on listings are dark coloured, and co-
operation arrangements with other firms are light coloured. BSkyB affiliated operations are 
marked with a triangle, ONdigital/ITV digital with a square, NTL with an hourglass symbol, 
and Telewest with a diamond symbol, respectively. 
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4.5 Public statements portraying managerial mindsets to 
competition and markets  
The digital television narrative contained several examples of firms competing at the 
expense of profitability. There were several potential motivations for such behaviour. 
Competitive behaviour can also be evaluated by looking at series of actions which 
have the potential to disrupt the competitive status quo (Ferrier et al., 1999). The 
phenomenon of competitive ‘wars’ have received limited research attention, and 
especially the role of language during intensified rivalry (Rindova et al., 2004). 
By looking at what people said at the time of competition, one can observe imitative 
or divergent directions of the industry. Theoretical concepts have stressed different 
aspects of positive and negative feedback (e.g. Arthur, 1990; Das & Van de Ven, 
2000; Dickson et al., 2001; Noda & Collis, 2001; Lee & O'Connor, 2003; Ehrhardt, 
2004; Suarez, 2004). A common theme is that positive feedback mechanisms and 
local learning increase firm divergence. Convergence is a product of global learning 
and strategic imitation (Noda & Collis, 2001) and is related to negative feedback. 
4.5.1 Statements expressing positive or negative feedback  
In addition to the case narrative and the network analysis, I also performed a content 
analysis of the quotations found from published news stories or company 
announcements. Content analysis was made on quotations, or statements of actual 
persons involved in evolution, published close to their first occurrence. Ferrier (1999; 
2001) divided actions into six categories, of which I used only signalling. My aim was 
to capture only the signalling action events in the process of competitive interaction 
(Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier, 2001). The reasons for selecting only one action type are 
three-fold. First and most importantly, most of the actions can be understood as 
signalling, because they have usually been announced or leaked to the media 
intentionally. Second, due to the relatively small amount of data and diverse 
evaluations by the reporting news journalists, a coarse-grained categorisation was a 
more reliable method. Third, my approach is along the lines of suggestions set by 
Rindova et al. (2004).  The article called for competitive action researchers to go 
beyond competitive attacks, and to analyse the strategic themes in patterns of 
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competitive interaction by attending to the language games being played (Rindova et 
al., 2004).  The importance of ‘war language’ (Rindova et al., 2004) emphasises the 
visibility of actions, compared to the specific material nature of the action.  
The firms involved were digital service broadcasting companies during the period 
1998-2002. The 462 statements were classified under two nominal variables 
(Krippendorff, 1980). The statements were classified based on the attitude to growth 
and competition, reflecting a reliance on positive or negative feedback using two 
nominal categories. To be valued, an announcement, or a reported quote has to 
possess clear implications for an announcer’s attitude to categories. The positive 
category included statements implying firm’s progressive or above-average growth 
strategies, own initiatives, leveraging the network for further growth, and confidence 
building measures, which are signs of trust in the favourable outcome of positive 
feedback mechanisms. The negative category included quotes on policies aimed at 
efficiency, firm’s actions to leverage the network for cost-savings or imitation, or 
claims of the hostile behaviour of competitors. These include the use of military 
language (Rindova et al., 2004), but also non-military expressions. The above 
examples of negative feedback comments stressed market share irrespective of the 
market size. Competitive bidding, or sponsoring to acquire valuable assets, belonged 
to the negative category as signs of imitative behaviour. These comments reflect the 
idea that the well being of the commentator’s firm does not require a joint institutional 
setting.  
The statements were classified as 313 quotes reflecting a focus only on positive 
feedback dynamism, and 107 quotes reflecting a focus on imitative, cost-cutting 
policies, characteristic of negative feedback dynamism. Some quotes (42) expressed 
both feedback types. This implies that in 355 quotes there were positive feedback 
expressions, while in 149 there were negative expressions.   
Negative feedback comments were less frequent, which should be reflected to the fact 
that the technology and market were still being created, so there was less incentive for 
exploitative strategies and cost cutting. In a growing market, the emphasis was on 
building trust, or even ‘hype’ among the customers. In this context, negative 
comments had the potential effect of derailing not only competitors, but also the 
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introduction of the technology. I observed positive comments as expected, and there 
was not a significant variance in statistical terms between the firms.  
At a time of the introduction of a new technology, critical comments do not support 
market creation, and so their occurrence requires more careful investigation. As could 
be expected based on the case narrative, the challengers and their parent 
organisations, including the BBC, expressed their views with a negative feedback 
mindset more often than BSkyB .  
There was a significant difference in negative comments between the groups. The 
difference between BSkyB and its challengers, namely ONdigital/ITV digital with 
their parent organizations, Telewest, NTL, and BBC, is also observable in cross-
tabulations. In Table 5, expressions about the negative feedback loop are cross-
tabulated with the respective firm sending out the statement. SPSS software was used 
to produce the tabulations and tests.  
Table 5 Firm and negative feedback cross-tabulation23 
 
Firm Negative 
feedback 
expressions 
No negative 
feedback in 
expressions  
Total 
BSkyB 13 42 55 
‘Challengers’ 63 79 142 
Others 73 192 265 
Total 149 313 462 
The results imply that the relationship between the type of firm and expressions of 
negative feedback is statistically significant in the case database. A binomial 
investigation is coherent with the earlier investigation and supports the above 
conclusion that the ‘Challengers’ expressed negative feedback significantly more 
fiercely than other firms did. In a binomial investigation, percentages of negative 
expressions are evaluated according to the average number of negative quotes in the 
sample. The average of negative feedback loop expressions is 32,3% of all quotes, 
while the observed proportion among ‘Challengers’ is 44,4%. The difference is 
significant according to the binomial testing procedure of SPSS24. 
                                                 
23
 Pearson chi-square has a value of 14,091, with 2 degrees of freedom. The significance of 0,001 
implies that the relationship between cross-tabulated items is statistically highly significant in 
the sample.  
24
 Observed proportion of negative “Challenger” quotes is compared to the test proportion was 0,323 
Significance of 0,002 is based on Z approximation.  
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The inclusion of expressions about a positive feedback loop and ambiguous 
expressions partially support the former results. The ambiguous variable refers to 
situations in which the statement or quote provides an indication of support for both 
positive and negative feedback. Adding new categories reduces the number of cases 
in each cell, making statistical inferences more difficult. The relationship between 
strategy view variables with categories (negative, ambiguous, positive), and firm class 
(‘BSkyB’, ‘Challengers’, ‘Others’) is statistically significant, and also visible in Table 
6.  
Table 6 Firm class and strategic view cross tabulation25 
 
Firm Negative 
feedback 
expressions 
Ambiguous 
feedback 
Positive 
feedback 
expressions 
Total 
BSkyB  10 3 42 55 
‘Challengers’ 45 18 79 142 
Others 52 21 192 265 
Total 107 42 3 462 
 
The time-series of negative feedback quotes informs that the firms expressed negative 
feedback in a rather constant manner. There are no observable peaks in the negative 
comments among ‘Challengers’. The flow of announcements did not change during 
the study period, with the possible exception of the last months of 2002, after the 
industry shakeout and the introduction of the Freeview platform. In relative terms, 
BSkyB and its parent organisation had a more negative emphasis during the last 
months of the investigated period. However, the small number of negative comments 
by BSkyB makes it difficult to draw inferences on their evolutionary path.  
The quantitative content analysis supports the view that firms searched in an imitative 
manner, did not explore new opportunities, and were inclined to follow others, thus 
not fully leveraging their distinctive advantages. The different analyses offered 
slightly different views on the firms. An analysis of quotes and statements portrayed 
BSkyB as a less imitative firm.  
                                                 
25
 Pearson chi-square has value 14,230  with 4 degrees of freedom. This would have implied 
significance (2-sided) of 0,007.        
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4.5.2  Qualitative comparative analysis on competitive topics 
Announcement data gives the perception that the ‘Challenger’ group was mostly 
responsible for the negative feedback expressions. Therefore, BSkyB could be 
described as a firm with strong reliance on the positive feedback mechanism. This 
would characterise it as a pioneering industry leader with initiatives exploiting 
distinctive resources, an explorer of new avenues for its benefit, while also supporting 
industry development. The other evidence found in the narrative section largely 
supports the finding inferred from the quotes and statements. However, the narrative 
offers a complementary view in which BSkyB is not as strong, or was not always the 
pioneering force, interviewees and text documents even describing BSkyB as 
‘obsessed’ with competitors, or sharing ‘industry obsession’. The examples suggest 
the ex post leader was not only an initiator, but also a follower itself. Further, they 
give insight how the powerful position of BSkyB was not evident when the events 
started to take place. It reached its leadership position only some time after 
introduction, and the firm was internally divided on the best possible digital strategy.  
The vagueness requires further investigation of the causal conditions of imitation. I 
use a qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin, 1987; Ragin, 2000) in order to shed 
further light on the role of an industry leader. If the challenger firms are imitating the 
industry leader, it gives a benchmark for them. The picture changes if the industry 
leader acts as an imitator and the imitated. If the leader possesses both roles, the result 
suggests an equal view of how the participants are assessing the market.  
Following the qualitative comparative case methodology tradition, I focused on the 
combinations of conditions in order to unfold the complexities (Ragin, 1987). The 
comparative method is interested in which combinations are associated with the 
particular outcome (Ragin, 1987). Therefore, I investigated the combinations leading 
to imitative behaviour. More specifically, I was interested to see, if combinations 
leading to imitation included BSkyB’s role as an initiator, or whether some other 
combinations were possible. The Boolean logic of expressing causal condition in the 
form of truth tables offers a way to summarise researched data. With even small 
number of comparable cases, a researcher can make causal inferences (Ragin, 1987).  
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This analysis took place after the need for new analysis was recognised, and therefore 
data manipulation was required. The narrative was written about the most central 
competitive phases, starting from the launch, competition over set-top boxes and 
content, leading to the industry shake-up. In the narrative, some minor phases 
emerged, such as cable industry consolidation and new product and service launches, 
which leveraged digital technology. The smaller competitive incidents were not as 
carefully observed in the media and the interviewed industry experts did not give 
them equal attention. For qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), I reread the 
material to identify with some less intensive periods in addition to the more visible 
competitive phases. I came up with 14 topics of the competition.26 The different 
competitive topics provide the comparison necessary for qualitative comparative 
analysis. Sharing the same larger context, the competing firms have partially different 
conditions and competitive outcomes. The number of configurations (14) is in line 
with QCA applications, as Ragin (1987) suggests that the most appropriate number of 
cases is between 5 and 20 (Ragin, 1987). 
After identifying the competitive topics, I tabulated the major characteristics of each 
of these case configurations. For that reason, I read 725 non-overlapping news items 
or quotes, with additional support from the interview data. The following table gives 
also a short description of the topic. Each one of them is mentioned also in the 
narrative.  
                                                 
26
 Most of the topics received quite coherent treatment both in the initial news and announcement 
material, and interviews. The iterative research process helped to find the themes, although 
some items were originally unnoticed. In the initial news material, there were reports about 
marketing bundles of channels. At that point the items were not classified as an news item at 
that point, because the pricing of bundles was not considered as an news event, nor they were 
supplied with a quote. However, the interviewees gave it a stronger role, and the material was 
reread providing data for QCA. 
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Table 7 Competitive topics  
Configuration 
number 
Topic Description 
1 Sponsoring set-top boxes  As firm sponsored customers with free 
or almost free boxes. This excludes the 
government’s idea to catalyze digital 
switch-over. 
2 BSkyB channels  As digital platform’s own premium 
channels were wholesaled to other 
platforms 
3 ITV channels  As parent organisations of terrestrial 
platforms were wholesaling premium 
channels to other platforms 
4 Football content  As broadcasters were involved in 
publishing rights and ownership of 
football teams 
5 Other provision of content  As firms were involved in bringing 
content to their channels and platforms 
6 Installed base  Platforms emphasised in their 
communication their installed base of 
customers  
7 Cable consolidation As cable television companies 
consolidated  
8 Interactive hardware and software  New product introductions after digital 
television  
9 Interactive television Interactive and enhanced television 
programs 
10 Digital shopping Digital home shopping and betting 
services 
11 Commercials  Interactive commercials 
12 Triple play  Internet, phone, TV services marketed 
as a bundle  
13 BSkyB as an operator  The negotiations over terms of 
distribution of channels on satellite, 
and their access in the Sky Digital 
electronic programming guide 
14 Channel bundling When channels of programming were 
sold as bundles 
 
Competitive topics are meant to be distinctive, although the content of the news item 
or statement would have provided material for several categories. Some of the topics 
seem to be residual classes, including ‘Other provision of content’. 
Competitive topics have different characteristics, including conditions associated with 
the outcome. The outcome here is imitative competition. The analysis was developed 
during the course of the study, which adds a word of caution. The investigation has 
been open to the actions of all companies, but its main focus has been on the actions 
of the major firms. Imitation by smaller, e.g., technology companies would have been 
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possible to detect, but I acknowledge that there is a bias due to the material used and 
the researcher’s preoccupation with the broadcaster and platform side of the narrative. 
The problem is not necessarily a serious one. The defining issue here is to clarify the 
role of BSkyB as a pioneer, or as part of an imitative group. As this investigation is 
intended to clearly focus on the unsolved role of BSkyB, and not the totality of the 
question, the investigation builds on the earlier chapter. This processual research has 
led to a change in the dependent variable, as well. In the previous chapter, comments 
about negative feedback included hostility against competitors, as they were not 
building trust in the viability of the network. Following the network externalities 
rationale, this meant that while hostile to the competitor, the negative comments were 
also undermining the perception of the viability of the total market. 
 This QCA investigation takes the view that hostility may occur in imitative or non-
imitative competition. The difference is evident in one stream of discussion. The case 
configuration 13 is about BSkyB as an operator, where it controlled access to satellite 
platform, and most importantly the Sky Digital electronic programming guide (EPG). 
ITV companies strongly opposed going to the satellite platform, so there was 
differentiation and hostility on their behalf that was present at the same time.  In the 
previous content analysis, quotes on these items should be calculated as sign of a 
negative feedback loop, but in this investigation the outcome was calculated as an 
occurrence of non-imitative competition. 
Imitation is understood as following the example of others with a similar approach. 
The emergence of new solutions and new programs is non-imitative, but tapping into 
same pool of resources is imitative. For a channel, buying new programs is non-
imitative as it involves novel creative products. Buying rights for the same products is 
considered as imitative. Competition over new but similar resources is a critical 
borderline issue. Reflecting on the interviews, I came to conclusion that competition 
over football was imitative, while the different arrangements with interactive 
technology suppliers were not. This is supported by the rationale expressed by Noda 
and Collis (2001), in which positive feedback catalyses divergence and negative 
feedback congruence. Non-imitation would bring about new firms, new resources and 
new combinations into development, while imitation more severely limits the number 
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of new entrants. Football teams are similar in kind, while new technology and creative 
cultural products offer an unbounded number of variations.  
The causal conditions investigated were selected after re-reading the data. I took notes 
when actors, types of actors, characteristics of actors, or events were associated with 
the competitive phase. Firstly I tried subjectively to understand their potential to cover 
the phenomenon i.e. leaving out the most idiosyncratic associations while avoiding 
tautologies. I came up with four conditions that were referred to in the written 
material and interviews. The conditions are the role of platform provider, ‘Platform’; 
the centrality of participants, ‘Centrality’; the role of BSkyB in initiating the 
competitive phase, ‘BSkyB’; and the role of digital services in the particular 
competition, ‘Digital’. 
‘Platform’ as a condition refers to platform operators’ role in the competitive phase. 
These firms include commercial, terrestrial, satellite, or cable operators, but exclude 
public broadcasters. The investigation of major competitive phases suggests that 
platform providers were inclined to imitative behaviour. 
‘Centrality,’ as a condition refers to the average centrality of discussants active in the 
competitive topic. Due to material and research focus, the ‘Platform’ and the 
‘Centrality’ are overlapping because the major platform firms are the most central 
firms, followed by the BBC. With the BBC, there is another distinction, as acquired 
cable companies were platform firms, but with no central position in the network.  
The ‘BSkyB’ initiative means that the condition is true when the company launched 
the competitive issue at hand. The content analysis showed that the other platform 
operators and the BBC expressed negative feedback mechanism in their quotes and 
statements. This lends to the proposition that the latter firms’ hostility was due to the 
leadership of BSkyB or, more generally, that imitative competition was a type of 
response against the leader. In that case, BSkyB’s initiatives would have been the 
most obvious targets of such responses. 
As the investigated topic covers a new technology introduction, it is justified to 
include it as a potential condition. The variable ‘Digital’ denotes the conditions of the 
significant presence of new technology in the particular competitive topic. As Noda 
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and Collis (2001) suggest, the emergence of new actors is logically associated with 
divergence and positive feedback (Noda & Collis, 2001). With new technology as a 
condition, we can evaluate how constant an association it has with non-imitative 
competition.   
With a small number of configurations, the QCA method relies on binary 
categorisation of causal conditions and output (Ragin, 1987). Subjective binary 
categorisation is based on the earlier material. Conditions are marked as present if 
they exist, absent otherwise. I attempted to constrain my judgment by assigning the 
presence-absence dichotomies of almost equal sizes. Within each variable, there were 
from 6 to 8 existent conditions, and respectively eight to six times of absence. The 
limitation presented pressure to classify more configurations as having an ‘Absent’ 
condition than would have otherwise been the case. The classification mirrors the 
situation, at least in relative terms. The cases with more ‘Present’ conditions, received 
the correct classification, while less present conditions received the classification 
‘Absent’. More information about coding is found from Appendix 7.7. The table in 
the appendix provides examples such as quotes, or excerpts from an interview as an 
illustration. They give advice on the reasoning behind the categorisation. 
Table 8 Binary categorisation of configurations  
Configuration  Centrality  Platform BSkyB Digital Imitation 
1 Present Present Present Present Present 
2 Present Present Present Absent Present 
3 Present Present Absent Absent Present 
4 Present Present Present Absent Present 
5 Present Absent Absent Absent Absent 
6 Present Present Present Absent Present 
7 Absent Present Absent Absent Present 
8 Absent Absent Absent Present Absent 
9 Present Absent Absent Present Absent 
10 Absent Absent Present Present Absent 
11 Absent Absent Present Present Absent 
12 Absent Present Absent Present Present 
13 Present Absent Absent Present Absent 
14 Absent Present Present Present Present 
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The configurations are here summarised in Table 9. There are 2k possible 
configurations with k as a number of conditions. In this investigation, there were 10 
existing combinations, while six possible configurations did not exist. The computer 
software fsQCA produced the following truth table (Ragin et al., 2005). 
Table 9 Truth table of case configurations  
Centrality Platform BSkyB Digital 
Number of 
configurations Imitation 
Present Present Present Absent 3 Present 
Absent Absent Present Present 2 Absent 
Present Absent Absent Present 2 Absent 
Absent Absent Absent Present 1 Absent 
Absent Present Absent Absent 1 Present 
Absent Present Absent Present 1 Present 
Absent Present Present Present 1 Present 
Present Absent Absent Absent 1 Absent 
Present Present Absent Absent 1 Present 
Present Present Present Present 1 Present 
Absent Absent Absent Absent 0 - 
Absent Absent Present Absent 0 - 
Absent Present Present Absent 0 - 
Present Absent Present Absent 0 - 
Present Absent Present Present 0 - 
Present Present Absent Present 0 - 
 
The table offers the existing and potential configurations. The first row describes a 
configuration that led three times to imitative competition. The combination included 
the presence of the most central participants in the discussion, strong involvement of 
platform providers, the competitive topic initiated by BSkyB, and with no significant 
impact of new digital technology. The configuration with the opposite conditional 
values, and the opposite outcome was found once, as seen in the fourth row.  
BSkyB had the initiative with most of the competitive topics. The analysis show that 
in imitative competition, BSkyB was usually the initiator and others followed. But the 
role of BSkyB and non-imitation do not perfectly associate. There were three 
instances where BSkyB was a follower. With the three most usual configurations, 
BSkyB had a role both in cases, where imitation was present and where it was absent.  
The frequencies are as important in the comparative approach as in the statistical 
approach. The approach is sensitive to changes in configurations, which is 
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problematic if the dichotomies are not clear-cut. With a small number of cases, the 
selection of cases influences the results strongly. If new case configurations had been 
added, it is possible that a finding of necessary or sufficient cause would be 
eliminated (Mahoney, 2000). Because of the smaller number of cases, the QCA 
approach stresses that each separate configuration has to be clearly understood 
(Ragin, 1987). The familiarity of each configuration also helps the researcher to make 
additional conclusions. One potential conclusion is to consider the difference between 
the content of conditions and the implications of conditions ‘Platform’ and 
‘Centrality’. The difference between conditions is the existence of the BBC in the 
former, and the smaller cable operations in the latter. All of the other major players 
are in both categories. According to the investigation, the first category is more 
associated with imitativeness than the latter, although the firms in the groups are 
almost the same. The distinctive outcome may be a result of a legitimisation effort 
from the BBC, in which it has a major role in providing variety in programming and 
service. The competition remained non-imitative when the BBC was actively 
involved, at least compared to a situation in which cable companies were present.  
The existence of digital technology carries some weight, as there is a pattern of non-
imitation if there are not strong opposite pressures. The similar role of the strongest 
players is associated with imitation, while the input of new technology works to the 
opposite direction, though maybe to a lesser degree.  
The ‘Platform’ condition is present in each configuration that had an outcome of 
imitative competition. The result expressed by the fsQCA software states that the 
presence of ‘Platform’ is a necessary and sufficient condition for the imitative 
outcome (Ragin et al., 2005). According to Boolean logic, to be a necessary 
condition, it has to be in every positive outcome, although it can be present also with 
negative outcomes. The sufficient condition implies that it is sufficient to produce a 
positive outcome, but it is possibly not the only cause for the result. As mentioned 
earlier, the classification schema forced some potentially ‘Absent’ codes to be marked 
as ‘Present’. The ambivalent coding was limited to the conditions ‘Centrality’ and 
‘Platform,’ especially the latter. This implies their strong role if the forced coding had 
not taken place. However, with more ‘Present’ conditions even with non-imitative 
competition, it would have lost its status a sufficient condition.    
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The fsQCA investigation provided a complementary view to the problem. I used the 
methodology to compare similar conditions with a certain outcome. The existence of 
‘Platform’ as a condition was seen as a major factor when competition was imitative. 
BSkyB’s initiative on a competitive topic did not guarantee imitative or non-imitative 
competition. The BBC, with other content and technology participants, was offering 
more different ways to compete.  
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5 RESULTS AND SYNTHESIS OF THE EMPIRICAL CASE  
This chapter aims to provide conclusions derived from theory and the empirical case. 
Firstly, the chapter summarises the empirical results. The effort continues by merging 
the insights from the case with the original nomological map. Revised concepts and 
relations to the network externality situation are described and explained. Based on 
these, a new description of the competitive dynamics is developed.  
5.1 The three major competitive phases 
The commercial launch of digital television set up the competitive scene. Ex post, it 
seems that the competition over digital broadcasting in the United Kingdom was 
already over before it had begun in 1998, due to the initially superior resources and 
technology of BSkyB. This was not, however, the perception in the industry at that 
time. BSkyB was strong in analogue pay-TV, but the position was not appealing 
according to industry experts. In fact, a business columnist described the situation of 
BSkyB on the eve of digital era in 1997,  
“This is not the end of BSkyB’s dominance of UK pay television, but it is 
surely the beginning of the end” (Cool et al., 2000). 
The interviewee 3 described satellite as “a minority platform”, appealing mostly to the 
‘movie and sports enthusiasts’. In addition, the firm itself seriously doubted its 
capabilities for successful digitalisation. Both the interviews conducted before the 
launch of digital and in 2005 express, that BSkyB was not an obvious winner, 
although it was the leading actor in pay-TV market.   
The ex-ante characterization of invincible BSkyB can be challenged on grounds of 
competitive logic. Had BSkyB been perceived as such an invincible competitor as it 
ended up being, it would have not make sense for competitors to ever challenge it. 
Even with a possible retrospective bias against the story given by the losing side, an 
interviewee provided a reminder that for a period, ONdigital was the company that 
got most positive attention in the public eye. The terrestrial platform was also the 
central focus of the technological development discussion amongst standard setting 
bodies and government. 
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BSkyB had certain key resources that turned out to be difficult for its competitors to 
overcome. It satellite technology, analogue subscriber base, content portfolio, and 
financial resources, all appeared ex post to contribute to its competitive success. Had 
BSkyB been passive in competition, however, aggressive competitors could easily 
have pre-empted its advantages through active channel portfolio development, 
building on their own initial subscriber bases, and advances in terrestrial transmission 
technology. As noted in the case narrative, a cable operator even argued that its digital 
transmission capacity was superior to satellite. 
The strategic initiatives of both BSkyB and ONdigital showed that they understood 
the potential benefits of first-mover advantages and positive feedback effects in 
creating a sustainable base of customers and complementary products and services. 
The existence of potential positive feedback effects and customer lock-in created an 
intense competition, because the competing firms knew that if they lagged behind, 
they might lose the whole game. There had previously been serious conflicts between 
the major companies, giving an additional reason for fierce competition. The 
competition started in the form of price subsidies that all actors engaged in and, 
consequently, did not provide any advantage to either of the two firms. The subsidised 
equipment catalysed the speed of industry growth as customers adopted the new 
services more quickly. The subsidies provided for the set-top boxes by the digital 
service providers were a major transfer of wealth from the platform firms to the 
digital equipment manufacturers.  
As with the provision of free set-top boxes, the benefits of content competition were 
not leveraged by platform operators. Instead of creating a profitable positive feedback 
loop for them, the sponsorship in fact strengthened the negative margin-reducing 
effects of competition. More channels and other services were offered, with losses to 
the pay-TV firms. Channel line-ups were less distinctive, as television rights owners 
sold their channels to several platforms.   
Buying television rights gave firms a possibility to pre-empt competitors. The 
auctions offering the pre-emption opportunities were visible, which worked in favour 
of the winner. By competing fiercely, all the participants were creating and sustaining 
customer interest over competed program types. The competition itself signalled that 
there was something valuable for the audience. 
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The decisive imitation rivalry between BSkyB and ONdigital took place in the 
premium sports bidding contest. BSkyB was able to bid the most to get the first-tier 
sports rights and ONdigital had to go for the second-tier sports channel with an 
equally high bid that it eventually could not pay back with its subsequent revenues. 
The ITV group had, in general, been restrictive in not delivering its premium channels 
to the cable and satellite providers, especially to BSkyB, in order to support its own 
ONdigital. However, ITV Sport, with a budget of £150 million (approximately US $ 
210 million), represented a turning point in this behaviour and it was made available 
to NTL subscribers, too. The imitative move by ITV to launch a premium sports 
channel was very risky, as it was based on the ill founded rational that the satellite 
platform would like to deliver the channel as well.   
The challengers were tempted into an imitation race where they constantly matched 
the leader’s offering, but with less optimal resources for the purpose. The competition 
was played out, however, according to BSkyB’s rules, as they had initiated the set-top 
box subsidy game, building on their financial strength, and who had created a pricing 
structure that turned subscribers’ attention to channel bundles and variety; a distinct 
strength also specific to BSkyB’s satellite transmission technology. Other digital 
service providers adopted the set-top box subsidies, channel bundles, and eventually 
even accepted the role of BSkyB as a channel content supplier for their own 
platforms, giving up a major differentiation opportunity. 
The third competitive phase depicts the market when the competitive pressure is 
relieved, at least temporarily. ITV Digital (the renamed ONdigital) went bankrupt and 
the two competing cable companies ended up in financial distress, forcing them to 
swap some of their debt for equity. BSkyB became a major winner of the business 
system competition as it could now renegotiate its contracts with its content suppliers, 
received an inflow of new subscribers, and saw the positive feedback effects now 
come in with full force. It is interesting to note that the period of intensive 
competition not only delayed the emergence of network externality benefits, but also 
that it ended up magnifying them later. The intensive competition had forced all of the 
competing firms to invest extensively in the creation of the new business system in 
the United Kingdom, and the resulting digital television penetration rates were 
significantly higher than anywhere else in the world. At that point, BSkyB could 
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benefit from the investments in marketing and business system creation that the now 
defunct competitor had made. Therefore, the firm was much better off than if it would 
have been if the creation of the business system had relied on only one core product 
provider. 
The different views on BSkyB in the competition narrative and the quantitative 
analysis of quotes suggest how much more careful they were in their comments about 
competitors. Although, an industry leader has the best opportunities to succeed if it 
wanted to succeed in destroying the competition, their signalling efforts focused more 
on their own offering, digital advantages, and explorative actions. BSkyB gave the 
impression of being a strong market leader, and their problems were only brought to 
the public on relatively few occasions, although they gained much visibility. 
However, the leader did not create the market or the rules of the business during the 
first years of television, but carefully considered the actions of its main competitors. 
The clearest evidence on BSkyB’s mimetic behaviour was given in Horsman (1998) 
and in the interviews, not in the sample of quotes found in the news announcements.  
In the sample of quotes, BSkyB’s competitors signalled negative feedback loops more 
often. Their announcements and news stories were aligned with the view presented in 
the qualitative reading of other media texts. Stressing the negative aspects could have 
been part of an intentional but flawed strategy of the challenger firms, as interviewees 
pointed out many managerial errors by ONdigital/ITVdigital and the cable companies. 
The investigated period ended with the conclusion of rivalries. After the collapse of 
competitors BSkyB negotiated a stake in Freeview, which offered BSkyB an even 
stronger position, but the lull lasted for only a short while. Despite being outside the 
scope of the dissertation, there are signs that a new round of competition with many of 
the same actors has begun in the U.K. BSkyB launched a free satellite service in 2004 
in order to compete with the Freeview offering. This competitive reaction is itself 
already being followed by a new free satellite venture. The following is a retrieved 
headline from the BBC website,   
“BBC and ITV to start Sky TV rival”  (BBC, 2005) 
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5.2 Concepts and their relations 
The original nomological map was based on the core documents of the network 
externality discourse. The map was in the background of the case narrative, which 
served as basis for a revised version. The case evidence suggests four major 
modifications to the first nomological map. They relate to switching costs and 
sponsorship; management of expectations; the end result of ‘winner-takes-it-all’; and 
the managerial perceptions of the competition, or cognitions. Figure 12 depicts the 
new model of competition for dominance in network business systems.  
In the case, the competitive phases involved sponsoring, which eliminated the 
importance of switching costs. If switching costs favour the first-mover, the 
challengers have an incentive to reduce them. But, the knowledge about this 
mechanism is dispersed in the industry. When an industry leader understands the 
mechanism, it can take an initiative on the issue. In the digital television case, there 
remained some obstacles to switching that were technological in nature. These were 
related to different channel carrying capacities and coverage. The positive loop of 
installed base and network viability was stated in the text documents and interviews.  
The original model reflected the extant literature, which gives guidance for how to 
win markets with significant network externalities. There is a strong motivation to 
rapidly grow customer and complementor bases. Arthur (1996) offers weaker firms 
two reasonable alternatives; ‘slow death and grateful exit’, but the case evidence 
suggests that firms are willing to stay in the competition longer than seems rational, 
ex post.  In the UK market, the firms continued to pursue a strategy of convincing 
customers to join their networks. Thus, ‘winner-takes-it-all’ is replaced by ‘delayed 
win’ in the iterated map. The seemingly irrational lengthening of competition is a 
pattern of behaviour also evidenced earlier in the British television industry 
(Ghemawat, 1997). 
The delayed win is a result of a chain of feedback loops. The case evidence illustrates 
that competition continued firms’ histories of rivalry, modified by technological 
differences between the platforms, and with a strong belief in growth, implying trust 
in the principles of network externalities. Technological differences partially 
explained the differences in initial subscriber numbers. The case evidence suggests 
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that the industry shared a view of how firms should compete and where the 
competition should take place. Perceptions of how people saw the dynamics of 
markets were observed and already acknowledged when going through the news 
journal articles. However, the interviews offered a more comprehensive 
understanding of the industry-view. The new iteration of the nomological map brings 
the cognitive aspect to the front to explain especially the length and intensity of the 
competition. An interviewee’s retrospective expression ‘industry obsession’ is a 
revealing comment on the idea of a shared, but not necessarily a productive agenda in 
the television industry. The available data suggested how the idiosyncratic histories 
were moulding the shared industry view in the first place. Potential factors include the 
history of the firms and earlier competitive battles, especially. These cognitions were 
maintained and revitalized in the competition. As television managers enacted the 
market, a closed-loop emerged, in which managerial views on competitive causalities 
became self-fulfilling prophesies (Weick, 1977). The competitive arenas were chosen, 
not only because it was reasonable in network context, but also because the 
participants shared the same view. As industry sense making was enacted, the market 
was created and responses to a new market situation occurred as they predicted 
(Weick, 1977).   
The industry perception intensified the competition around two major topics, namely 
content and set-top-boxes. These competitive topics are future orientated, 
emphasizing the need to manage expectations of customers and other participants. An 
intermediate result was imitative competition, which itself was feeding the cognitions.  
The competition ends when the resources of most firms are exhausted in the 
‘obsessed’ industry. 
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Figure 12 Cognition and externality driven competition for network dominance  
 
5.3 Industry outcome resulting from the competitive 
dynamics  
The dynamics of the competition for dominance in U.K. digital markets seems 
different than the network externality discussion would propose. As mentioned 
earlier, the idea that markets are ‘tippy’ (Besen & Farrell, 1994) has been the 
dominant illustration of network competition. The participants decide on their support 
of a particular network as soon as they can evaluate the future viability of the 
networks. Network participants favour networks that they expect to be the largest in 
the future. The seemingly larger network will find that newer arrivals to the game will 
join it. The combination of expectations and real growth makes the leading network 
grow even faster. All or most participants shift their custom from the seemingly less 
viable networks to support the leading network. A stable solution; equilibrium, is 
easily reached when a major portion of participants have joined the leader.  
However, the case evidence does not support this straightforward view. BSkyB won 
the intense competition over network dominance at the end of study period after 
resource-draining and intense competition. Ultimately, the only beneficiary of the 
positive feedback effects was the survivor. The win was delayed and magnified, 
because the losing networks had given significant inputs to the development of the 
new business system. As a result, the United Kingdom enjoyed a leading position in 
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digitalisation. Had the digital television business been created without a significant 
competitive battle, the adoption of new technology would have taken significantly 
longer. Thus, the existence of short-term negative feedback dynamism in the form of 
‘Red Queen’ competition (Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Barnett & Sorenson, 2002) 
magnified also the performance of the leader, but with a delay. The surviving firms 
reaped the benefits of the rapidly grown business system. I metaphorically name this 
kind of mutually strengthening interaction between positive and negative effects as a 
‘positive feedback spring’. The metaphor illustrates how negative feedback seemingly 
delays the evolution, like a hand pressing a spring. Heavier pressure to the system 
keeps the spring in place and in a seemingly worse situation. After the release, 
however, the force acquired gives the system greater velocity.  
On the other hand, in the metaphor ‘positive feedback spring’ the situation seems to 
worsen before the relief and strong movement. As with tipping markets, the end-result 
favours the leader, but the mechanism and timing differs. In the ‘positive feedback 
spring’, the competition ensures that more benefits are flowing to new adopters. This 
makes the ‘positive feedback spring’ more favourable to customers and suppliers. It 
may take some time before industry dominance is settled, and during the intense 
competition, the network participants are getting benefits from sponsoring. 
After an intensive competitive period, the U.K. digital television markets changed in 
2002. The later events fall outside the scope of this dissertation, but are nevertheless 
informative. The Freeview terrestrial proposal provides evidence how earlier imitation 
by pay-TV operators was seen as detrimental, but only with hindsight. In their 
application letter, the initiators of Freeview manifested how the new venture would be 
radically different than ITVdigital in most aspects including program offering, 
business model and over-all quality (Dyke & Abery, 2002). The regulators saw the 
situation similarly, and free-to-view offering was given a license. With a different 
kind of actor imposed by an authority intervention, the industry entered a new 
competitive phase. The earlier imitative rivalry came to a halt, and a more distinctive 
offering was offered to the viewers. The growth of Freeview encouraged other 
companies to follow suit. BSkyB started marketing a free satellite service, ‘Freesat 
from Sky’ in 2004. According to BBC news website, BBC and ITV are planning to 
launch their free satellite service as a counter-move to rival BSkyB (BBC, 2005). A 
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new round of imitative rivalry may have started with a functioning ‘positive feedback 
spring’.  
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6 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The dissertation has sought to shed light on firm strategies in the competition for 
dominance of network business systems. This chapter summarises the previous 
chapters and evaluates the contribution of the study. The U.K. market offered a view 
that contributed to our understanding of the network externality phenomenon and to 
the relevant theoretical approaches. The main contribution of this research is an 
improved understanding of the dynamics of competition for dominance. In addition to 
theoretical implications, I will present the managerial, cultural and regulatory 
implications that the study has to offer. Furthermore, I give my view on the 
limitations of the study and suggest further research. 
6.1 Summary of the study 
In order to identify the relevant concepts in the research setting, I conducted an 
investigation of previous research on the network externalities phenomenon. Building 
on the most influential works on the topic, I built a nomological map of the relevant 
concepts of emerging network business systems competition.  
The review of literature showed that the most important research had been conducted 
in the realm of economics, while the field of organisational studies had not produced 
research with a direct impact on the discourse. However, some of the relevant 
theoretical streams had investigated the same questions. I chose the evolutionary 
perspective on economics and population ecology for further inspection.   
Ecological and evolutionary perspectives make inquiries on the same historical 
processes (Singh, 1990). They both investigate variation, selection and retention in 
and among organisations, and assume rigidity in organisations (Barnett & Carroll, 
1995). While variation has been more central to the evolutionary perspective on 
economics, there is an emphasis on focusing on selection and retention among 
population ecologists (Ginsberg & Baum, 1994). In broad terms, the variation and 
adaptation stream emphasises positive feedback, while the selection orientated stream 
focuses on competitive effects and negative feedback. The two complementary 
research approaches (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Burgelman, 1991) were reviewed 
and their insights structured the following empirical work.  
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The competitive phases: ‘creating the market’, ‘the decisive battle’ and the emergence 
of ‘post-dominance’ in the framework of Suarez (2004) are observable in the 
narrative. The case narrative was divided into phases in an effort to reflect the content 
and timing of competition (Suarez, 2004), but the observed phases were linked and 
overlapping. During the first period, digital television was commercially introduced. 
The terrestrial proposition received more initial attention, while BSkyB had some 
technological advantages. Cable operators came later to the market, as their resources 
were tied up in consolidation efforts. Sponsorship of set-top boxes was the initial 
driver for digital diffusion. It was followed by competition for premium content. The 
actions of BSkyB and ONdigital showed that they understood the potential benefits of 
first-mover advantages and positive feedback effects. The competing firms increased 
their resources in order to win network dominance, and to avoid fatality. Their 
strategies were more imitative than distinctive. The existence of potential positive 
feedback effects and customer lock-in created an intensive rivalry, in which subsidies 
strengthened the negative margin-reducing effects of competition. The third 
competitive phase evidences the new market situation, in which three out of four focal 
firms are bankrupt or in debt-arranging agreements. The surviving firm could leverage 
the resulting viable industry ecology and the high digital television penetration rates 
catalysed by the high rate of investments.  
Social network analysis visualised the evolution of the network and gave some 
descriptive data on the differences of the leading firms. Quantitative content analysis 
provided information on executives’ comments, reflecting views on positive and 
negative feedback loops. Qualitative comparative analysis emphasised how the strong 
role of platforms, or the focal firms was associated with imitative competition. In 
addition, it underlined, that the industry leader was also involved in imitation. The 
quantitative and qualitative comparative analyses triangulated the view of the intense 
competition.  
The U.K. digital television evolution offered insights for altering the theoretical case. 
An analysis of the empirical case showed the significance of managing the 
expectations of network participants, and cognitive aspects were brought to the 
foreground. Also, new ideas on the dynamics between the major participants were 
developed. The case evidenced the simultaneous existence of both positive and 
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negative feedback mechanisms. This combination was communicated with a new 
metaphor, the ‘positive feedback spring’. It illustrates that fierce competition requires 
vast resources. Firm’s actions cannot make a difference between the competitive 
positions, as the moves are imitated and benefits are jockeyed out. The negative 
feedback works like a hand pressing a spring. Heavier pressure on the system keeps 
the spring in place and in a seemingly worse situation. The situation changes after the 
release and the systems is given greater velocity by the force acquired earlier.  
6.2 Contributions to theoretical perspectives 
The dissertation attempts to contribute to research on the competitive behaviour in a 
network business system. The starting point was the recognition that while the 
network externalities discussion had focused on the phenomenon, evolutionary 
approaches would add a dynamic insight to the subject. Among evolutionary 
approaches, evolutionary perspectives on economics have a high appreciation for 
path-dependencies and positive feedback effects, the economics-driven ecological 
approaches emphasise efficient population level competition and negative feedback.  
In the analysis, I set out to take steps to bridge this gap between the different potential 
explanations of competitive outcomes in an analysis of the interdependency of 
positive and negative feedback effects. The evolution of the business system from its 
inception to dominance demonstrates the co-existence of both positive and negative 
feedback effects over time. The findings regarding their mutually strengthening 
effects and the metaphor of a ‘positive feedback spring’ strive to make this 
contribution. In the course of case evidence evaluation, cognitive aspects of 
managerial decision-making were brought to the foreground to complement the view.  
The major contribution of the dissertation to cognitions and competitive dynamics is 
the attempt to describe and explain competition in networked markets more 
realistically. The dissertation investigates the markets in a longitudinal setting, an 
attempt warranted by earlier research (Gallagher & Park, 2002; Schilling, 2002) in 
order to avoid the usual neglect of processes (Wade, 1995). Much of the earlier work, 
with the exception of Gallagher and Park (2002) and Schilling (2003) has relied on 
quantitative studies or economic modelling, giving difficulties in finding new results. 
Suarez (2004) offered the dissertation a framework of competitive phases for 
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evaluating the battle for network dominance. The milestones were marked with 
different competitive actions, leading to a situation in which one technological design 
defeats its competitors (Suarez, 2004). The dissertation validated the framework by 
focusing on three competitive phases (Suarez, 2004). The phases were not distinctive 
entities, but strongly linked and overlapping. The framework provided tools to 
describe more fully the phenomenon in order to surface the limitations and further 
refine the network externality concepts.  
6.2.1 The dynamics between the positive and negative feedback effects 
Studies investigating an organisation’s path-dependent evolution have often included 
positive feedback as an self-enforcing mechanism (e.g. Penrose, 1959; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984; Arthur, 1990; Barney, 1991; Dickson et al., 2001), 
with evolutionary perspective on economics (Nelson & Winter, 1973, 1974; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) as a representative and the most influential framework. This 
dissertation follows the same tradition while focusing on a narrower topic. Among 
researchers investigating positive feedback dynamics, my contribution is mainly to the 
research on the effects of network externalities for the competitive strategies of firms 
(Katz & Shapiro, 1986b; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Wade, 1995; 
Arthur, 1996; Schilling, 1998; Schilling, 1999; Shapiro & Varian, 1999a; Shapiro & 
Varian, 1999b; Gallagher & Park, 2002; Schilling, 2002, 2003; Shankar & Bayus, 
2003; Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). The above researchers leverage the previous work 
of network externality theorists with additional emphasis on managerial decision-
making and actions.  
Katz and Shapiro (1994)  reviewed earlier network externality literature and stretched 
the idea of network markets to contain all strongly complementary products and 
services. The article discussed briefly how competition between the systems can be 
intense and costly. If managers think that only one firm or system is going to be the 
eventual winner, they are effectively bidding for future monopoly profits. The 
incurred costs obtaining industry leadership are recovered by higher profits after a 
shakeout. The Besen and Farrell article of 1994 was probably the first major attempt 
in the network externality research to give firms theoretically sound advice for 
choosing a strategies for standardisation. The article described and analysed the 
properties of network markets and competition types from a managerial point of view. 
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Their modelling effort emphasised first mover strategies in the case of incompatible 
standards, and intense conflict if a leader wishes to prevent followers using same 
technologies (Besen & Farrell, 1994). In contrast to the dissertation, the article does 
not analyse firms in a longitudinal setting, despite the article’s recognition of the 
importance of history, path-dependence and future orientation of installed bases. The 
focus on consequences without specification of mechanisms is typical for economic 
theorists in the field (Wade, 1995). 
Arthur (1996) and Shapiro and Varian (1999a; 1999b) offered a view comprising 
many of the elements of how to succeed in a network externalities situation. They also 
suggested that the dynamics are working in most industries but are more evident in 
high technology and knowledge intensive industries (Arthur, 1996; Shapiro & Varian, 
1999a; Shapiro & Varian, 1999b). The articles and book by Arthur, and Shapiro and 
Varian offered plenty of anecdotal evidence for the dynamic interaction of different 
companies, as well as the popularisation of the theme. The aforementioned authors 
deduced managerial action points from the idea of increasing returns with the 
assumption of a positive feedback mechanism. The dissertation challenges the 
dominant view on rapid market tipping (Besen & Farrell, 1994), based on the 
industry-shared and anticipatory view of competition. Extending the reasoning by e.g. 
Arthur (1996), the length of intense competition measured in months or years is not so 
much of an issue, but rather the time between perception and action. For a rational or 
ideal manager in a losing network, the decision should be clear. A firm should quit the 
competition immediately when a manager realises the negative outcome of 
competition (Arthur, 1996). Although it took only four years to change the U.K. 
television market, with hindsight it can be asked why the participants invested more 
time and effort when it was supposed to be evident that the market was radically 
changing. The previous authors on network externality competition and increasing 
returns (e.g. Besen & Farrell, 1994; Arthur, 1996) seem to have overlooked some of 
the second-order effects of feedback loops. The core articles have not clarified the 
role of the decision-makers in competition in realistic terms. The decision-makers 
seem to have an outsider, or a rational position to view competition. The case 
narrative demonstrates that the firms were practising the teachings of network 
externalities, but could not correctly evaluate the situation as it developed. The idea of 
a virtuous circle involving installed base, availability of complementary products and 
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effective signalling (Schilling, 1998; Schilling, 1999; Dickson et al., 2001; Schilling, 
2002) is found in the U.K. market as well. But, the U.K. experience underlines that if 
everyone shares the idea, most of the participants cannot build a competitive 
advantage based on it. The case approach also contributed to this line of work by 
highlighting  both the historical antecedents and future orientation of the competition.  
Much of the work mentioning both network externalities and strategy issues has 
focused on the relative merits of first-mover advantages (e.g. Katz & Shapiro, 1986b; 
Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Arthur, 1990; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Arthur, 
1996). In this context, these advantages stem partly from the switching costs 
(Klemperer, 1987; Farrell & Shapiro, 1988; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Beggs 
& Klemperer, 1992; Kerin et al., 1992). Previous research has showed the great 
importance of switching costs, including money, time and effort. This dissertation 
describes how the role of switching costs is diminished by sponsoring. The 
dissertation acknowledges the role of switching costs as a part of the initial setting, 
but rejects its importance during intense competition. Switching costs became a 
competitive issue, which is the reason why the costs went down. Gallagher and Park 
(2002) study on manufacturers of game consoles and software; managerial actions can 
be used and are used to manipulate switching costs (Gallagher & Park, 2002). This 
practice was is contrast to advice given, e.g., in Schilling (2003), on how industry 
leader can limit competition by increasing switching costs.   
Sponsoring technology is an efficient way of building up a self-sufficient installed 
base (Rohlfs, 1974; Katz & Shapiro, 1986b; Besen & Farrell, 1994; Katz & Shapiro, 
1994; Wade, 1995; Arthur, 1996). The Katz and Shapiro (1986b) article suggests that 
in the case of two competing technologies, the technology that will be superior 
tomorrow has a strategic advantage implying a second-mover advantage. The U.K. 
case evidence gave results that can be interpreted as a limitation to the applicability of 
their modelling findings. Sponsoring decisions ought to be understood in terms of 
competitive strategies, irrespective of technological superiority. The U.K. firms felt 
that they had the resources to commit to sponsoring, even when it was not financially 
viable. 
In the dissertation, population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Carroll, 1984; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1984) has been the major source of insights in the negative 
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feedback effect research tradition. The field has been contributing to research 
investigating the implications of mutualism and competition among interdependent 
firms (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Carroll, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Carroll, 
1985; Barnett & Carroll, 1987; Barnett, 1990; Baum & Singh, 1994c; Carroll & 
Harrison, 1994). Theories of learning have switched the focus of the original 
structural inertia proposition in population ecology research, with implications for 
cognitive inertia and mimetic search in competition (Haveman, 1993; Greve, 1996; 
Baum & Haveman, 1997; Hodgkinson, 1997; Greve, 1998a, 1998b).  
Distancing from the original inertia position, Greve (1998a) linked inertia with action 
rather than inaction (Amburgey et al., 1993). The line of work by Greve (e.g. 1996; 
1998a; 1998b) on radio stations on different markets share the dissertation the scope 
on a content-driven business. Greve (1996) reasoned that uncertainty about the 
consequences of adopting a different market position leads to mimetic change, instead 
of inaction. In Haveman (1993), imitation was result of legitimation processes led by 
successful pioneering companies. Empirical support was found for how successful 
innovations were mimicked by spatially or socially close companies (Greve, 1996). 
The U.K. case shows, that the imitation is not confined to the follower companies. An 
incumbent firm may be inclined to follow the competitors in several competitive 
topics. A reason might be, that one cannot have ex-ante accurate knowledge on the 
potential superiority of a resource.  
The dissertation contributes also to  the occurrence and implications of ‘Red Queen’ 
competition (Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Barnett & Sorenson, 2002). Barnett, with 
Hansen and Sorensen (Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Barnett & Sorenson, 2002) applied 
the ‘Red Queen’ analogy to the field of organisation and management science. In 
‘Red Queen’ competition subsequent competitive actions lead to pre-empting of the 
action by competitors (Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Barnett & Sorenson, 2002). When 
observed from outside, the system appears to be advancing very fast. When observed 
from within the system, there do not seem to be any significant changes taking place 
with respect to the competitive positioning (Barnett & Hansen, 1996).  
The dissertation bridges network externality and population ecology by introducing 
‘Red Queen’ competition (Barnett & Hansen, 1996) in the network externality 
context. The dissertation provides further investigation and validation, with new 
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methods and in a new industry, of ‘Red Queen’ competition. The U.K. experience 
underlines that even the benefits from positive feedback mechanisms can be jockeyed 
out. Attempts to pre-empt some benefits from competition is like anticipative 
mimicry. In case of significant competition, there is strong incentive for a challenger 
to reduce costs for switching in order to build a larger base. However, the incumbent 
has the same knowledge, and may try to overcome the situation. The case narrative 
showed how BSkyB and the challengers operated in this fashion. If both types of 
firms attempt to rush in front of the other, anticipating changes, the game will start 
earlier. 
The study follows the competitive situation a step further than the earlier researchers 
have done. The changing dynamics of the negative and positive effects complements 
earlier results. In comparison, a study analyzing both positive and negative feedback 
mechanism on telephone company strategies found positive forces more significant 
(Noda & Collis, 2001). In ‘Red Queen’ studies, the investigation has not followed 
what happens after resources are exhausted. The ‘positive feedback spring’ favouring 
the original leader is an attempt to widen the longitudinal setting of ‘Red Queen’, and 
proposes an outcome of ‘Red Queen’ competition. The ‘Red Queen’ analogy has not 
been used earlier in a network context. The proposed ‘positive feedback spring’ 
metaphor also directly contributes to an emerging avenue in competitive action 
research, which Ketchen et al. (2004) term ‘competitive interaction scenarios’.  
6.2.2 Cognitive perspectives and  rivalry 
As suggested in the previous chapter, mimicry is not restricted to situations where 
smaller firms follow successful incumbents. Rather, all the participants with their 
different inputs are creating the ways how the markets work. This relates to cognitive 
aspects of competitive dynamics including research on sense-making practices 
(Weick, 1977, 1993; Reger & Palmer, 1996; Ocasio, 1997; Bogner & Barr, 2000) and 
competitor constructed rivalry (Porac et al., 1989; Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; 
Porac et al., 1995; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Rindova et al., 2004)  
Firm managers focus their attention in a way that has an effect on the behaviour of a 
firm and industry (Ocasio, 1997). The concept of industry-level focus highlights how 
industry participants selectively focus their attention on a limited set of issues that 
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represent problems or opportunities to the industry (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). 
Interactions between firms and its different constituents with e.g. the media as an 
intermediary give rise to an industry macro-culture (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; 
Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). Shared assumptions about market structure help to define 
the competitive arena and the rules of the competition (Porac et al., 1995; Bogner & 
Barr, 2000). The market rivalry is socially constructed, where managers discover, 
learn, and enact market positions (Porac et al., 1995). Competition takes place over 
the interpretations of multiple constituencies, not only over material resources 
(Rindova & Fombrun, 1999).  
There are several reasons, why cognitions shaping firm and competition are of self-
enforcing nature. A firm’s identity is largely shaped by its reputation, which itself 
may reflect observers’ cumulative interpretations rather than the current state of the 
firm (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). Cognition influences not only the selected means 
to achieve goals, but also the goal setting process (March & Simon, 1958). The 
cognitions have an effects on actions, but the actions carried out also affect the 
cognitions (Porac et al., 1989; Weick, 1993; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). Managerial 
views on competitive causalities are self-fulfilling prophesies (Weick, 1993). The 
escalation of actions may result in a commitment to beat the enemy-rival, and 
improving relationships may prove difficult (Rindova et al., 2004).  
The narrative from television industry evolution in the United Kingdom fits the ideas 
summarised above. Many actions of the focal firms were hostile, but they shared the 
similar view on the competitive arenas. The escalation of competition was a resource-
draining process for the platforms. A series of studies focusing on competitive groups 
in the Scottish knitwear industry (e.g. Porac et al., 1989; Porac et al., 1995) 
considered the shared understanding of the market characteristics among spatially and 
socially proximate managers. In socially constructed market rivalry the participants 
determine the competition and competitors, ‘competitive arenas’ and ‘rules of the 
game’ (Porac et al., 1995), a notion shared also in this dissertation. The television case 
shows how the industry leader had the initiative, at least in relative terms, informing 
that it had the better ability to understand new market demands. The case suggests, 
however, that it is not only about the leader finding the proper new way, but that there 
is a strong element of others accepting the leadership even without clear 
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understanding of what is really good for their own companies. This resonates with the 
discussion in Hodginson (1997) describing how entry by leading firms offers a highly 
visible stimulus which narrows actors’ attention.  
Homogenous industry cultures increase the level of inertia, and the level of similarity 
among competitors (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994). It has been found that cognition 
of managers reiterates earlier schemas in new surroundings, even at the expense of 
relevant objective characteristics of a current situation (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 
1994; Reger & Palmer, 1996; Hodgkinson, 1997). The shared industry view by the 
U.K. decision-makers may explain why the firms did not see differentiation as a 
successful way to compete. In the U.K., the commercial terrestrial operator was 
willing to reduce the own content of its parent organisations in favour of their 
strongest competitor’s channels. This expensive mimetic change was hardly criticised 
at the time of action. With hindsight this seems surprising and suggests that mimicry 
could be a ruling principle even in industries seemingly favouring strong variety. 
The mental models of managers may determine the type of adaptation to a new 
strategy (Greve, 1998a), while the Miller and Chen (1994) article suggested that 
threatened managerial egos can be the reason for inertia and inability to effect 
strategic change (Miller & Chen, 1994). The idea of cognitive inertia in managerial 
action (Greve, 1996; Reger & Palmer, 1996; Hodgkinson, 1997; Greve, 1998a) was 
further supported by the case evidence. There were references to e.g. ‘industry 
obsession’ and personal characteristics of managers linking cognitions with 
unproductive behaviour.  
The inertia of active organisations (Amburgey et al., 1993) is difficult to stop when 
firms observe similar competitors and remember their competitive past. The firms 
most active in the digital diffusion shared a history of business conflicts, and the 
pattern continued during the observation period. The case interviews suggest that even 
the new practices may be reflections of history or results of relatively local searches. 
Two of the U.K. firms had had intense rivalry already before the digital era, which 
provided experience on how to manage competition. This resembles the results of 
Reger and Palmer (1996), in which they conclude that managers navigate in new 
competitive environments that contain some elements familiar from the past. Inertia 
makes it difficult for managers to update their cognitive maps quickly enough for 
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turbulent environment (Reger & Palmer, 1996). There are several ways a real-life 
manager can find a solution with stabilising previously known elements. In an 
uncertain situation, she can find advice from history, but the closest source of 
information may be the competitors (Greve, 1996, 1998a).   
In the case study of IBM, Rindova and Fombrun (1999) suggested that industry 
conditions are in flux by actors’ interpretations of events, while learning by the moves 
and signals by other actors (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999).  If decision-makers reflect 
signals to their past experiences, network externalities make the interpretation even 
more challenging. Firms facing significant network externalities are driven by 
expectations, which may have implications for sensemaking practices. Contributing to 
this line of research, I propose that firms might experience ‘tippy markets’ of 
managerial ideas, in addition to ‘tippy markets’ of products and services. The firms 
shared a managerial idea that network externalities existed, and actions to build an 
installed base led to imitative sponsoring. If they had not scrutinised competitors 
sharing the same competitive view, the pressure to imitate would have been less. The 
future-orientated managerial view spread rapidly through the markets, and settled 
itself as a ‘standard’. The bandwagon effect on building momentum is conceptually 
different than an externality effect associated with network size, as Cusumano (1992) 
states, but they were closely related in the case. The time-critical bandwagon was built 
on the shared, although not necessarily explicit, management principles set by 
network externality ideas. This is a context specific notion, because the future 
orientation of the perception made the diffusion faster. It was safer to share the view, 
because time was a key element in the network externality game.  
Recently, much work has been done on the dyadic nature of business relationships. 
The competitive action research stream investigates competitive moves, and its 
traditional focus has been on competitive actions and responses to them (Ketchen et 
al., 2004). The work provided methodological assistance, and the findings are related 
to the research stream. Its major line of findings has been on how aggressiveness of 
firm actions affects the market share of the industry leader (Ferrier et al., 1999; 
Ferrier, 2001; Smith et al., 2001). So far, the competitive action stream has repeatedly 
suggested that the number, the unpredictability, and the breadth of competitive actions 
by a challenger firm has a positive affect on acquiring market share from the 
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incumbent (Ketchen et al., 2004), while in the long run the activity may prove 
destructive because of an escalation of competitive responses (Rindova et al., 2004).  
I would complement the view by arguing that the potential actions and reactions are 
part of temporally and spatially located rules of engagement. Not only the number or 
breadth, but also the perceived quality has important consequences. Most of the 
actions are signalling actions, because they are made public. This puts more emphasis 
on language, perceptions and shared assumptions. Rindova et al. (2004) stated that the 
use of ‘war-language’ can shift the focus to beating the enemy-rival instead of 
optimising profits (Rindova et al., 2004). Promoting ‘aggressiveness’ in their 
appearance may distract managers when they are contemplating tasks for expectation 
management.  
In addition, I suggest that competitive actions might be different in a network setting 
compared to purely dyadic firm relation abstractions. The number or breadth of 
actions may measure a firm’s viability or strength improperly if competitors are trying 
to negatively influence the perceptions of other participants. Signalling a negative 
feedback loop gives customers or complementors less confidence about the firm in 
question, while focusing on the positive feedback mechanism has a stronger 
favourable effect on the market, and also on the firm.  
6.3 Managerial implications 
Digital television services are in the process of being started and gaining popularity in 
many countries. Since the business system dynamism and the competitive 
implications of entering the digital television business are not well known, 
broadcasting companies in many countries have been hesitant in preparing their entry 
to this business area. The emergence of the digital television business system in the 
United Kingdom provides the first complete ‘laboratory experiment’ revealing what 
are the drivers of success and failure in the digital television business.  
Understanding the importance and implications of initial conditions, competitive 
actions, and the dynamism leading either to business system dominance or failure is 
likely to be valuable for managers competing in a business area. The rivalry for 
network dominance is an area that has also wider interest in other industries with 
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significant network effects. The dissertation provides a decision-maker a coherent 
way to understand the industry and act on the information. The implications of the 
study have therefore potential significance in other industries, as well. 
Building a viable network of complementary products and services involves a large 
amount of resources. The metaphor of ‘positive feedback spring’ describes a situation, 
where large investments by all major participants contribute to market creation, 
benefiting customers, and complementary product and service providers during the 
intense competition. As the losing networks have invested in building a viable new 
market, it can be tempting for the industrial leader to ‘lure’ new competitors to enter if 
they finally lose the game. The case evidence suggests that inviting competitors can 
be profitable when the demand for an offering is dependent on the offering of several 
other products and services. This interdependent demand is evident in many non-high 
technology markets e.g. with stores and their offerings.    
The case evidence suggests that risks in network competition are even greater than 
predicted in most of the previous studies on the subject. The competition for network 
dominance may be highly rewarded, but the intensity puts an additional strain on 
firms. In addition to a financial burden, competition has several aspects requiring 
managerial attention. The technological dimension has only a limited value in 
explaining the difference between the winner and losers of network evolution. A 
network offering is a combination of products and services, but building on them rests 
a social construct. The competition is played not only by offering products and by 
services, but also people’s perceptions are a major competitive arena. In order to gain 
a leading position, the image of leadership and innovation have to be communicated 
clearly to the consumers, but also to the competitors, and to other participants in the 
market. Focusing on positive feedback mechanisms helps a firm to distinguish itself 
from the more imitative competitors.  
When more firms understand the importance of positive feedback mechanisms, it is 
more difficult to differentiate. The managers focus their attention on similar points, 
and crowding might occur quite rapidly. If the managers share the view e.g., of the 
necessity of the future size of the installed base, the sharing itself catalyses the 
diffusion of the managerial view. The competitive arenas and rules of the game are 
quickly established, even in new surroundings, with intense competition. There is a 
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danger, that escalation of action may distract managers who favour beating the 
competitor, instead of profit optimisation, as noted in Rindova (2004). 
The complementary providers of a product offering are often the hinge factor in 
network evolution, when the consumers decide which networks are the most viable. 
While consumers examine the breadth and quality of the network offerings, the 
offerings are largely a product of the combination of complementary products and 
services. Therefore, the entry decisions and network choices of complimentary 
product providers have a major impact on the success of a focal firm. As the 
complementary firms act on their perceptions of the market, the feedback loops of 
expectations of network viability are significant. Managing expectations in reliable 
manner at different levels is critical for a network success.   
The managers may see the role of their firm as an active first-mover or as a mimetic 
follower. This is a choice involving judgments on several levels, including personal 
and firm level evaluations. When evolution is path-dependent on the histories, the 
managerial freedom to operate may be limited. It is difficult for a firm to choose a 
strategy that is not closely related to its past, or to its social proximity. However, even 
in rigid organisations, a better sense of the dynamics may help managers to realise 
what kind of future is in the making.  
6.4 Implications for regulators and television culture  
Digitalisation has given a possibility to offer niche channels, with minority appeal. 
The smaller audiences provide less revenue base, but the streams can be viable even 
when funded with advertisements. Minority channels can offer a better option than 
mass-audience channels, because it is a way to escape the intense competition (Liu et 
al., 2004). The U.K. case proves that channel variation offered a way to commercially 
differentiate, but often the firms favoured the imitating behaviour of the other similar 
companies. Fragmentation is also a result of competition over television publishing 
rights (see e.g. Boardman & Hargreaves-Heap, 1999), which has been proven to be a 
resource-draining experience.   
Suggestions to restrict pay-to-view broadcasters from certain events can be 
rationalised using the idea of network externalities (Boardman & Hargreaves-Heap, 
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1999). The proponents of the idea argue that there are shared externalities in 
consuming cultural products. The exclusion of mass audiences would be harmful to 
the social welfare, if, e.g., a large number of people start conversions about sporting 
events they have seen on television, and these mutual experiences bond the 
participants, which is important for community building (Van der Wurff & Van 
Cuilenburg, 2001). A pay-TV owner uses pricing in order to get most of his exclusive 
television rights, while an advertisement funded, free-to-view channel has an 
incentive to get as many viewers as possible in a chosen segment. The number of 
potentially alienated sections of the audience is larger with pay-TV, than with 
channels paid by commercials or license fees, but it does not mean the disappearance 
of common topics for discussion. If there is a genuine and strong interest viewers 
would acquire the possibilities to watch the events. Viewers would prefer consuming 
more money on television, and this money would be taken from some other spending. 
On the other hand, if there were not genuine interest in participating in a particular 
event, the mass audiences would be created elsewhere e.g. new sporting events. 
Therefore, the alienation arguments hold only if there is a very widely shared 
understanding of which events will remain with significant network externalities, with 
the additional premise that a pay-TV operator would charge viewers in a manner that 
would alienate significant numbers of potential viewers27.  
The U.K. experiences can shed light in relation to using the network externality 
concept in sharing cultural products. The case study shows that there was a tendency 
to use television rights aggressively by different participants. However, during the 
first years of digital television, the benefactors were not the pay-TV operators. The 
surplus went to the consumers and the initial rights owners, because pay-TV operators 
wanted to offer programming. The firms used predatory pricing, which did not reflect 
well the costs that the firms had to pay. The operators had the incentive to build large 
audiences, because only a large installed customer base was seen viable. Therefore, 
the pay-TV operation provided television for larger audiences than alienation 
arguments could explain. 
                                                 
27Unsurprisingly, watching free-to-view channels is not free, either. The costs may include price of 
television set and other equipment, license fees, and even price for electricity. These costs 
alienate a proportion of potential viewers and discussants.  
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Digitalisation involves the entry of new organisations. In modelling the social welfare 
and television economics, it has been found that multiplication can provide an 
improvement by introducing a closer match between a consumer’s taste and the 
offering (Liu et al., 2004). The financial motivation for multiplication of channels is 
evidenced in the case, which initially favoured viewers. Firms were making losses 
when they delivered their content in order to build a winning network. The 
multiplication of channels has the danger of lowering the quality of programming, if 
the resources for additional programming hours do not increase (Liu et al., 2004). Van 
der Wurff and van Cuilenburg (2001) modelled and tested how multiplication of 
channels in moderate competition increase programming variety, while diversity 
declines in extreme, or ruinous competition (Van der Wurff & Van Cuilenburg, 2001). 
In the Netherlands, the intensity of competition led to imitative behaviour in the 
digital television business. The U.K. experience supports largely the economic model 
of the Netherlands. The point of difference is that the perceptions of the competition 
have an effect on competitive actions, and in intense competition, perceptions may 
play an even stronger role. If the industry-shared cognitions view variety favourably, 
competition will take the form of variety competition. If the firms feel that the 
revenue streams are protected from imitation, they act accordingly. The BBC as a 
publicly financed company had a serious challenge to induce variety to the listeners 
and viewers. It participated in sports publishing rights auctions, in which its input to 
programming is not significant, as some other firm would have shown the events 
anyway. However, public broadcasters e.g. provided first sports and entertainment 
programs with multiple screens, which paved the way for others. The developmental 
work offered programming variety, which is one of the least controversial roles of a 
public broadcaster. In addition, as a major feature of the industry was a culture of 
imitation, the example was a refreshing reminder to others that there are various types 
of competition.  
The regulators should set incentives that make the ecology, and not necessarily 
individual firms prosper. This idea could be seen as the background for BBC’s 
platform neutral policy, as they were present in satellite, terrestrial and cable. This 
improved the competitive ecology of the platforms and invited new content providers 
by showing their viability in the eyes of a major player. Setting proper incentives have 
the possibility to improve the ecology. Setting boundaries often have the adverse 
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effects of increasing rigidity, which is a reason why limiting competition should not 
be taken as a guarantee of program variety. The intensity of competition and the 
resulting failed firms in the U.K. did not have serious effect on television, as there is a 
dynamic industry serving different audiences. Firm competition may benefit the other 
participants more than the competitors. The case evidence suggests that the U.K. 
remained a leading country in the digital era, even when three quarters of its 
commercial digital platforms failed. New firms emerged, and in the course of 
competition, new kinds of services had emerged.  
It might be useful to compare the dynamic evolution in the U.K. and a more stagnant 
case of Finland. Industry-shared perceptions define where the firms want to compete, 
as was seen in the U.K. Commercial platforms, even with the strong involvement of a 
public broadcaster, competed on arenas of their selection, where programming variety 
played an important but subordinate role. If they had selected otherwise, e.g. preferred 
program quality, or stability between the focal firms, the outcomes would have been 
different. One can argue, that the Finnish industry-shared view about digital television 
has not promoted growth, or high-risk ventures. Finnish broadcasters have all 
survived the same time period, and the competition has stayed relatively calm. The 
British viewers and producers of complementary services benefited from the 
competition, whereas similar dynamism has not happened in Finland.  
Based on the comparison, one can propose that an industry to take a globally leading 
role has to have an industry culture pushing competition towards it. The authorities 
should aim for actions that are coherent with the policy objectives. Regulators should 
consider how to mould the cognitive perceptions of firm managers e.g. by setting 
industry wide incentives that promote program variety and quality.    
6.5 Limitations and future research 
Several limitations that provide potential starting points for future research can be 
identified. Firstly, I examined dynamism in one network business system for a limited 
period of time only. The findings are case-specific and cannot be directly generalised 
to any other business system. Some distinctive features in this case include the 
competitive histories of the firm, and the role of the U.K. and European Union 
authorities in the regulated broadcasting industry. The firms had experienced rivalry 
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before digital era, and the actions taken by regulators were in encouraging 
competition. Future research could extend the analysis of the relative importance of 
initial resource endowment, feedback effects, and competitive actions also to other 
settings. An immediate step could be to expand on this dimension by studying digital 
television broadcasting service introductions in other countries. This would provide 
relatively similar settings where variability due to different types of technologies 
could be held constant. Secondly, my data consisted of news reports and 
announcements, and a small number of interviews. The unobtrusive data did not 
provide the perception of managers, while the retrospective information had its own 
biases. On the other hand, qualitative action research involving an on-site investigator 
is a methodology that could help in providing a relatively good complementary 
picture of how managers perceived their competitors and competitive action.  
The dissertation process has opened new avenues for further research in competitive 
action research. The competitive action research has largely relied on news event data 
as an independent variable, with different performance measures as dependent 
variables. Including network positions and different motivational factors can shed 
more light on the question of the causality of actions and performance.   
I share the view of Schilling (1999) in asking for further investigation of causal 
models linking technology adoption with the installed base and complementary goods. 
The case suggested that the firms shared an understanding of the network economics. 
If the new knowledge of the phenomenon can truly change the behaviour of the 
studied objects, the results found in managerial science become rapidly obsolete if the 
focus of the studies is poorly specified. In more conceptual terms, this is about 
feedback loop between research and management communities. Firms can act in 
anticipation, as they better understand the possible near-time consequences of 
competitive reactions. Obtaining more solid and time-independent results would 
warrant new attempts to investigate higher-order actions, and more theoretical work 
on the feedback loops.  
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7 APPENDICES 
7.1 Details on selecting scientific articles and data retrieval 
The impact factor in the ISI Journal Citation Report was primarily used for journal 
selection. The impact factor is the frequency of citations of an article of a particular 
journal. It is calculated by dividing the number of current citations to articles 
published in the two previous years, by the total number of articles published in the 
two previous years. The calculation is made annually for every journal in the 
database. The calculation of impact factors was available from the ISI Journal Citation 
Report Social Science 2002 edition. The Social Sciences edition used contains data 
from some 1,500 journals in the social sciences.  
The evaluation included journals in the areas of economics, management, and 
business. The division of journals was given in the ISI Journal Citation Report. The 
top 20 journals from each of the three areas were included. Because of the overlap in 
business and management, the number of journals was 52. The calculation was filed 
in 2. - 5.1.2004.  
A list of the original journals included in the bibliometric analysis of network 
externalities/effects is found below. An asterisk (*) is given to articles that were 
categorised as business journals by ISI Journal Citation Report. Additional 14 journals 
were added to the original list following a procedure (Parvinen, 2003) which relies on 
a readership survey organised in U.S. business schools (Siggelkow, 2001) and are 
marked with (+). These additions were those journals that were the most respected 
(outside the original list of 52) amongst the faculty of prestigious U.S. business 
schools’ strategy, organisational behaviour and economics departments. The 
information was retrieved from a readership survey by Siggelkow (2001) 
Table 10 List of  journals  
Name of the journal 
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL (*) 
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW (*) 
ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY (*) 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  
ECONOMETRICA  
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY  
ECONOMIC POLICY  
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY  
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HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (*) 
HEALTH ECONOMICS  
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
INFORMATION & MANAGEMENT  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (*) 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN MARKETING (*) 
JOURNAL OF THE ACADEMY OF MARKETING SCIENCE (*) 
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS  
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS (*) 
JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES (*) 
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH (*) 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH  
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE  
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES  
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT (*) 
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS  
JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS  
JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY  
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES (*) 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS  
JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANISATION  
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT (*) 
JOURNAL OF MARKETING (*) 
JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH (*) 
JOURNAL OF ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR MANAGEMENT  
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY  
JOURNAL OF PRODUCT INNOVATION MANAGEMENT (*) 
JOURNAL OF RETAILING (*) 
JOURNAL OF THE ACADEMY OF MARKETING SCIENCE  
LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY  
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE  
MARKETING SCIENCE (*) 
MIS QUARTERLY  
NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL  
ORGANISATION SCIENCE  
ORGANISATION STUDIES 
ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES  
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS  
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS  
RESEARCH POLICY  
SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW (*) 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL (*) 
WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (+) 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (+) 
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (+) 
INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW (+) 
INDUSTRIAL AND CORPORATE CHANGE (+) 
JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY (+) 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR & ORGANISATION (+) 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (+) 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE (+) 
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS (+)  
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS (+) 
JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (+) 
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS (+) 
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES (+) 
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Two article searches were conducted using the journal lists. The retrieval was 
conducted using ISI World of Science, which is a repository for three major 
databases. According to the ISI World of Science website, “The Social Sciences 
Citation Index is a multidisciplinary index to the journal literature of the social 
sciences. It fully indexes more than 1,725 journals across 50 social science 
disciplines, and it indexes individually selected, relevant items from over 3,300 of the 
world's leading scientific and technical journals…. Average 2,900 new records per 
week…. Includes approximately 60,000 new cited references per week…“ 
A search was made to find articles concentrating on the topic of network externalities, 
published in the above journals. As the aim was to analyse the discussion of network 
externalities, the search words were chosen accordingly. The search words were 
‘network externality’, and ‘network effect,’ including plural forms. The total number 
of retrieved articles was 120. The searched articles were from the period 1.1.1986 - 
10.01.2004, according to ISI Web. In practice the first article was published in August 
1986 and the last articles in December 2003.  
Computer software by Henri Schildt called Sitkis was used to download data from the 
ISI Web of Science to an Access database and to improve the data quality of the 
original database (Schildt, 2004).  The retrieved articles cited another 4259 texts of 
which 264 were discarded by the program. The errors were due to unidentified marks 
in the downloaded files, e.g. asterisks. The report produced by the software showed 
which kind of citations were left out. I classified the abandoned citations by 
interpreting the information of discarded citation. According to my judgment, 75 
discarded citations were from government, organisation, industry or company 
statistics, or similar numerical information, 103 referred to newspaper, or trade 
journal articles, 51 were from scientific articles and 35 citations were not obvious 
enough to be classified. It can be judged that the first two categories represent 
secondary data for researchers, without theoretical development. The last two 
categories may have some impact on the scientific discourse, but only in significant 
numbers. The 86 discarded scientific, or undetected articles represent only 2% of the 
citation population. The error report also suggests that every dismissal referred to 
different citation, which makes it more unlikely that any of the abandonment of any of 
the discarded citations could have had an impact if it had been corrected individually. 
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The number of 120 citing articles was then reduced to 119 after reading the abstracts 
of these articles. The topic of the article omitted was ‘the charisma attributes of 
individuals’, which seemingly did not have a clear relevance to organisation level 
subjects.  
A source for error in bibliometric studies lies in the fact that part of information in the 
original databases is misspelled or not uniformly coded. Journal names and author’s 
first, or second name initials were notified in various ways. Careful checking was 
made to minimise the problems concerning inaccuracy in document information. The 
Sitkis-program was used for correction. The article citation database of 119 articles 
was first checked by author names, and their respective article information was 
checked similarly. In the course of inspection, data entries with almost similar author 
or journal information were looked at to find misspellings e.g. Brynjolffson, 
Brynjolfsson, Brynjolfson.   
A document may have been published in different outlets, e.g. a highly valued article 
may have many reprints. Everett M. Rogers wrote in his preface of his fourth edition,  
“I have once again titled this book Diffusion of Innovations to identify it with the 
forty-year sequential tradition of diffusion studies marked by my 1962 book of the 
same title.” Following this, reprinted articles of the most active writers were identified 
with the original if found. The aim was to combine references made to re-prints, and 
book editions as references to one, original article. This correction procedure was 
made understanding that books, or reprints may or may not change their content 
between the editions. The seminar-papers having a more than years of separation to 
the article were treated as separate articles. Compiled, edited books consisting of 
different articles posed a problem, as the references were not made in a unified 
manner. This study used the same information as the citer. An additional correction 
was made for correcting the problem of software, which did not recognise a difference 
among articles written by the same first writer during the same year for a particular 
journal. As Joseph Farrell was a first-writer for two different articles in Rand Journal 
of Economics in 1988, the software combined the citations. Two names were given to 
the journal to separate the articles.  
A separate procedure was made to check that journal names were spelled in a unified 
way. It has to be noted that some of the misspellings and notation differences may 
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have gone unnoticed. This is especially the case if the first letters of the author’s last 
name were misspelled, or the name of the journal, or article was significantly 
differently abbreviated. If the remaining errors were dispersed equally, they do not 
have an impact on the relative merits of separate articles.  
After the corrections were made 3855 references were left in the chosen articles. 
Some of those references were self-citations i.e. an author is citing her other 
document. Following e.g. Ratnatunga and Romero (1997), self-citations were not 
discarded. 
To evaluate the cohesiveness of the discussion a series of two-dimensional  (citer-
cited) networks were produced. In a two-dimensional network, authors of the citing 
articles were the first dimensions, and the cited texts acted as their affiliations. A 
description of different two-dimensional networks is in Table 11. For example, it can 
be seen that 114 articles cited 218 articles, each of them having at least three citations, 
while the remaining five (119-114) articles may or may have not cited any of those 
218.  
Table 11 Number of citations, citing articles and cited texts 
Number of citations Number of citing articles Number of cited texts 
1 118 3855 
2 117 525 
3 114 218 
4 108 103 
5 105 66 
6 103 50 
7 101 38 
8 96 28 
9 93 21 
10 91 17 
Articles with very different sets of citations can be thought of as being out of the 
mainstream of a particular discussion. A threshold was used also to leave out 
references that do not have serious impact on this study, including articles depending 
heavily on individual statistical data and news articles. The literature does not suggest 
a unitary way to decide a particular threshold level. Ratnatunga and Romano (1997) 
believe that obtaining more than four citations would place an article into ‘significant 
contribution’ category, without comparing to the population size.  Brown (1996) 
grouped the ‘top 100 accounting articles’ as ‘classics’, ‘near classics’ and ‘other top 
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100’. In order to be a ‘near classic’, article had to be referenced three times, and ‘a 
classic’ had to be referenced four or more times. In this study, a different approach to 
selecting a threshold was selected. First, a limit of including 90% of citing articles 
was chosen. At this threshold (90,8 %), there were 108 articles citing 103 different 
texts, each being cited at least four times. The low threshold seems to capture the 
relevant articles, as some less relevant. Second, in order to validate the threshold, 
Table 11 was negotiated. It can be seen, that at the threshold of five citations (88,2 % 
of articles), the speed of decrease in numbers of cited papers flattens. This implies that 
threshold of five, or above, the marginal efficiency of leaving out cited articles 
diminishes. At that point, it is harder to separate many articles by increasing threshold 
only by one. As most of the discussants should be involved, it can be argued that the 
threshold should leave outside only those articles that are easily removed.  
There were 11 citing articles that were left out after the process, and they did not seem 
to have a major influence on the discussion of network externalities. One of them did 
not have any citations, one article had only one citation, one article was a reply to 
other commentators, and two others discussed networks by relying to inter-personal 
facets of the problem. One article discussed intra-firm networks, and one was on inter-
firm networks in country settings, which may have had implications to used citations. 
Four were economics papers, modelling international trade and foreign direct 
investments, pricing a network good, size of a firm, and foreign currency exchange, 
respectively. As these articles had three or less citations shared with other 108 articles, 
it can be argued that they do not follow the main stream of this discussion.   
The articles were sorted alphabetically and given their new identification numbers.  
The third column gives information about how many times the article had been cited 
in the sample of 119 articles. 
Table 12 Retrieved articles and the number of their citers 
 
Original identification  New id 
Number of 
citers
ADAMS WJ-Q REV ECON BUS-1982 1 4
ANDERSON P-ADM SCI Q-1990 2 8
ARROW KJ-REV ECON STUD-1962 3 4
ARTHUR WB-EC EVOLVING COMPLEX-1988 4 4
ARTHUR WB-ECON J-1989 5 19
ARTHUR WB-EUR J OPER RES-1987 6 6
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ARTHUR WB-HARVARD BUS REV-1996 7 8
ARTHUR WB-INCREASING RETURNS P-1994 8 7
BANDURA A-SOCIAL LEARNING THEO-1977 9 4
BANERJEE AV-Q J ECON-1992 10 5
BARNEY JB-J MANAGE-1991 11 6
BARNEY JB-MANAGE SCI-1986 12 4
BASS FM-MANAGE SCI-1969 13 6
BAYUS BL-J PROD INNOVAT MANAG-1987 14 4
BEGGS AW-ECONOMETRICA-1992 15 7
BESEN SM-CHANGING RULES TECHN-1989 16 4
BESEN SM-COMPATIBILITY STANDA-1986 17 5
BESEN SM-J EC PERSP-1994 18 7
BIKHCHANDANI S-J POLIT ECON-1992 19 5
BRYNJOLFSSON E-MANAGE SCI-1996 20 14
BULOW JI-J POLIT ECON-1982 21 4
BULOW JI-J POLIT ECON-1985 22 4
BURNS LR-ACAD MANAGE J-1993 23 4
BURT RS-AM J SOCIOL-1987 24 7
CHOI JP-J IND ECON-1994 25 6
CHOI JP-RAND J ECON-1994 26 4
CHURCH J-J IND ECON-1992 27 6
CLARK KB-RES POLICY-1985 28 5
COASE RH-J LAW ECON-1972 29 4
COHEN WM-ADM SCI Q-1990 30 4
CONNER KR-MANAGE SCI-1991 31 4
CUSUMANO MA-BUS HIST REV-1992 32 5
DAVID PA-AM ECON REV-1985 33 30
DAVID PA-EC INNOVATION NEW TE-1990 34 7
DAVIS GF-ADM SCI Q-1991 35 5
DIMAGGIO PJ-AM SOCIOL REV-1983 36 6
ECONOMIDES N-AM ECON REV-1989 37 8
ECONOMIDES N-INT J IND ORGAN-1996 38 8
ELIASHBERG J-J MARKETING RES-1988 39 4
FARRELL J-AM ECON REV-1986 40 38
FARRELL J-ECON LETT-1986 41 7
FARRELL J-J IND ECON-1992 42 15
FARRELL J-PRODUCT STANDARDIZAT-1987 43 5
FARRELL J-Q J ECON-1988 44 7
FARRELL J-RAND J ECON NR 2-1988 45 7
FARRELL J-RAND J ECON-1985 46 45
FARRELL J-RAND J ECON-1988 47 5
FLAMM K-CREATING COMPUTER GO-1988 48 4
GABEL HL-COMPETITIVE STRATEGI-1991 49 4
GABEL HL-PRODUCT STANDARDIZAT-1987 50 9
GANDAL N-RAND J ECON-1994 51 13
GARUD R-STRATEGIC MANAGE J-1993 52 9
GILBERT RJ-J IND ECON-1992 53 4
GRANOVETTER M-AM J SOCIOL-1973 54 5
GRANOVETTER M-AM J SOCIOL-1978 55 6
GRANOVETTER M-AM J SOCIOL-1985 56 7
HENDERSON RM-ADM SCI Q-1990 57 8
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HOTELLING H-ECON J-1929 58 4
KATZ ML-AM ECON REV-1985 59 57
KATZ ML-J EC PERSP-1994 60 16
KATZ ML-J IND ECON-1992 61 17
KATZ ML-J POLIT ECON-1986 62 53
KATZ ML-OXFORD ECON PAP-1986 63 10
KERIN RA-J MARKETING-1992 64 4
KLEMPERER P-Q J ECON-1987 65 6
LANGLOIS RN-BUS HIST REV-1992 66 4
LEIBENSTEIN H-Q J ECON-1950 67 6
LIEBERMAN MB-STRATEGIC MANAGE J-1988 68 6
MAHAJAN V-J MARKETING-1990 69 4
MALONE TW-COMMUN ACM-1987 70 4
MATUTES C-J IND ECON-1992 71 4
MATUTES C-RAND J ECON-1988 72 18
MEYER JW-AM J SOCIOL-1977 73 4
NELSON RR-EVOLUTIONARY THEORY-1982 74 9
NORTON JA-MANAGE SCI-1987 75 4
NUNNALLY JC-PSYCHOMETRIC THEORY-1978 76 4
OREN SS-BELL J ECON-1981 77 5
PADMANABHAN V-J MARKETING RES-1997 78 5
PORTER ME-COMPETITIVE STRATEGY-1980 79 9
REINGANUM JF-HDB IND ORG-1989 80 4
ROBERTSON TS-J MARKETING-1986 81 4
ROBERTSON TS-SLOAN MANAGE REV-1993 82 4
ROBINSON B-MANAGE SCI-1975 83 4
ROGERS EM-DIFFUSION INNOVATION-1962 84 15
ROHLFS J-BELL J ECON-1974 85 12
ROSENBERG N-INSIDE BLACK BOX TEC-1982 86 8
SALONER G-EC INNOVATION NEW TE-1990 87 4
SALONER G-RAND J ECON-1995 88 7
SALOP SC-BELL J ECON-1979 89 4
SCHELLING TC-MICROMOTIVES MACRO-1978 90 5
SHAPIRO C-INFORMATION RULES-1999 91 5
SHURMER M-INFORMATION EC POLIC-1993 92 6
SPENCE AM-BELL J ECON-1981 93 6
TEECE DJ-RES POLICY-1986 94 10
TIROLE J-THEORY IND ORG-1988 95 8
TOLBERT PS-ADM SCI Q-1983 96 5
TUSHMAN ML-ADM SCI Q-1986 97 10
VONHIPPEL E-SOURCES INNOVATION-1988 98 4
WALDMAN M-Q J ECON-1993 99 5
WESTPHAL JD-ADM SCI Q-1997 100 4
WHINSTON MD-AM ECON REV-1990 101 4
WILLIAMSON OE-EC I CAPITALISM-1985 102 5
WILLIAMSON OE-MARKETS HIERARCHIES-1975 103 4
 
Two-dimensional citation data, or affiliation network, was exported to Ucinet 6 
network analysis software for further analysis. A data matrix (119 articles, 103 
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references) was multiplied by its transpose for further analysis. A symmetric square 
matrix represented a co-citation profile for each of 103 articles (McCain, 1986). This 
procedure was also performed using Ucinet 6 software. 
Co-citation data was normalised in order to produce a more realistic picture of 
discussion clusters.  Using absolute counts would overemphasise the density of 
widespread articles whilst overlooking the proximity relations between similar, but 
quite rarely quoted references (Gmür, 2003). The normalised co-citations strength 
measure, S, for individual pairs was calculated by means of the Jaccard index (Small 
& Greenlee, 1980), also called co-citation strength. Using relative information has 
been found to produce sufficient differentiation, but it is not able to correct the 
tendency to overrate co-citations between commonly cited references (Gmür, 2003).  
Table 13 Jaccard index 
co-citations of works A&B 
S =  
(total citations of A + total citations of B – co-citations of A&B) 
7.2 Details on clustering methods 
Johnston’s single-link, average-link, and complete link hierarchical algorithms, and 
Tabu cluster optimisation were tried in order to produce meaningful clusters. The 
results of different approaches  are shown in the following paragraphs, as well as the 
procedure for producing Figure 3.   
Tree-diagrams of clusters evidence how a single link method clusters articles one at a 
time, whilst the complete link method clusters in a compact manner. Positioned in the 
middle, the average link method produces clusters more continuously than the other 
hierarchical methods.  
Johnston’s hierarchical clustering finds a series of nested partitions of the items. The 
different partitions are ordered according to decreasing levels of similarity. The 
algorithm begins with the identity partition (in which all items are in different 
clusters). It then joins the most similar pair of items, which are then considered a 
single entity. The algorithm continues in this manner until all items have been joined 
into a single cluster (Borgatti, 2002).  
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The basis for selecting the method for further analysis lay in clustering efficiency. 
Tree-diagrams of clusters evidence how single link and complete link methods cluster 
articles individually or respectively in a compact manner. On the other hand, average 
link produced clusters more continuously than the other hierarchical methods. For 
these reasons, average link was used as a method for further analysis. Cluster 
optimisation is not a method often used in bibliometric research, because the number 
of theoretically optimum number of clusters is not known. In this study it was tried for 
comparison of results. Using different methods provides more reliable clusters, if the 
results remain similar.   
Major clusters in the network externalities discussion were found with all different 
methods. For example, the core articles establishing the field, or the discussion appear 
in the same clusters. Some clusters are not as distinctive, and some overlap between 
clusters exists.   
Hierarchical methods have no generally accepted rules for selecting the best set of 
clusters to report (McCain, 1990).  The tree-diagrams are often used to visualise the 
information on structure. The cases are on X-axes and Y-axis gives information on the 
value of similarity among articles. The maximum value for similarity is 1. The 
number of clusters diminishes moving down on Y-axis, describing the process of 
individual articles and smaller clusters joining together. 
In the average distance algorithm distance between two clusters is the average 
dissimilarity between members (Borgatti, 2002). At higher levels of similarity, more 
clusters emerge, until the ‘branches’ reaches the level of individual articles. The 
average-link illustrates both the most separated clusters, as single-link, and also less 
distinctive clusters, see Figure 13. Due to space restrictions, the similarity values, and 
identification numbers are not observable in the dendrogram.  The tree has eight 
branch-like departures at similarity level 0.067. These clusters are separated with a 
thicker line. At the left there are also two individual articles (ID numbers 98 and 49) 
falling out of these clusters. These clusters with their respected article identification 
numbers are in Table 14. At higher levels of similarity, more clusters emerge, until the 
‘branches’ reaches the level of individual articles.  
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Figure 13 Average link cluster tree diagram 
 
The cluster identification follows the division sketched out in Table 14 starting from 
left, with the exception that the two documents in the bottom-left corner are left out. 
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The first emerging sub-clusters, which were larger than two in size, were also 
identified. They appear approximately at similarity level of 0.07-0.01. 
Table 14 Major average link clusters and the first sub-clusters 
A 
 101, 95, 80, 26, 99, 25, 29, 21 
B 
 89, 58, 43, 53, 27, 71, 14 
C 
 67, 34, 103, 93, 72, 37, 65, 47, 22, 15 
D 
 87, 45, 44, 17, 16, 6, 4 
E E.i 85, 77, 63, 41, 61, 42, 59, 62, 46, 40, 33 
 E.ii 88, 51, 20, 38, 13 
F F.i 83, 69, 60, 91, 78, 82, 81, 64, 39, 32, 8, 7 
 F.ii 75, 76, 30, 92, 11, 68, 2 
G G.i 54, 100, 24, 73, 96, 36, 35, 23, 9  
 G.ii 90, 74, 84, 55, 5 
H H.i 102, 70, 56, 19, 10,  
 H.ii 31, 12, 94, 18, 79, 86, 3, 66, 52, 97, 57, 28, 50, 48, 1 
 
In the complete link, the distance between two clusters is defined by as largest 
dissimilarity between members (Borgatti, 2002). Jain et al. (1999) reviewed clustering 
methods, and reiterated that the algorithm produces tightly bound or compact clusters, 
which are quite useful to work with (Jain et al., 1999). With this data complete link 
algorithm produced either 1, 19, or even more clusters, which seems unpractical for 
the study. In the single link method the distance between two clusters is the smallest 
dissimilarity between the members (Borgatti, 2002). The results of the single link 
algorithm make it difficult to choose one level for clustering consisting of most of the 
articles. A review of Jain et al. (1999) evaluated the earlier idea that single the 
algorithm has a tendency to produce clusters that are straggly or elongated, a view 
further supported by this data. The algorithm separates the discussion participants 
rapidly, but almost individually. The tree-diagram has the look of a bush bent by a 
strong wind, and the figure does not suggest one clear cut-off point. Researchers have 
to choose a particular level for detailed analysis, referring to higher or lower levels 
when useful (McCain, 1990). In Figure 14, there are three separate thicker branches (4 
or more members at or above similarity value of 0.429), which may suggest to 
different research discussions. The clusters, with their respected article identification 
numbers are in Figure 14. Note, that the alphabetical coding is different when using 
different algorithms. The ordering follows their appearance in the computer printout.  
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Figure 14 Single-link tree diagram  
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Table 15 Major single-link clusters 
A. 73, 23, 35, 36, 96, 100      
B. 59, 40, 62, 46  
C. 66, 52, 91, 78, 82, 81, 64, 39, 68, 2  
Cluster B in the single-link output is the core of the network externality discussion. 
The documents have similar citing patterns, which is partly because they were written 
in a short period of time (1985-1986) by two writing teams. This core of network 
externalities articles is widely shared by most of the later writers joining the 
discussion. The authors laid the foundation for most of the others, which is the 
distinctive feature of this cluster.    
A comparison of the three clustering methods (average link, single link and complete 
clustering methods) revealed the strong position of some of the core documents. The 
cut-off point of similarity for choosing the single-link clusters was higher in the scale 
compared to other methods. Therefore, the members of single-link clusters should be 
found with the other methods using lower cut-off point. Members of the single-link 
cluster A (73, 23, 35, 36, 96, 100) are members of average link cluster G.i, and Tabu 8 
cluster E. Members of the single-link cluster b (59, 40, 62, 46) are members of 
average link cluster E.i and Tabu 8 cluster C. Single-link cluster C members (82, 81, 
64, 39) belong also to the groups of average link cluster F.i and Tabu 8 cluster A.  
Table 16 Strong overlap of different clusters 
Cluster 
method and 
identification 
Document 
number 
Cluster 
method and 
identification 
Document 
number 
Cluster 
method and 
identification 
Document 
number 
Single link A  73, 23, 35, 
36, 96, 100 
Average link 
cluster G.i 
54, 100, 24, 
73, 96, 36, 
35, 23, 9 
Tabu 8 cluster 
E 
9, 10, 19, 
23, 24, 35, 
36, 54, 55, 
56, 73, 90, 
96, 100 
Single-link 
cluster B  
59, 40, 62, 
46 
Average link 
cluster E.i 
85, 77, 63, 
41, 61, 42, 
59, 62, 46, 
40, 33 
Tabu 8 cluster 
C 
13, 20, 33, 
38, 40, 46, 
51, 59, 60, 
61, 62, 63, 
84, 85, 88 
Single-link 
cluster C 
82, 81, 64, 
39 
Average link 
cluster F.i 
83, 13, 69, 
60, 91, 78, 
82, 81, 64, 
39, 32, 8, 7 
Tabu 8 cluster 
A 
8, 18, 27, 
32, 39, 53, 
64, 75, 76, 
78, 81, 82, 
83, 91, 92 
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There is a weaker, but noticeable similarity between wider groups of average-link 
cluster A, and Tabu 8 cluster D, between average-link cluster E, and Tabu 8 cluster C, 
between average-link cluster F, and Tabu 8 cluster A, between average-link cluster G 
and Tabu 8 cluster E, between average-link cluster H and Tabu 8 cluster F.  
Table 17 Weaker similarity of different clusters  
Cluster 
method and 
identification 
Document number Cluster method 
and 
identification 
Document number 
Average link 
cluster A 
101, 95, 80, 26, 99, 25, 
29, 21 
Tabu 8 cluster D 21, 25, 26, 29, 69, 
77, 80, 95, 99, 101 
Average link 
cluster E 
85, 77, 63, 41, 61, 42, 59, 
62, 46, 40, 33, 88, 51, 20, 
38, 13 
Tabu 8 cluster C 13, 20, 33, 38, 40, 
46, 51, 59, 60, 61, 
62, 63, 84, 85, 88 
Average link 
cluster F 
83, 69, 60, 91, 78, 82, 81, 
64, 39, 32, 8, 7, 75, 76, 
30, 92, 11, 68, 2 
Tabu 8 cluster A 8, 18, 27, 32, 39, 53, 
64, 75, 76, 78, 81, 
82, 83, 91, 92 
Average link 
cluster G 
54, 100, 24, 73, 96, 36, 
35, 23, 9, 90, 74, 84, 55, 5 
Tabu 8 cluster E 9, 10, 19, 23, 24, 35, 
36, 54, 55, 56, 73, 
90, 96, 100 
Average link 
cluster H 
102, 70, 56, 19, 10, 31, 
12, 94, 18, 79, 86, 3, 66, 
52, 97, 57, 28, 50, 48, 1 
Tabu 8 cluster F 1, 3, 4, 28, 48, 50, 
57, 66, 70, 79, 86, 
97, 102 
The rest of the clusters did not have such clear counterparts when using different 
algorithms, which leads to the suggestion that cluster instability may be a sign of 
some overlapping, or thin clusters.  
In order to spread out the visible structure of the discussion, data had to be normalised 
for Figure 3. In order to make reading it easier, I reduced the number of visible links 
by having an arbitrary cut-off level of co-citation strength. Those links below the cut-
off level were left out of the picture, as well as articles isolated by this procedure. In 
the graph, the remaining links and articles visually indicate which documents may act 
as a bridge from one stream of discussion to another. The differences in the visual 
structure and in the clusters described previously are due to the differences in the 
method. Normalised co-citation data and Ucinet Netdraw program was used for this 
purpose. An arbitrary cut-off for co-citation strength of 0.25 was used to isolate 
documents with less in common with others. Netdraw program arranged the 
remaining documents according to geodesic distances. With this cut-off point, the 
groups are linked to each other, but their distinctiveness can be observed. The isolates 
are left from the picture. Some positions have been slightly changed for the visual 
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presentation to make the document identification number observable. Groups A and B 
share a legend because of the limitation of the used software. 
Cluster E includes the classic network externalities is located inside the group 
containing clusters A to D. The two other groups showing stability irrespective of the 
clustering method, namely F and G, are clearly traceable from the picture. Still even 
with the cohesiveness, some major members of cluster G are detached from their 
cluster neighbours. 
7.3 Details on using social network analysis with bibliometric 
data 
Bibliometric methods rely on several measures borrowed from social network 
analysis (Oliver & Ebers, 1998; Phillips & Phillips, 1998; Parvinen, 2003).  In the co-
citation context, the amount of information in the link is the number of co-citations. If 
there are only few citers, the links emerge as weak. Individual researchers referencing 
non-equivalent documents may have made these weak links. As the number of co-
citations grows, the role of non-equivalent citations also diminishes, because stronger 
links imply more evident co-citation patterns. Therefore, social network measures are 
more reliable when the links and nodes are stronger.   
There are a variety of social network measures used to signify the differences in 
bibliometric data. Centrality in the co-citation context can be operationalized as the 
number of direct ties of a cited author, omitting the indirect paths. The assumption of 
the betweenness centrality measure is that information is passed from one node to 
another along the shortest, or otherwise most proximate path linking them (Freeman et 
al., 1991). Betweenness measures are used to capture the bridging ability of individual 
points (Freeman, 1977, 1979; Freeman et al., 1991). If a node does not have any ties, 
it does not have a channel to carry its information forward (Freeman et al., 1991). A 
point of high betweenness value has the possibility to facilitate or limit the interaction 
between the nodes of its linked points (Freeman, 1979). Betweenness centrality based 
on maximum flow of information considers links connecting points as having 
different capacities for passing information. Freeman’s betweenness centrality cannot 
use information on different strength of links i.e. either a link exists or it does not 
(Freeman, 1977).  
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Freeman’s betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1977) is often used to analyse how 
theoretical constructs are passed along in the scientific discourse (e.g. Oliver & Ebers, 
1998; Phillips & Phillips, 1998; Parvinen, 2003). The measure calculates the shortest 
possible path along two points, which does not take in account different routes 
(Stephenson & Zelen, 1989; Freeman et al., 1991; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In 
many occasions the link may have different values. The flow measure does not 
consider direct links as being more efficient than indirect (Freeman et al., 1991). 
If there are two information sources (s1, s2), the citers may link information directly or 
indirectly. In the latter, all the other possible channels and passing nodes connecting 
the two could be included (Freeman et al., 1991). Connections between s1 and s2, and 
s2 and s3, and s3 and s4 are usually manipulated to draw a path s1-s2-s3-s4. However, 
without knowledge of the quality of cites, one cannot conclude that there is a certain 
kind of path. The purpose for choosing particular co-citations may differ from one 
pair to another. The betweenness measure is understood in this co-citation context to 
be the maximum possibility that bringing a node sx to the path interferes or converts 
information (possibly) shared by the sx-1 and sx+1. The writer of sx has not necessarily 
written her article to link it with its neighbours, as it is the citers who have done the 
linkage by co-citing them. As the neighbours, sx-1 and sx+1, are not directly linked, the 
shared information may be covert in nature.  
It can be argued that the number of co-citations represents the information potential of 
a link, and not the actual flow of information. Stephenson and Zelen (1989) propose 
that information flow should also take account of path length. To remedy the problem 
of long and diverse information paths, I use Stephenson and Zelen’s information 
centrality measure (1989). Each path is weighted in proportion to its information, and 
the paths are then combined. Information centrality indicates the maximum 
information each node then has after combining of all the paths (Stephenson & Zelen, 
1989). A high value in information centrality tends to imply a large number of short 
paths to many others within the network. Information centrality is calculated from all 
the paths going through all the possible nodes. ‘Noise’ in a signal is measured by 
variance. Information loss occurs each time there is a new link. If the variance of one 
link is unity, the variance counts the number of links along the path i.e. path length. 
The amount of information is reciprocal to the variance. Each path is weighed 
  182 
proportional to its information, and the paths are combined. Information centrality 
indicates the maximum information each node has after combination of all the paths 
(Stephenson & Zelen, 1989). High value in information centrality tends to implicate 
large number of short paths to many others within network.  
High betweenness centrality does not necessarily mean that the node lies in the core, 
but may indicate that a cited document connects diverse streams of discourse 
(Borgatti & Everett, 1999). In the case of an emerging synthesis of different streams, a 
citer reveals some covert shared basis of different streams. If proved useful, the citer 
herself becomes the cited, because the cited article will be trespassed. If followers will 
take a similar stance on synthesising, the differing streams are directly connected. 
New citers will link the documents representing the differing streams. The 
significance of bridge-like connections evaporates, when links become denser. A 
bibliometrical mapping is an interim result of a discussion, not a final one. 
In this work, betweenness is a measure the maximum likelihood that a node sx 
interferes or converts information potentially shared by the sx-1 and sx+1. Betweenness 
is therefore a capacity, not necessarily fulfilled. Betweenness measures were 
calculated for Stephenson and Zelen information centrality (Stephenson & Zelen, 
1989), and more conventionally Freeman’s betweenness centrality. As point of 
analysis was on node’s capacity to facilitate information flows, a co-citation data was 
used without standardisation. Ucinet 6 binarised data for calculating Freeman’s 
betweenness centralities. Diagonal values of matrices were omitted for Stephenson 
and Zelen information centrality.  
The mean of citers in 103 documents is 8.3. Values for Freeman centrality 
betweenness range from nil to 252.92, with a mean of 29.56. Values for Stephenson 
and Zelen information centrality start from 9.98 ending in 50.91, with mean of 30.59. 
One document has the highest score in every index. All the documents scoring above 
the mean in Freeman centrality (with one exception ID 27)) and all documents above 
mean in the number of citers, score above mean in information centrality. The 
documents having a score above the mean in any of the indexes are included in 
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Table 18 Document centralities. No documents in cluster A reached mean scores. In 
the table, also a cluster, and sub-cluster description is given. Documents having 
betweenness centrality values over the mean are marked in bolded characters.  With 
clusters E, F, and H, there is a sub-heading in the cluster description to reflect the 
division in the cluster.  
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Table 18 Document centralities 
Document 
ID 
Cluster ID Cluster description (sub-
cluster description after 
colon) 
Between- 
ness 
Information Number of 
citers 
98 No cluster  0 9,98 4 
49 No cluster  3,52 18,80 4 
21 A Economics: Firm innovation 
and strategic interaction 
0,82 
18,45 
4 
29 A  0,82 18,45 4 
101 A  1,35 14,84 4 
99 A  3,59 24,23 5 
80 A  3,62 20,00 4 
25 A  14,38 30,08 6 
95 A  15,74 27,57 8 
26 A  23,76 28,88 4 
89 B Economics: Compatibility 
and standardisation 
1,44 
19,65 
4 
14 B  2,72 25,97 4 
58 B  2,77 17,88 4 
53 B  10,67 28,88 4 
71 B  12,38 30,03 4 
43 B  13,89 29,77 5 
27 B  45,81 35,54 6 
22 C Economics: Systems vs. 
components 
7,22 
25,06 
4 
47 C  7,70 29,92 5 
67 C  9,69 28,38 6 
37 C  14,36 32,52 8 
93 C  16,60 29,10 6 
15 C  16,74 33,02 7 
103 C  19,13 27,94 4 
65 C  25,69 32,06 6 
34 C  49,18 35,98 7 
72 C  70,94 42,89 18 
4 D Economics: Switching 
costs and market structure 
3,61 
22,02 
4 
6 D  3,63 22,39 6 
87 D  3,95 25,05 4 
16 D  5,48 26,48 4 
17 D  9,39 30,38 5 
44 D  14,96 35,13 7 
45 D  19,00 33,97 7 
77 E.i Network externalities: Core 
Concepts 
5,84 
23,11 
5 
13 E.ii Network externalities: 
Empirical context 
6,83 
30,62 
6 
88 E.ii  7,27 29,52 7 
38 E.ii  7,49 29,27 8 
41 E  26,18 36,03 7 
20 E.ii  27,75 39,49 14 
63 E.i  39,51 39,25 10 
51 E.ii  45,45 40,28 13 
85 E.i  55,39 40,60 12 
61 E.i  64,94 43,70 17 
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42 E.i  79,44 42,95 15 
33 E.i  175,77 47,05 30 
40 E.i  190,35 49,21 38 
62 E.i  208,49 50,33 53 
46 E.i  208,73 49,73 45 
59 E.i  252,92 50,91 57 
75 F.i 
 
Path dependence: Firms 
and industries 
2,41 
22,41 
4 
69 F.ii Path dependence: 
Technology diffusion and 
market structure 
2,83 
23,81 
4 
83 F.i  4,38 29,54 4 
39 F.i  6,62 33,37 4 
82 F.i  6,79 31,02 4 
30 F.ii  7,99 25,36 4 
76 F.ii  8,10 25,38 4 
91 F.i  8,54 30,40 5 
64 F.i  9,58 33,19 4 
81 F.i  9,58 33,19 4 
32 F.i  10,88 31,44 5 
78 F.i  15,93 35,34 5 
8 F.i  17,55 36,75 7 
7 F.i  22,57 30,89 8 
68 F.ii  24,46 36,89 6 
92 F.ii  24,83 33,61 6 
2 F.ii  29,77 38,30 8 
11 F.ii  46,57 32,02 6 
60 F.i  116,93 42,89 16 
100 G.i Collective action: 
Interaction of individual with 
social structure 
0,19 
15,63 
4 
23 G.i Collective action: Market 
structure 
3,16 
23,17 
4 
35 G.i  3,16 23,76 5 
90 G.ii  4,61 22,74 5 
54 G.i  7,57 21,29 5 
73 G.i  10,25 26,04 4 
96 G.i  13,39 26,84 5 
24 G.i  14,16 28,11 7 
9 G.i  16,31 23,58 4 
36 G.i  20,45 30,41 6 
55 G.ii  31,59 32,05 6 
74 G.ii  39,11 33,10 9 
84 G.ii  106,52 43,06 15 
5 G.ii  114,16 44,12 19 
70 H.i Decision making: Social 
structure’s effect on 
decision making 
5,90 
18,80 
4 
66 H.ii Decision making: 
Structure’s effect on firm 
strategy 
5,97 
26,18 
4 
48 H.ii  6,01 26,74 4 
12 H.ii  6,41 25,68 4 
31 H.ii  6,94 25,39 4 
102 H.i  7,11 22,01 5 
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10 H.i  8,18 21,37 5 
19 H.i  8,18 21,37 5 
3 H.ii  9,45 25,09 4 
1 H.ii  10,51 26,24 4 
28 H.ii  13,99 30,57 5 
57 H.ii  16,76 33,97 8 
56 H.i  17,03 30,12 7 
50 H.ii  20,97 36,69 9 
18 H.ii  32,72 35,82 7 
52 H.ii  34,64 39,04 9 
86 H.ii  45,91 36,20 8 
94 H.ii  49,86 38,95 10 
79 H.ii  55,00 38,49 9 
97 H.ii  65,61 39,09 10 
 
The following table offers information about the most influential documents in the 
clusters produced by the average link method. Bolded article identification numbers 
indicate that the article is influential. It can be seen that the original cluster A does not 
have any articles with centrality above the mean, and clusters B and D offer only one 
or two important articles.  
 
Table 19 Average link clusters with their cluster description and most 
influential documents 
 
Cluster Sub-
cluster 
Article ID Cluster description, and most influential 
documents in the cluster 
A  101, 95, 
80, 26, 
99, 25, 
29, 21 
Economics: Firm innovation and strategic interaction  
Tirole(1988):  Theory of Industrial Organisation  
J.P.Choi: (1994) Network Externality, Compatability 
Choice, and Planned Obsolence  
B  89, 58, 
43, 53, 
27, 71, 14 
Economics: Compatibility and standardisation  
Church and Gandal (1992): Network effects, software 
provision, and standardisation 
C  67, 34, 
103, 93, 
72, 37, 
65, 47, 
22, 15 
Economics: Systems vs. components  
Matutes and Regibeau (1988): Mix and Match – 
Product compatibility without network externalities.   
D  87, 45, 
44, 17, 
16, 6, 4 
 
Economics: Switching costs and market structure  
Farrell and Shapiro (1988): Dynamic Competition 
with Switching Costs  
Farrell and Gallini (1988): Second-sourcing as a 
commitment – monopoly incentives to attract 
competition 
E E.i 85, 77, 
63, 41, 
61, 42, 
59, 62, 
46, 40, 33 
 
Network externalities: Core concepts 
Farrell and Saloner (1985): Standardisation, 
Compatibility, and Innovation and  
Farrell and Saloner (1986): Installed Base and 
Compatibility – Innovation, Product 
Preannounements Predation  
Katz and Shapiro  (1986): 
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Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network 
Externalities  
Katz and Shapiro  (1985): Network Externalities, 
Competition, and Compatibility  
 E.ii 88, 51, 
20, 38, 13 
Network externalities: Empirical context  
Gandal (1994): Hedonic Price Indexes for 
Spreadsheets and an Empirical Test for Network 
Externalities  
F F.i 83, 69, 
60, 91, 
78, 82, 
81, 64, 
39, 32, 8, 
7 
Path dependence: Technology diffusion and market 
structure 
Katz and Shapiro (1994): Systems competition and 
Network Effects  
 F.ii 75, 76, 
30, 92, 
11, 68, 2 
Path dependence: Firms and industries 
Anderson and Tushman (1990):  
Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: 
A Cyclical Model of Technological Change  
Lieberman and Montgomery, (1988): First-Mover 
Advantages 
Barney (1991):  Firm resources and Sustained 
Competitive Advantage  
G G.i 54, 100, 
24, 73, 
96, 36, 
35, 23, 9  
Collective action: Interaction of individual with social 
structure 
DiMaggio and More (1993): Cultural Capital, 
Educational Attainment, and Marital Selection  
 G.ii 90, 74, 
84, 55, 5 
Collective action: Collective action and market 
structure 
Arthur (1989): Competing Technologies, Increasing 
Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events 
Rogers (1962): Diffusion of Innovations 
Nelson and Winter (1982): Evolutionary Theory 
H H.i 102, 70, 
56, 19, 10 
Decision making: Social structure’s effect on decision 
making 
Granovetter (1985):  Economic Action and Social 
Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness  
 H.ii 31, 12, 
94, 18, 
79, 86, 3, 
66, 52, 
97, 57, 
28, 50, 
48, 1 
 
Decision making: Structure’s effect on firm strategy 
Tushman and Anderson (1986): Technological 
Discontinuities and Organisational Environments  
Porter (1980): Competitive Strategy  
Teece (1986): Profiting from Technological 
Innovation – Implications for Integration, 
Collaboration, Licensing and Public-Policy  
Rosenberg (1982):Inside the Black Box: Technology 
and Economics  
7.4 The 1998-2003 citer articles published in selected 
business journals  
The most important citer articles published in recent business strategy journals were 
negotiated. For this purpose, the two-dimensional citer-cited network used for the 
clustering was again used, but this time for retrieving information on the citer articles.  
To be considered as important recent article, the document had to be published during 
1998-2003 in a 20 most influential business strategy journals, according to the ISI 
  188 
Journal Report 2002 impact factor loadings. Twelve articles were retrieved, which 
were themselves cited at least once in addition to possible first-author self-citations. 
Table 20 Recent citer research on network externality  
Author(s) Article name Journal 
Yannis Bakos; Erik 
Brynjolfsson 
Bundling and Competition on 
the Internet 
Marketing Science, Vol. 19, 
Issue 1, Special Issue on 
Marketing Science and the 
Internet. Winter, 2000, pp. 
63-82.  
Hemant K. Bhargava, 
Vidyanand Choudhary, and 
Ramayya Krishnan  
Pricing and Product Design: 
Intermediary Strategies in an 
Electronic Market 
International Journal of 
Electronic Commerce, 
Volume 5, Issue 1, Fall 
2000, pp. 37. 
Dekimpe MG, Parker PM, 
Sarvary M  
Global diffusion of 
technological innovations: A 
coupled-hazard approach  
Journal of Marketing 
Research, Vol.  37 Issue 1 
February 2000 pp. 47-59 
Sachin Gupta; Dipak C. 
Jain; Mohanbir S. Sawhney 
Modeling the Evolution of 
Markets with Indirect Network 
Externalities: An Application to 
Digital Television 
Marketing Science, Vol. 18, 
Issue 3, Special Issue on 
Managerial Decision 
Making, 1999, pp. 396-416. 
Hellofs LL, Jacobson R Market share and customers' 
perceptions of quality: When 
can firms grow their way to 
higher versus lower quality? 
Journal of Marketing Vol.63 
Issue 1, 1999 pp.16-25 
Leo van Hove  The New York City Smart 
Card Trial in Perspective: A 
Research Note 
International Journal of 
Electronic 
Commerce,Volume 5, Issue 
2, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 
119. 
Robert J. Kauffman and 
Eric A. Walden  
Economics and Electronic 
Commerce: Survey and 
Directions for Research  
International Journal of 
Electronic Commerce, 
Volume 5, Issue 4, Summer 
2001, pp. 5.-  
Majumdar SK, 
Venkataraman S..  
Network effects and the 
adoption of new technology: 
Evidence from the US 
telecommunications industry.  
Strategic Management 
Journal 19 Issue 11, 1998, 
pp. 1045-1062 
Melissa A. Schilling Technological Lockout: An 
Integrative Model of the 
Economic and Strategic 
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7.5 Details on firm strategy and organisational research 
bibliometric study 
The documents that surfaced in the first conducted bibliometric study on network 
externality were used as ‘seed’ documents. Many of the important documents can be 
associated with discourses other than the field of network externalities. These 
documents act here as a proxy for a scientific field. The subjectively chosen 
documents are in Table 21 with their descriptions. The most cited article in the 
network externality discussion, Katz and Shapiro (1985), represents the network 
externality discussion.  Choosing one article instead of a key word is based on an 
assumption of a citation as a symbol of an idea (Small, 1978).  
Table 21 Related fields and their representative documents  
Approach/framework Representative document Citers in 1999-
2003 
Citers in 
2003 
Diffusion theories  Rogers (1995): Diffusion of 
Innovations 
680 223 
Resource-based view Barney (1991):  Firm 
resources and Sustained 
Competitive Advantage 
740 185 
Evolutionary 
approach 
 
Nelson and Winter (1982): 
Evolutionary Theory 
624 183 
Social structures 
 
  
Granovetter (1985):  
Economic Action and Social 
Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness 
749 179 
Industrial 
organisation 
Porter (1980): Competitive 
Strategy 
580 114 
Network externalities  
 
Katz and Shapiro (1985): 
Network Externalities, 
Competition, and 
Compatibility 
202 58 
Dominant designs Tushman and Anderson 
(1986): Technological 
Discontinuities and 
Organisational 
Environments  
252 57 
Complex, evolving 
systems 
 
Arthur (1989): Competing 
Technologies, Increasing 
Returns, and Lock-in by 
Historical Events 
245 48 
First-mover 
advantage 
Lieberman and 
Montgomery (1988): First-
Mover Advantages 
141 27 
 
The field of economics covers network externalities, and the number of relevant 
publications is large. To shed more light on societal views and to serve the realm of 
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strategic management, I used only one of the core documents representing the field of 
economics, that from Katz and Shapiro (1985).  
As the aim was to locate the network externalities discussion into larger context, all of 
the journals in the ISI Web of Science Social Science Index were used for data 
mining. A search was made to find all articles citing the mentioned ‘seed’ article that 
were published in 2003. The one-year time window was due to computer resources, 
but it also helps to draw a map of the current discourse. The new articles with all of 
their references (including seeds) were retrieved. This produced 36772 cited 
documents in 893 different articles.  
The large sample has different requirements than the network externalities discourse 
bibliometric study. More citations allow an investigator to put more trust in the 
reliability of citations. If the percentage of erroneous filings is the same, the greater 
number of citations ensures easier analysis of data. In addition, a large quantity of 
data would make the efforts more difficult to uniformly correct e.g. misspellings.  
An arbitrary cut-off for co-citation strength of 0.1 was used to isolate documents with 
less in common with others. The analysed matrix was 885 articles, which referenced 
53 documents. The Netdraw program was used to arrange the remaining documents 
according to geodesic distances, seen in Figure 1. The Ucinet Netdraw program used 
normalised co-citation data.   
At this threshold level, the most popular citation, ‘Diffusion of Innovation’ by Everett 
Rogers (number 42 in this graph) is an isolate, because of the seemingly varied 
citation patterns of its citers. Although the series of editions by Rogers are very 
popular, it has been cited in different contexts. Compared to the others, it has been a 
source for more varied reasons, and therefore, it is not strongly associated with other 
documents. 
The problems of different ways of indexing data was solved by choosing the most 
common reference, e.g. Porter (1980) Competitive Strategy was spelled in different 
ways, from which the most popular one was chosen. The timeframe for mapping is 
2003 in order to posit different approaches in recent discussion. The number of citers 
allows positioning, while a greater data corpus would make the analysis difficult for 
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normal computers. The most recent document is published in 1991, so all of the 
chosen documents have been available for researcher during the studied time frame. 
Rogers’ ‘Diffusion of Innovations’ edition from 1995 was chosen, as it was the last in 
the chosen timeframe.  
There were 893 articles referencing at least one of the above. Those articles 
referenced altogether 36772 differently coded texts. The threshold was set to 27 as it 
was the number of citers the article Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) received. This 
produced a network of 885 articles referencing to 55 documents. As Penrose (1958) 
and Nelson (1982) had ambiguous surname coding, their contributions were checked 
from the original material. This produced a new matrix, where the two very 
distinguished documents received more citing. The size of the matrix was 885 articles 
referencing to 53 documents.  
Even with time frame set in ISI Web of Science, the ISI produced some data from 
2002, and 2004, which had to be left out. Finally, there were 53-9=44 publicised 
documents found from the database. In Table 22 are the names of the retrieved 
documents with the number of citers, and document identification corresponding to 
Table 22. It has to be noted that the corrections produced the observable differences 
between numbers of citers some the influential articles have received (Table 21 and 
Table 22).  
Table 22 Cited documents with the number of citers 
 
 Citers Document 
ID 
AMIT R-STRATEGIC MANAGE J-1993 42 1 
ARTHUR WB-ECON J-1989 51 2 
BARNEY J-J MANAGE-1991 186 3 
BARNEY JB-MANAGE SCI-1986 35 4 
COASE RH-ECONOMICA-1937 28 5 
COHEN WM-ADMIN SCI QUART-1990 82 6 
COLEMAN JS-AM J SOCIOL-1988 33 7 
CYERT RM-BEHAV THEORY FIRM-1963 46 8 
DAVID PA-AM ECON REV-1985 35 9 
DIERICKX I-MANAGE SCI-1989 58 10 
DIMAGGIO PJ-AM SOCIOL REV-1983 45 11 
DOSI G-RES POLICY-1982 27 12 
EISENHARDT KM-ACAD MANAGE REV-1989 40 13 
EISENHARDT KM-STRATEGIC MANAGE J-2000 28 14 
GRANOVETTER M-AM J SOCIOL-1985 185 15 
GRANOVETTER MS-AM J SOCIOL-1973 45 16 
GRANT RM-CALIF MANAGE REV-1991 31 17 
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GRANT RM-STRATEGIC MANAGE J-1996 31 18 
HANNAN MT-AM SOCIOL REV-1984 30 19 
HANNAN MT-ORG ECOLOGY-1989 29 20 
HENDERSON RM-ADMIN SCI QUART-1990 50 21 
HUBER GP-ORGAN SCI-1991 28 22 
JENSEN MC-J FINANC ECON-1976 31 23 
KATZ ML-AM ECON REV-1985 60 24 
KOGUT B-ORGAN SCI-1992 50 25 
LEONARDBARTON D-STRATEGIC MANAGE J-1992 37 26 
LEVITT B-ANNU REV SOCIOL-1988 35 27 
LIEBERMAN MB-STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT-1988 27 28 
LIPPMAN SA-BELL J ECON-1982 28 29 
MARCH JG-ORGAN SCI-1991 45 30 
MARCH JG-ORGANISATIONS-1958 37 31 
MEYER JW-AM J SOCIOL-1977 38 32 
NELSON RR-EVOLUTIONARY THEORY-1982 220 33 
NONAKA I-KNOWLEDGE CREATING C-1995 41 34 
NONAKA I-ORGAN SCI-1994 39 35 
PENROSE ET-THEORY GROWTH FIRM-1959 63 36 
PETERAF MA-STRATEGIC MANAGE J-1993 43 37 
PFEFFER J-EXTERNAL CONTROL ORG-1978 46 38 
PORTER ME-COMPETITIVE ADVANTAG-1985 36 39 
PORTER ME-COMPETITIVE STRATEGY-1980 114 40 
PRAHALAD CK-HARVARD BUS REV-1990 50 41 
ROGERS EM-DIFFUSION INNOVATION-1995 224 42 
RUMELT RP-STRATEGIC MANAGE J-1991 27 43 
SCHUMPETER JA-THEORY EC DEV-1934 28 44 
TEECE DJ-RES POLICY-1986 30 45 
TEECE DJ-STRATEGIC MANAGE J-1997 77 46 
TUSHMAN ML-ADMIN SCI QUART-1986 57 47 
UZZI B-ADMIN SCI QUART-1997 31 48 
UZZI B-AM SOCIOL REV-1996 30 49 
VONHIPPEL E-SOURCES INNOVATION-1988 27 50 
WERNERFELT B-STRATEGIC MANAGE J-1984 88 51 
WILLIAMSON OE-EC I CAPITALISM-1985 40 52 
WILLIAMSON OE-MARKETS HIERARCHIES-1975 39 53 
 
7.6 Case study data sources 
A formal case study protocol was not produced in the beginning of the research, as the 
research strategy was selected during the course of the study. The iterative process of 
delivering research plans raised some of the same topics as a case study protocol (Yin 
2003). These include an introduction to the case study, data collection procedures, and 
case study questions. An outline of the case study report was given by the academic 
requirements. 
A formal case study protocol concerning case study questions and field procedures 
was written in the course of research, well before interviews. The case protocol used 
for the interviews follows.   
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7.6.1 Case protocol 
7.6.1.1 Role of protocol in guiding the case study investigator 
A protocol is a standardised agenda for conducting the inquiry. In this study, the 
standardisation is part of preparation for the interviews. 
7.6.1.2 Data collection procedures 
Interviewed persons, their affiliations to the question, and the site to be visited 
 
Type of visit Person Date 
Pre-arranged 
meetings  
Dame Patricia Hodgson 30.11.2004  
 Allan Williams 3.12.2004  
 Julian McCougan 6.12.2004  
 Michael Starks 8.12.2004  
Meetings arranged 
during the trip 
Professor emeritus Vincent Porter 2.12.2004 
 Dr. Peter Goodwin 8.12.2004 
 Professor  Stewart Purvis 30.11.2004 
Field trips Voice of the Listener and Viewer  30.11.2004 
 Field visit to BBC television centre  10.12.2004 
See Appendices 8.1 and 8.1 relating to the interviewed persons.  
Data collection plan 
7.6.1.2.1.1 Document retrieval and analysis 
Social networks 
Content analysis 
7.6.1.2.1.2 Interviews 
The interviews were held in the London area, during a stay in the United Kingdom 
between November 27 and December 14, 2004. An hour and a half was asked for 
each interview. The actual time for the interview was between one and two hours. The 
interviews were taped on every occasion and the transcripts were made 24 hours after 
the interviews. Separate notes were made during the interviews. The ‘research diary’ 
notes include insights perceived during the session.  
Expected preparation prior to site visits 
Internet search on the person, current and prior affiliations 
Careful checking of the question list 
7.6.1.3 Outline of case study report 
The report follows the structure of a normal dissertation. 
The empirical part consists the following elements: historical setting with overview of 
technology, actors, and institutions, which is followed by the ‘story’ of competition. 
New elements are added if needed. 
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7.6.1.4 Case study questions 
Open-ended questions concentrated on the launch of digital television, the evolving 
competition and its consequences. The introduction and the first questions are for the 
interviewee and the interviewer to orientate to the situation. The later questions aim to 
reveal the emphasis of competitive actions that major firms made. The interviewed 
people were asked to evaluate the diffusion not only on their own and on their 
organisations behalf, but to also consider the views customers and other participants 
had.   
Introduction to the interviewees given by the interviewer 
“The focus of this study is the competitive strategies of the television firms in the 
early years of digital television 1998-2002. My aim is to describe what actions major 
firms took and why, and what implications those actions had on the firms and society. 
I focus on competition between firms, especially between digital television channel 
packager i.e. satellite, terrestrial and cable platform operators. There is competition at 
several levels, between programs and between channels and between packagers. 
These interviews reveal different aspects of the problem, and with the other sources of 
information give the overall picture of the digital diffusion. I will use quotes, but I 
will not cite your name after the quote. Please, use examples and names of the 
companies because real world examples illustrate the dynamics in a clear way. “  
7.6.1.4.1.1 Personal affiliation to the empirical domain 
Describe your position in the time period between 1998-2002. 
7.6.1.4.1.2 The industry outlook in 1998-1999  
What firms, organisations, or regulatory bodies were the major actors leading the 
introduction of digital television? Give your personal insights on who had the 
initiative, and how they showed it? (Why) 
How did the industry present the introduction of digital television? Was is it MORE 
of the same traditional TELEVISION OR a NEW PRODUCT, or service offering 
altogether?  
7.6.1.4.1.3 Reasons for complementor entry and early adoption 
What was the importance of installed base of OLD ANALOGUE CUSTOMERS 
when new customers and new firms were thinking about digital television market? 
If we take viewer’s angle to the digitalisation, what role did TECHNOLOGICAL 
PERFORMANCE of channel packager’s platform play among the first adopters at the 
LAUNCH?  
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What about the other television participants e.g. providers of channels, software, set-
top boxes etc. what was the importance of technological performance of the platform 
for THEM? Examples. 
Did the situation change AFTER the launch? 
Still having the view of complementary product or service provider. Think back to a 
situation where a firm was considering introducing new product or service to one of 
the platforms operated by another company: What was the importance of offered 
VARIETY in the existing service of that platform? Was the variety i.e. number, or 
quality of other firms and channels already present a positive or negative sign. 
What OTHER FACTORS contributed to the rise of number of channels and other 
services? Price, or terms in the contract… 
Again, if we think about viewers… Compare the aspects of VARIETY to PRICE for 
customers? Did the preferences change?  
Switching from one platform to another may cost money or time. How did these 
SWITCHING COSTS affect firms’ behaviour in early digitalisation?  
Packagers offered a growing number of services to a growing number of customers, 
let’s call that totality as a platform network. What importance did this NETWORK 
SIZE have on further adoptions?   
7.6.1.4.1.4 Core product provider competition 
Did competition push the channel packagers to offer MORE VARIETY and 
distinctiveness or did the packagers IMITATE what the others were doing? 
Were there any COMPETITIVE PHASES, BREAKING POINTS that changed rules 
of the game, looks or feels of television, industry leadership? What kind of 
competitive actions packager firms during those phases? 
What’s your view on how sponsoring the platforms affect packagers network and 
industry as a whole? 
What about competitive bidding for television rights. Can you describe the 
importance of that in 98-02?   
HOW DID YOU and your organisation VIEW the COMPETITION of the packagers? 
Was it good, or bad, did it require your action, or was there a need to wait how the 
events would unfold? Did the competition help, or harm the industry, and society?  
7.6.1.4.1.5 Managing expectations 
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Participants active in digital television are much in public. Did the firms and other 
bodies MANAGE people’s and other firm’s EXPECTATIONS on diffusion and about 
the companies, and if so, how? What was the importance of this media presence? 
Did the firms SUPPLY what they PROMISED? Was there a particular reason for the 
over/undersupply of quantity/quality? 
I will try to give a good account of the dynamics in the diffusion. In order to help me 
in this quest is there something you would like to add on your behalf?     
7.6.1.4.1.6 QUESTIONS IN RESERVE 
How did imitative behaviour manifest itself? 
Variety has both qualitative and quantitative aspects. In the packagers television 
offering which were more dominant and did the situation change?  
I have noticed that the privately owned companies have strong hesitation to studies 
like this, compared to others. Do you have any suggestions why?  
7.6.2 Principal news sources 
 
Information on the publisher of Digital TV group news site filed 1.10.2004:  
 The Digital TV Group (DTG) is the industry association for Digital 
Television in the UK: an independent body facilitating the rapid roll-out 
of digital television and convergence across the communications industry. 
Its membership stretches from camera to consumer; from the BBC, 
BSkyB and OFCOM to Sony, Philips and Panasonic, Dixons and Comet 
through to the Consumers' Association, RNIB and RNID. Its agenda 
covers all aspects of future technology, public affairs and the setting, 
promotion and interpretation of standards and good practice.  
The DTG was formed in 1995 to set technical standards for the 
implementation of digital terrestrial television (DTT) in the UK and now 
encompasses all digital TV platforms and convergence issues on a world-
wide basis.  
The DTG acts as a technical clearing house, publicising the work of 
members and providing a user-group to implementers around the world. It 
has established a wholly-owned subsidiary, DTG testing Ltd (web site), to 
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provide interoperability testing services to the industry. The DTG also 
fulfils marketing and regulatory roles on behalf of its members and the 
industry.  
Membership of the DTG is open to all companies involved in digital TV 
broadcasting on all platforms with a commitment to published standards 
and open markets.  
The DTG supports DVB standards and a non-discriminatory approach that 
will enable an open and competitive market in service provision, receivers 
and conditional access, which is consistent with the European Union 
Directive on Television Transmission Standards. The DTG D-Book (3rd 
Edition published June 1998, with subsequent revisions) sets out the 
detailed technical standards for digital terrestrial television in the UK.  
DTG membership brings a range of benefits to any organisation in the 
digital television industry. The fundamental benefits for most are being 
able to participate in the development and implementation of important 
technical standards and to have a voice in activities that influence the 
regulatory regime. The DTG has an impressive record of forming a broad 
industry consensus and speaking with authority on many important issues 
to the great collective benefit of its many member companies.  
In addition, DTG activities provide members with:  
a regular forum to discuss latest technical developments  
a regular forum to formulate important communications within the 
industry  
a recognised mechanism for lobbying government and regulatory bodies  
free subscription to Digital News - the magazine of the DTG  
opportunities to promote specific member activities within the industry  
general networking opportunities  
preferential rates for receiver and application testing at DTG Testing Ltd  
close contact with companies active in UK DVB-T implementation  
access to the UK D-Book receiver specification, and other technical 
publications and confidential information via the members-only DTG ftp 
site.  
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opportunity to participate in the technical work of the DTG, through the 
activities of the working groups** (see section on Structure)  
The DTG creates an environment that enables its members to:  
investigate and specify important technical standards  
influence the shape of the regulatory regime  
communicate effectively with each other  
Over 100 member organisations value the business benefits that arise from 
first-hand participation in such activities. 
 
Information on Advanced.television.com news site and its publisher, filed on 
1.10.2004: 
www.advanced-television.com is published by Advanced Television Ltd. 
The company also publishes the leading industry journal Euromedia and is 
therefore able to offer advertisers a unique opportunity to run truly 
combined on and off-line campaigns. The principal of Advanced 
Television Ltd is Nick Snow who as head of 21st Century Publishing was 
responsible for the development of many leading media business titles 
including Cable and Satellite Europe and TBI-Television Business 
International. 
Quick Facts:  
October 2000: Launches at BCE 2000 
January 2001: Launches Friday File, a weekly email digest of the news 
stories carried on the site. 
May 2002: Launches Daily News, a daily email industry news service. 
Mailed at approximately 5pm London time it is in most recipients Inbox 
when they arrive at their desk in the morning. Quick Stats  
 
Latest site stats: May 2003 1st 
Feb  
30th Apr 
03 1st Feb 
30th Apr 
02 
Total Page mpressions  237,099 131,693 
Unique Visitors (Average/ onth)   26,885 18,671 
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Average Daily Sessions  
  2,426 1,506 
Total of Registered Users  7,383    
Total circulation of Daily   16,000*    
Total circulation of Friday File  33,000*     
*In addition to our Registered Users these names are hand picked from 
our over-all mailing lists which total some 65,000 email addresses. The 
criteria for all these names as a minimum qualification is that they have 
visited at least one of the following industry events within the last two 
years: Mediacast, BCE, Casbaa, IBC. 
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7.7 Binary categorisation of configurations  
 
 
 
 
No.  Centrality  Example Platform Example BSkyB Example Digital Example Imitation Example  
1 Present ”British Digital 
Broadcasting (BDB) is to 
spend a minimum of 
£553.7 million subsidising 
the take-up of digital 
terrestrial TV (DTG 
9.1.1998)”  
Present See, 
centrality 
column 
Present “..free STB to 
customers spending 
more than £200 on 
a new TV in May, 
may match BSkyB”  
( DTG 6.4.1999) 
Present ”Selected customers of 
BSkyB's current analogue 
service will be invited to take a 
decoder to allow reception of 
the first transmissions of 
digital television in the UK.” 
(DTG 6.4.1998) 
Present see, BSkyB column 
2 Present "Ondigital accused 
Rupert Murdoch's BSkyB 
of failing to honour its 
contract to supply Sky 
Sports 2.” (DTG 
9.9.1999) 
Present See, 
centrality 
column 
Present see, centrality 
column 
Absent Content also in analogue Present ”The deal means that 
Telewest will broaden 
the distribution of Sky 
One, already the UK's 
most-watched non-
terrestrial channel...” 
(DTG 14.9.2002) 
3 Present [BSkyB] "has accused 
ITV of "withholding its 
channels (from Sky 
Digital) for private gain." 
(DTG 6.6.1998) 
Present See, 
centrality 
column 
Absent  Absent  Present see, centrality column 
  201 
 
4 Present " ’Football is the key 
driving force behind 
take-up of pay 
television… A pay 
television platform 
cannot be reliant upon 
a competitor for its key 
channels, so it was 
essential that we 
started to generate our 
own premium content," 
said Mr Prebble” (DTG 
11.7.2001) 
Present see, 
centrali
ty 
column 
Present see, 
centrality 
column 
Absent  Present ” ’ ..there must be some sports rights 
Sky don’t have. Let’s buy them!’. So, 
that’s what they did, they bought 
second-tier sports rights, they paid 
crazy prizes for them (Interviewee 2) 
5 Present ”…reminded the 
audience of the BBC's 
determination to 
remain at the heart of 
broadcasting with a 
wide variety of free-to-
air channels. He looked 
forward to new 
children's programming 
on digital TV that 
wouldn't depend on 
imported cartoon” 
(DTG 15.11.1999) 
Absent see, 
centrali
ty 
column 
Absent see, 
centrality 
column 
Absent "Sky aims to be the leading 
provider of entertainment, 
information and communication 
to the British home in the 
information age. The addition 
of radio services to Sky digital 
further enhances digital 
satellite television” (DTG 
20.10.1999) 
Absent “BSkyB has donated three years of 
transponder capacity to The 
Community Channel” (DTG 5.11.1999) 
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6 Present "From a standing start to 
almost half a million 
subscribers in less than a 
year is a remarkable feat. 
Unlike satellite and cable 
every one of our customers 
is new." (DTG 10.10.1999)  
Present ”The switch to digital appears 
to be racing ahead of all 
predictions! BSkyB's 
announcement last week that 
they have reached 4.1million: 
add on more than 900,000 
Ondigital digital 
subscribers,[…] 350,000 and 
150,000 from ntl and 
Telewest ”(DTG 10.11.2001)  
Present see, 
platform 
column 
Absent  Present see, centrality column 
7 Absent  Present “Telewest talks to buy 
General Cable; also 
seeking...two London and 
Birminham franchises” (DTG 
14.4.1998)   
Absent  Absent ”The headline 
news from 
Telewest today 
is that the 
company has 
now converted 
almost half its 
TV subscriber 
base to digital - 
532,000 (DTG 
6.6.2001). 
Present see, platform 
column,;“[NTL to] Acquire 
ComTel and Diamond...[in 
a ]...£1.4million deal” 
(DTG 17.6.1998); “NTL 
Buys Eastern Group...said 
to be worth £90 million” 
(DTG 29.12.1998) 
8 Absent "Grundig, Hitachi, 
Matsushita, Philips, Sharp, 
Sony, Thomson and 
Toshiba had created draft 
specifications that would 
enable digital AV appliances 
to be interconnected and 
interoperated in an 
integrated home network 
system." (DTG 20.4.1998) 
Absent see, centrality column Absent see, 
centrality 
column 
Presen
t 
see, centrality 
column 
Absent ”[ITN] said that ntl are the 
perfect partner to exploit 
the opportunities offered 
by new technology and 
digital broadcasting, 
including interactivity and 
Enhanced Television, 
which will distinguish the 
channel from its 
competitors. ”(DTG 
18.2.2000) 
  203 
 
 
9 Present “Our successful 
relationship with OpenTV 
allows the BBC to deliver a 
groundbreaking service like 
Wimbledon Interactive that 
puts BBC viewers in the 
thick of the action like 
never before and offers 
them unprecedented 
choice,..”(DTG 16.5.2001) 
Absent ”Viewer feedback tells 
us that there is an 
untapped demand for 
late-night adult 
entertainment," said 
Two Way TV 
commercial director 
Jean de Fougerolles. 
’We are constantly 
looking for new and 
innovative formats to 
drive revenues through 
our games channel’” 
(DTG 19.6.2002) 
Absent see, 
centrality 
column; “Are 
the British 
catching on 
to 
interactivity 
at last? If so, 
it's Big 
Brother what 
done it!” 
(DTG 
19.6.2001)  
Present see, 
centrality 
column 
Absent see, centrality column; 
”Big Brother has 
confounded critics of 
enhanced TV, and proved 
how a creative approach 
can be a real hit with TV 
viewers.”(DTG 19.6.2001) 
10 Absent ”Telewest 
Communications, has 
bought Rapid Travel 
Solutions, a software 
company that links travel 
companies to an online 
booking system. This will 
enable people to view 
video clips of hotels and 
holiday resorts.”(DTG 
5.6.2001)  
Absent "Bargainholidays.com is 
to target Hull-based 
digital TV viewers 
through its new service 
on Kingston interactive” 
(DTG 8.7.2002). 
Present “[Open is] 
offering the 
first 
largescale 
opportunity 
for e-
commerce 
from the TV 
(DTG 
12.10.1999)  
Present see, 
centrality 
and 
BSkyB 
columns 
Absent  
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11 Absent "Instead of just 
watching adverts, 
viewers across the 
country can now 
find out more 
about advertisers' 
products and even 
buy them straight 
away." (DTG 
27.3.2000) 
Absent see, centrality column Present "Britain's first 
interactive television 
commercial will be 
screened this week 
on Sky Digital.”(DTG 
27.3.2000) 
Present see, BSkyB  column Absent  
12 Absent  Present ”Consumers in NTL's 
broadband cable franchises 
are now free to choose 
Freeserve Broadband as part 
of bundles with cable 
telephony and TV 
packages.”(14.5.2002) 
Absent “[NTL offers] cut-
price phone 
services,Internet 
and e-mail via 
phone.” (DTG 
24.4.1998) 
Present “It’s very much bundled 
service, not exclusively 
digital TV. Also, they 
are now using some of 
that bandwidth, some of 
the capacity to develop 
broadband services, 
which again adds 
features to the bundle 
of services they [cable 
companies] offer. 
(Interviewee 2] 
Present ”[BSkyB] said their aim 
was to compete 
effectively with the 
cable industry, which 
will launch digital 
cable later this year ” 
(DTG 6.4.1999) 
I don’t think that 
people or that many 
people would by it for 
the digital television, 
but if you want digital 
television AND 
telephony then it’s 
probably a good 
option. Sky has 
responded to it by 
offering its own 
telephony (Interviewee 
2) 
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13 Present “The BBC decided that not 
only [it] could not be left 
behind…[from the launch of 
digital satellite, but had to be 
active] (Interviewee 1) "BBC 
and Sky have agreed terms 
for the carriage of BBC free-
to-air services on Sky 
Digital” (DTG 6.6.1998) 
 
Absent  Absent  Present “Satellite in digital is very 
different than satellite in 
analogue. It is much 
wider product, broader 
appeal, it is value 
addition to analogue. 
And you pay the same 
and get many more 
channels. (Interviewee 3) 
Absent see, digital 
column 
14 Absent  Present ”BDB would charge a 
subscription rate of 
under £10 per month, 
aiming its services at 
’the families of middle 
England’ who had not 
been attracted to take 
BSkyB services” (DTG 
8.5.1998) 
Present “Because, Sky very 
much is a market 
leader and it has I 
think pretty much 
dictated how other 
people were able to 
sell their packages.” 
(Interviewee 2) 
Present “So, you get 
multiplication of 
channels, but not 
necessarily multiplication 
of original content. The 
viewer things he is 
getting more…” 
(Interviewee 3) 
Present “[ITV Digital] it 
was forced to 
sell its packages 
in very similar 
ways 
(Interviewee 2) 
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8 REFERENCES 
 
8.1 Semi-structured interviews 
• Dame Patricia Hodgson was Chief Executive of the Independent Television 
Commission (ITC), which was the regulatory body for commercial television 
prior until the establishment of Ofcom at the end of 2003. Prior to joining the 
ITC in 2000, she was the Main Board Director at the BBC responsible for 
Policy and Planning, a post she held for eight years. Her early career was spent 
as a radio and TV producer and journalist. She is a commissioner for Statistics 
Commission, a member of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, a non-
executive Director of GWR Group PLC and a non-executive Director of the 
Competition Commission, and a governor at the Wellcome Trust. She was 
awarded a CBE in 1995 for services to broadcasting. Interview held 
11/30/2004, at Wellcome.  
• Allan Williams is Senior Policy Advisor of Consumers Association ‘Which?’. 
Interview held 12/3/2004, at Consumers Association ‘Which?’. 
• Julian McGougan is BBC Public Policy Senior Advisor, formerly worked as a 
policy adviser for commercial television regulator ITC, and earlier worked for 
telecommunications regulator Oftel. Interview held on 12/6/2004 at BBC  
• Michael Starks is the Project Manager at Department of Trade and Industry for 
the UK’s Digital TV Action Plan – the joint government-industry project 
designed to inform Ministers’ decisions on the UK’s full switchover to digital 
television. He formerly directed the BBC’s free-to-view Digital TV project 
(Freeview), Earlier he was BBC’s director of Customer Service, the Controller 
of the BBC Digital Broadcasting, and the founding Chairman of the industry-
wide Digital TV Group. Interview held on 12/8/2004 at DTI. 
8.2 Informal interviews 
• Professor emeritus Vincent Porter, University of Westminster, School of 
Media, Arts and Design, acted formerly as a professor of mass 
communications. Discussion on the 2nd of December, 2004 in London. 
• Dr. Peter Goodwin, University of Westminster Communication and Media 
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industry. Discussion on the 8th December, 2004, at University of Westminster. 
• Professor of Television Journalism Stuart Purvis at London City University 
and Financial Times columnist, former Editor of Independent Television News 
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